



The rule Of reason

Containing the Arte of
Logique.

Set forth in English, and newly
corrected by Thomas Vvilson.

Wherunto is added a table, for the ease
of the Reader.



[illegible]

The South Sea as a Kingdom
 in the North Sea as a Kingdom, is
 not a Kingdom, but a Kingdom
 with a Kingdom, and a Kingdom
 but no Kingdom, and a Kingdom
 some Kingdom, and a Kingdom
 crown and a Kingdom, like a Kingdom

To the most excellent
Prince, and our most redoubted
souereigne Lord Edward the sixt, by
the grace of God King of England,
fraunce, and Ireland, Defendour of
the faith, and of the Churches of En-
gland, and Irelande, in pearth the su-
preme heade, your moste faithfull
and obedient subiect Thomas
Vvilson wisheth long life
with moste prosper
ouse Reigne.



If my power & ha-
bilite were answere-
table to my good
wil, most excellent
Prince and soue-
reigne Lord, this token of mine
humble duetie which I now offer
unto your Maiestie, shoulde be
as great & pfectouse, as by rea-
son of the contrarie, it is base and
tender. wherefore I most hum-
bly beseeche your Maiestie in no

A.ii. worse

The Epistle to

worſe part to accepte this litle
offre, the as the preſent of a true
faithful ſubiecte, whiche would
haue brought better, if hys po-
wer had bene thereafter. But fol-
lowing the example of poze men
in the auncient hiftories of Plu-
tarche, and other wryters much
commended: I offre vnto your
highnes parte of ſuche fructes
as haue growen in a poore ſtu-
dētes garden. This fruit being
of a ſtraunge kinde (ſuch as no
Engliſhe grounde hath befoze
this time, and in this ſorte by a-
ny tillage brought forth,) maye
perhaps at y^e firſte taſting, ſeeme
ſomewhat rough and harſh in
the mouth, becauſe of the ſtraū-
genesse: but after a litle uſe, and
familier accuſtoming thereun-
to, I doubt not but theſame wil
ware

the King.

waxe euery one day moze pleasaunt then other. But in simple and playne wordes to declare vnto your Maiesty, wherin my wit and earnest endeuout hath at this season trauailed: I haue assaied through my diligence to make Logique as familier to the Englishman, as by diuerse mennes industries the most part of other the lyberall Sciences are. For considering the forwardnesse of this age, wherein, the very multitude are prompt & ripe in all Sciences that haue by any mans diligence bene sett forth vnto them: weighing also that the capacitie of my countrymen the Englishnaciō is so pre-gnaunt and quicke to achue any kynde, or Arte of knowlege, wherunto it may attayne, that

A.iii. they

The Epistle to

they are not inferiour to any other: And farther pōdering that diuerse learned mē of other cōtreis haue heretofore for the furtheraunce of knowlege, not suffred any of the Sciences liberal to be hidden in the Greeke, or Latine tongue, but haue with most earnest trauaile made euery of them familiar to their vulgare people: I thought that Logique among all other beyng an Arte as apte for the English wittes, & as profitable for there knowlege as any the other Sciences are, myght with as good grace be sette forth in the English, as the other Artes, heretofore haue bene. And therefore I haue so farre as my slender practise hath enabled me, enterprised to ioyne an acquaintance betwiene Logique

gique, and my countrimē, from
 the whiche they haue beene he-
 therto barred, by tongues vna-
 quainted. Notwithstanding I
 must nedes cōfesse, that y^e prin-
 ter herof your Maiesties Ser-
 uant prouoked me firste here-
 vnto, vnto whome I haue euer
 found my selfe greatly behol-
 dyng, not onely at my beyng in
 Cambrige, but also at al tymes
 els, when I moost neded helpe.
 But as touching the thing self,
 though I haue not done it with
 so good perfectiō as the worthi-
 nesse of the Arte requireth, oz as
 some other better learned could
 do: yet I hope that wheras now
 it is dedicated vnto your high-
 nesse, and so made commune to
 all: my good will shall want no
 fauozers in that I haue first la-
 boz

The Epistle to

bouzed to bryg so noble a maist-
resse both of teasō & iudgemēt,
acquainted with so noble a coun-
try, & here to be made of a stran-
ger a fre Denison: wherin I ta-
ke not vpon me so conningly, &
perfectly to haue wrytten of the
said arte, as though none could
do it better: but because no En-
glishman vntil now hath gone
thzough with this entrepryse, I
haue thought mete to declare y
it may be done. And yet herein
I pzoesse it to be but a spurre
oz a whetstone, to sharp the pē-
nes of some other, that thei may
polish, and perfaict, that I haue
rudely & grossely entred. And
albeit I do herein take vpon me
no more but to bee as a pooze
meane man, oz a simple persone
whose charge wer to be a lodes-
man

the King.

man to conuey some noble prin-
cesse into a straunge land wher
she was neuer before, leauyng
the entreteyning, the enrichyng
and the deckyng of her to suche
as were of substance and furni-
ture accoꝝding: yet if this work
may now at the first entraunce,
haue the saufe coꝝduict and pro-
tection of youre mooste Royall
Maiesty, I trust it shal in pro-
cesse appere, and proue, that I
haue not altogether in vain ta-
ken vpon me this straunge la-
bour, but rather to verpe good
purpose and effect attēpted the-
same. I knowe, your grace for
your owne study litle nedeth a-
ny helpe of suche an Englyshe
treatise, beyng so wel traueiled
both in the Greke & in the Latin
for the same purpose, throughe
A. v the

The Epistle to

the helpe of those right worthe
men Sir Ihon Cheke, and Sir
Anthony Cooke, your Maiesties
teachers & Schole maistres
in all good literature. But to
fede & to satisfie the thirste and
desire of suche Englishemen as
for defaulte of thesaid tongues
could otherwise not come to the
knowlege of Logique: I haue
iudged it labour worth to geue
þ Preceptes & Rules therof in
English, that al men according
to the gifte that to euery one is
measured, may be the moze pro-
uoked to follow the Examples
of your maiesty aswell in studi-
ousnes and desire of knowlege,
as also in the exercise of all ver-
tue, and princely worthynesse,
wherinto your grace hath made
a goodly entrie. In whiche most
godly

the King.

godly trade if your grace shall
continue together with the feare
of God, and the moste reuerent
obseruacion of his most holy cō-
maundementes, and Gospell,
(wherein at this daie al Englād
to their incomparable ioye and
comforte doth see and find your
Matiesties chief delite to be) it
cannot be doubted, but that the
same shalbe to the wicked a ter-
rour, to the godly a comforte, to
this Realme of England, a per-
petuall defence and sauegarde,
and to al Christian Kynge, ei-
ther now liuyng oz hereafter to
come, an example of Kyngly
worthynesse, and a myrroure of
Pryncely gouernaunce. And
where as to the most noble Kin-
ges of Israel and Iuda, the lord
for their sundrie vertues gaue
sundry

The Epistle to

sundry giftes of his grace (as to
Dauid his dearling puissance,
and might against his enemies
to Salomon, wisdome and ri-
ches: To Aza, innocencie of life
and purenes of religion, to Jo-
saphat, prudence of kyngly re-
giment, to set good Ministres
and officers vnder him: to good
King Iosias, the aduancemēt
of Goddes true seruice, and the
rooting vp of Idolatry: to Jo-
athan, a long, and prosperous
Reigne in al godly rest & quiet-
nes:) al these noble giftes, of re-
gal excellency, shal the lord your
guide, and gouernour, vouches-
safe to powre vpon your high-
nes, to endue you withall, in
whome are nowe planted suche
graffes of his heauenly Grace,
as the fructe hereafter is moost
like

the King.

like to be incomparable. Which
thyng that it maye so bee, youte
Majesty hath and perpetually
shall haue, the dayly, and inces-
saunte Prayers of all vs your
most faithfull louing subiectes,
for the long & prosperouse reig-
ne of your highnes, to the glozy
of God, & the honour and prin-
cely dignitie of your Real-
mes, and Dominions
long to endure.

Amen.

GVALTERVS HADDONVS
Cantabrigiensis, Legū Doctor
et Regius in iure civili professor.

Grammaticæ, lingua nos est affata Britāna,
Curreret ut Latij lingua Britāna rotis.
Nunc λογικὴ uenit, et nostris se uocibus ef
Ut ratio nostros possit habere sonos. (fert
Ante, peregrinis linguis instructa fuisti
Anglia, nunc propria discere uoce potes.
Grammaticen laudat oēs, quia uerba poluit:
Qualis erat λογικὴ nos ratione regens.
Attulit hanc, nostras Thomas wilsonus ad aures
Vtilis et patriæ sic fuit ille suæ.

THOMAS VVILSON
nus, Lectori. S. D.

Si sit amor λογικῆς, uel honesti sit tibi cura
Quæ tibi sunt usu nota, docere decet.
Instruit ars mentem, uel disce uel ipse doceto
Vtere si placeat, corrige, si libeat.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637
OFFICE OF THE DEAN
OF THE FACULTY

Dear Mr. [Name]:
I have your letter of [Date] regarding [Subject].
The [Department] has [Action] and [Reason].
I am [Status] and [Action].
Very truly yours,
[Signature]

[Text block containing several lines of faint, illegible text, likely a continuation of the letter or a separate section.]

[Text block containing several lines of faint, illegible text, likely a continuation of the letter or a separate section.]

[Text block containing several lines of faint, illegible text, likely a continuation of the letter or a separate section.]

The arte of fol. I.
Logique.

Euery cause that manne doth handle, this one lesson should first be learned. Neuer to entre vpon any matter, nor yet once to talke, without good aduise-ment. Artes therfore wer inuēted, wise men are yet for the same cause esteemed, and sage counsaillors had in muche honoz. In consideration wherof, Aristotle, in whom nature hath poured her graces plētifully, teacheth by preceptes, in all our doynges, to take good aduise. It is alwaies right needful (saith he) by these iij. especiall pointes to examine euery matter, before we take in hand to teach it any other. Firſte, to knowe whether the thynge be or no, wherof we entreat. Again, what it is in substance, & by the awne nature. Thirdly, what maner of thynge it is. Fourthly, wherefore, or to what ende it is. Now, in talkyng of Logique, I nede not to question, whether Logique be or no. for he that knoweth reason to be in man, and the same geuē

Four questions necessary to be made of any matter, before we dispute.

B. i. by

The arte

by the greate might of God: muste nedes cōfesse, that Logique also is in mā, and that onely by God. For there is none other difference, betwixt the one and the other, but that (Logique) is a Greke worde, and (Reason) is an Englishe worde.

And therefore, he that spekethe Logique, speaketh nothynge els but reason. yea, ther be many Greke wordes, made Englishe, wherof all men haue not the meanynge. As for example. A yong man of Cambrige, sittynge in his chamber, with twoo or thre of his felowes, and happenynge to fall in talke of a woman then lately married to a Scholer, when every one had said his fantasie, as well of the manne, as of the woman, comparynge the qualities of the one, with the properties of the other, sayng their pleasure every one of the, of her beautie and her body, pro et contra: this yong man choppynge in with his reason, saied: I cannot tell my Maisters, but surely I for my part, take her for a catholike woman, let other men thinke what thei list. When his felowes hard this

this dyle report, thei laughed apace, as knowyng by their learnyng. What this woorde ment. For (Catholike) beyng a Greke woorde, signifieth nothyng in Englishe, but vniuersall or common. And we call in English a common woꝛ mā an euill woman of her body. Therefore, though termes bee darke, and the meanyng vnkowen to many, yet the truth enclosed, is alwaies one, and geue vs of God, vse what termes we list. This then perceiued, that Logique is the rule of reason, I thinke it as needlesse, to aske whether it bee or no, as to aske, whether any mā can speake or no. Thus ye se, we muste trie Logique by the second question, learnyng thereby, to knowe firste of all, what is the substance and nature thereof.

The definition of Logique.



Logicque is an arte to reason probably, on bothe partes, of all matters that bee put furth, so farre as the nature of euery thyng can beare.

What Logique is in substance.

In declarpyng what maner of thyng Logique is, we must vnderstande that

what maner of thyng Logique is.

W.ij.

all

The arte

all thynges happenyng, or the whiche do fall in controuerlie, & maie through reason fully bee examined, are in this question euermore considered. It happeneth therefore to Logique, and accidentally also belongeth to the same, vpon all thynges to entreate, whiche commonly by witte are examined, or maie through reason at al be discussed. Neither can we do any thyng, without the help of reason, to guyde all our acciōs.

Wherefore, or to
what ende Logi-
que is.

Manne, by nature hath a sparke of knowlege, and by the secrete workyng of God, iudgeth after a sort, and discerneth good from euil. Before the fall of Adam, this knowlege was perfect, but through offēce, darknesse folowed, and the bright light was takē awaie. Wise men therfore, consideryng the weaknesse of mannes witte, and the blyndnesse also, wherein we are al drowned: inuented this arte, to helpe vs the rather, by a naturall order, to finde out the truthe. For though before Adams fall, knowlege was naturall, and came without labor, yet no one man can now of hymself, attain the truthe in al thynges

Of Logique. Fol. 3.

ges, without help & diligent learning.

The deuision of Logique.

This arte is deuided into two partes. The first part standeth in framing of thynges aptly together, and knittynge wordes for the purpose accordyngly, and in latine is called Iudicium.

Iudicium.

The second part consisteth, in finding out matter, and searching stuffe, agreeable to the cause, and in Latine is called Inuentio.

Inuentio.

For you must vnderstand, that when one goeth about to proue any thyng, he must first inuēt somewhat to proue his cause, the whiche when he hath doene: he must vse iudgement, bothe in framing the same reason so inuented, & also to see whether it serueth for y^e purpose or not

And now some will saie, that I should first speake of the finding out of an argument, before I should teache the way how to frame an argument. Truth it is, that naturally we finde a reason or we begin to fashio the same. And yet notwithstanding, it is more mete that the ordering of an argument should be

W. iij.

first

The arte

first handled: forasmuche as it shall no more profit a mā, to find out his argument, except he first knowe, how to order the same, & to shape it accordyngly, (which he doth not yet perfectly know) then stones or timber, shall profite the Mason or Carpēter, whiche knoweth not how to worke vpon the same. A reason is easlier found, then fashioned, for euery man cā geue a reason naturally and without art, but howe to fashion and frame the same, accordyng to arte, none cā do at all, except thei be lerned. Therfore, because euery mannes wit, canne geue lightly a reason of diuerse thynges, without any learnyng at all, euen by the instincte of nature, and yet not be able to set the same in order scho- lerlike, either to proue, or to cōfute: I purpose first to shew, the maner of mak- kyng an argument (as whiche is more nedefull) next after that, the maner of findyng of an argument, and the places where all argumentes dooe rest. And last of all, the capcious or decepti- full argumentes, as thei bee in Ari- stotle,

Of Logique. Fol. 4.

A brief declaration in metre, of the se-
uen liberall Artes, wherein Logique
is comprehended as one of them.

Ramer doth teache to viter wordes
To speake bothe apt and plain.

Logique by art, setteth furthe the truthe,
And doth tell what is vain.

Rethorique at large paintes well the cause
And makes that seme right gaie,

Whiche Logique spake but at a worde,
And taught as by the waie.

Musike with tunes, delightes the eare:
And makes vs thynke it heauen:

Arithmetique by number can make
Rekenynges to be eauen.

Geometry, thynges thicke and brode,
Measures by line and square:

Astronomie by sterres doth tell:
Of foule and eke of faire.

The difference betwene Lo-
gique and Sophistrie.

Logique otherwise called Dia-
lect (for thei are both one) is an
arte to trie the corne from the
chaffe, the truthe from enery
Willie, falshed

The arte

The difference
betwene Logi-
que & Sophistrie

falshed, by defining the nature of any thynge, by diuidyng the same, and also by knittynge together true argumêtes, and vntwinyng all knottie subtilties, that are bothe false, and wrongfully framed together.

Sophistrie is euer occupied, either in prouyng the truthe, alwaies to bee false, or els that, whiche is false to bee true, so that euermore, one part of the argumêt is either false, by vsyng some ambiguous word, or by not wel applyng it to the purpose, or els not framyng it, accordyng to the rules: so that a skilfull artificer, maie sone putte the vain Sophister to silence, by openyng the fraude, and declaryng the crafte of his inuencion. Whereas otherwise an argument, made by the rules of Logique cannot be auoyded, but must nedes bee true, whosoever saie naie. And so muche more is Logique to be preferred before Sophistrie, as he is the more to bee esteemed, that telleth a true tale, then he, whiche telleth a lye. And euen as a Grammarian is better liked, that speketh true and good Latine, then he
is

is that speaketh false: euen so Logique of it self is good. Whē Sophistry on the other side is naught. And well may we saie, that Sophisters are like those, whiche plaie with false Dice, & would make other beleue that thei are true, or els properly to terme thē, thei bee like those that go for honest men & are none

The difference betwene Logique and Rethorique.

Whe these Artes are muche like, sauing that Logique is occupied aboute all matters, and doeth plainly and nakedly set furth with apt words, the some of thinges, by the waie of argumentacion. Again of thother side, Rethorique vseth gaie painted sentences, & setteth furth those matters with freshe colours and goodly ornamentes, and that at large. In somuche, that zeno beyng asked the difference, betwene Logique and Rethorique, made answer by demonstracion of his hande, declaring that when his hand was closed, it resembled Logique, when it was open and stretched out, it was like Rethorique.

The difference
betwene Logique
and Rethorique.

W. v.

The

The arte

The office of Logique.

The office of
Logique.



Logique professeth to teache
truely, orderly, and plainly.
And here wee make see, how
vniuersall this commoditie
is, & how largely it extendeth, not ones-
ly to knowe worldly affaires: but also
to knowe God, & all his heuenly wor-
kes, so farre as nature may cōprehend.

The partes of
Logiques duetie
or office.

There bee foure partes of this of-
fice or duetie, whereunto Logique is
bounde. That is: To define the nature
of every thyng, to diuide, to knit true
argumentes, and vnknit false.

Of questions.

This same maner of knittynge
wordes in due order, beyng one
of the partes of Logique, or ra-
ther Logique it self, sheweth
the maner of questiōs which otherwise
are ether propolicōis, or seueral wordes.
A question is either a worde or sentēce
put furthe, as when I aske what suche
a thyng is, and would knowe another
manues aduise therein, as thus: What is
man? What is truth? What is ambiciō?
Euery questiō is either single or dou-
ble,

ble. A single question resteth in a single word, as thus. What is frendship? What is Philosophie? A double question standeth not in one word, but in two severall sentences, as thus. Is the study of philosophie praise worthy, or is it not?

Likewise a propolition, whiche is a sentence, vttered in plain wordes expressly, signifying either truthe or falsehood, is either single or double. A single propolition as thus: Wicked men cannot abide to reade the woorde of God. Of the which you may make a double propolition, by adding somewhat thereunto, as thus. Wicked men, not onely can thei not abide to read the woorde of God, but also thei seke, by all meanes possible, to ouerthrowe the same.

Of the .v. predicables, otherwise called the .v. comon wordes, which are spoken of other

When we go about to expound any matter, first we must begynne with the definition, to knowe the very nature of the thing, the whiche we cannot do, except we first learne the predicables, for thei shew the largenes and the narrownes
of

The arte

of wordes, how farre thei do extende, & how muche thei comprehend in them. As when I se one a farre of come vnto me, first I know that he is a man, then when he cometh nigher, I know whether he be of myne acquaintance or no. Likewise, when I go about to declare what one is, and to open the nature of any thyng, I vse the largest woordes, and so it must nedes bee, that I begin with þe predicables, because thei shewe how muche euery worde doth comprehend in it self, and how large or narrow it is. Thei be called Predicables, because some one thyng, is spoken of another. And thei are (as a mā would say) markes or notes of woordes that are spoken of many, shewyng how and by what maner thesame woordes are attributed to other. And euen as the childe beginneth with his crosse rowe, & the scholer with his eight partes of speche to the Logician first and formoste, professeth to know woordes, before he purporeth to knitte sentences. Neither is there any one worde, which is not comprehended, vnder one of these five common

mon woordes . And to this ende were those markes limited, that euery thing might bee knowen in his kynde. For if euery singular substance, of herbes, of stoues, and suche like, should haue a seueral name, neither the thynge self, nor yet the names could once bee comprehended in our memories. Therefore as euery thynge is topped by nature, one with another, so thei all beeing of one affinitie, are comprehended vnder one of these five common woordes.

<p>{</p> <p>Genus</p> <p>Species</p> <p>Differentia</p> <p>Proprium</p> <p>Accidens</p>	<p>{</p> <p>The generall worde.</p> <p>The kynde.</p> <p>The difference.</p> <p>The proprietie.</p> <p>The thynge chauncing or cleuyng to the substance.</p>

Genus is a generall worde, the which is spoken of many, that differ in their kynde: as when this question is asked, what it is. As animal. A liuing creature. Ars an Art. Virtus, vertue. Gemma. A precious stone. Or els thus, genus, is a generall worde, vnder the whiche diuerse kyndes or sortes of thynges, are comprehended, as vnder a liuing creature,

Genus?

The arte

ture are comprehended, men & beastes. Under arte, are comprehended, Logique, Grammer, Rethorique. &c. Every generall worde, hath diuerse kyndes and is spoken euermore, of them al. As gemma, a precious stone, comprehendeth in it self, a Saphire, a Rubie, a Chrystall, a Turkas : as thus. Saphirus est gemma. A Saphire is a precious stone And so of other.

Every generall worde, is two waies considered, and commonly called the chief generall, in Latin, genus summum, and the middle generall, in Latine, genus intermedium.

The chief general is so, that whereas it is in the hed of all, and aboue all, it can neuer become inferior, to bee of any kynde or sorte in thynges. As the substance, the qualitie, the quantitie, are euer chief generall wordes, and cannot be comprehended vnder any other.

The middle generall, is the same by being comprehended betwixt the chief generall, and the lowest kynd or sort in thynges, may bee also some kynde or forme it self, as a body, a liuing creature

a precious Stone, the whiche. in. beeyng compared with their inferiours, are generall wordes: beeyng referred to their superiours, they are Species. That is to saye. shapcs, kyndes, or sortes of thinges

Species, seu forma, the kind, or sort of any thyng, (comprehended vnder a woorde more vniuersall) is the same of whom the generall woorde, is spoken, when the question is asked, what it is. And when I aske, what is Justice? I answere a vertue. Therefore, in this propolition (Justice is a vertue) Justice is the kynde, and vertue is the generall woorde, whiche comprehendeth the said iustice, & is spoken of the same.

Or thus, Species is a cōmon woorde that is spoken of many, whiche differ onely in number, as man is spoken of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of euery proper name belōggyng to any mā. As Socrates is a man, Plato is a mā. Aristotle is a man.

Euery Species, or kind in thinges is of two sortes. The one is called the lowest kind, whiche is alwaies spoken of euery proper name, and euer is the

The kynde

kynde,

The arte

kynd, neyther can it at any tyme be the generall woorde, although somtyme it beare the name of the generall woorde. The other is called Species inter media, that is the kynde placed betwene the highest and the lowest, which at diuers tymes, and by diuerse considerations may bothe be the generall woorde and the kynd. For that whiche is vnder the generall woode, that same maie be called Species, or kynde, that whiche comprehendeth other, maie bee called the generall woode.

A Noun proper

A Noun proper, is that wherof the kinde is reherfed. As Cato est homo, Cato is a man: in this proposition Cato is the Noun proper, whiche belongeth to one man onely, and manne, is the kynd, which is more large and comprehendeth all men.

This

Of Logique. Fol. 9.

This Table sheweth the Ordre of every Substaunce, and kind, as they are appointed by nature, what the chief general wordes are, what the middle general are, what the lowest kindes in every thyng are, and what the kindes betwixt both are.

With body	{ A Sub- Staunce.	{ Without body: As	{ God. Angelles. Spirites. The soules of man.
Compounded of diuers ele- mentes	{ A body.	{ Without mixture As	{ The. iij. ele- mentes. fire. Ayer. Water. Earth. Heauen & all the planetes
Being ali- ue thyng	{ A body liuing.	{ Without life: As	{ Stones. Metalles. Liquores.
Having the sence of feeling	{ A body liuing.	{ Without sence of feeling as As: As	{ A Tree. a Shrubbe. an Hearbe.
Endued with reason.	{ A liuing creature.	{ Without the gift of reason: as Beastes, Birdes or fishes, some liuing.	{ Upon the land in the water. in the ayer, or in the both.
	{ A man: As	{	{ Scipio. Socrates. Alexander: and every so- uerain man liuing.

L. 7.

Diffes

The arte

The difference.

Differentia, that is to say the difference, is the same that is spoken of many which differ in forme and kynde, when the question is asked. What manner of thyng it is, as when wee saye. Quale quid est homo? What manner of thyng is a man? We must answer: He is endued with reason. If the question be asked what a man is: We must answer by his Genus, or generall worde, he is a liuyng creature. If the question be asked, what manner of thyng a Beaste is: Wee maie saye: He is without the gift of reason. Every difference that is moost proper to every thyng, is naturally and substantially ioynded to the kynde, which is comprehended vnder the generall worde.

The propriete.

Proprium, that is to say a propriete, is a natural pronenes, & maner of doing, which agreeth to one kynde, & to the same onely, & that evermore. And also may be spoken of the same kynde, and by conuersion the same kinde may be spoken of him also. As to speake & to haue power to laugh, both onely agre to mā, & to none other creature earthly. And

Of Logique. Fol. 10:

ly. And as I may say, who soeuer is a man, hath power geuen him of nature to speake: So may I also say by conuersiō backward, whosoever hath power geue him of nature to speake, that same body is a mā. To barke is propre to a dogge, & onely propre, & euermore propre. Ergo, whosoever hath power or rather an enclinaciō geue of nature to barke, that same is a dogge. And again, whatsoeuer creature is a dogge that same hath powre, or rather an enclinaciō to bark. To go vpight is propre to a man, & only to a man, & to none other liupng creature. Notwithstandyng ye muste mark one thyng, that although many men go croked & some also cannot speake: yet both to go vpight, & to speake are propre to al men generally, & therfore this rule serueth to auoid such obiections. Verba in definitionibus posita, non actū, sed potentiam significant. Which is asmuch to say, that wordes vled in definitiōs, do not signifie the very act in died, but the power, the aptnes, or the enclinaciōs of nature therunto: as whē I say,

A.ij. it is

The arte

it is propre for euery man to speake: I
meane to be able or to be apt by nature
to speake, is propre to euery man.

Note further, that the Propertie is
not alwayes taken after one sort, but
it is foure wayes considered.

First the propertie is that, which as
agreeth to some kinde onely, although
not to euery persone comprehended un-
der the same kynd. As it is propre to a
ma only to be a Poete, or to be a Phi-
sician, & yet not propre to euery man.

Secodly, the propertie is that which
agreeth to euery singuler persone, and
yet not onely to man. As to haue two
fete agreeth to euery singuler person,
and yet not to man onely.

Thirde, the propertie is that which
agreeth to euery man, and to man on-
ly, & yet not alwaies nor for euermore.
As to haue hoare heares in the old age
agreeth to man only, and yet not al-
wayes, but for the moste parte menne
haue hoare heares in their olde age.

Fourthly, the propertie is that which
in diede is most aptly and chiefly called
Proprium, when any thyng doth agre
to eue:

to every man, to mā only and alwaies to man. As to be able to Speake, to laugh, to go vpight, agreeth to every man, to man only, & alwayes to man.

This diuersite many haue made betwixt the difference and the proprietie, that the difference is one parte of mānes substance, and is the parte that maketh vp man. As to haue the gift of reason doth signifie the minde, whiche is one parte of man, for man himself is compact of body and minde.

The difference betwixt the proprietie, and the difference.

A Proprietie doth signifie a certaine thing, which is attributed to man whē he is made, & as a man would say, doth come after, whē mā is whole made, as to be able to speke, to laugh, to go vpight

Accidēs (that is to say, a thing clea- uing, or chauncing, or cōming to a substance) is that which doth not stād by hymselfe, neither is the parte of a substance, but rather is after such sorte in the substance, that it may both bee away, & be there, sometimes more, and sometimes lesse, without destruction or losse of the Subiecte, or substance, as mirth, sorow, to runne, to sit, to be wel

The Accident.

The arte

coloured, all these may be away, & yet the man may bee on liue in whom they were before. So that the lacke of them in their quantite, or greatnes, is not y^e losse of the Substaunce. And although no Substaunce at any tyme doth altogether forsake his Accidētes. Yet this we se, that one & the same Substaunce, doth somtyme altre his Accidētes, forsakynng some, & takynng other. As water beyng set on the fire, altereth the coldnes, & taketh heat, so that we may iudge by this, that coldnes in the water is not a Substaunce, but an Accidēt.

The diuision of
Accident.

An Accident is two wayes considered, for either it maie be separated, or it may not. Some may be separated from their Subiecte, as colde may be taken from water, and knowledge from the mynde. Other are inseparable, because they cannot be taken away, altogether, as stature or brydenes, cannot be taken from man. Heate cannot be taken from fire, nor moisture from water, the which not withstanding they are not separate from their Substaunce, yet the quantite or greatnes is changeable
in euery

In euery one of them, for some time it is more, and some time it is lesse. And we se heate in other thynge to be separated from the Subiect. Where vpo we iudge that the heate is an other thynge thē the very Substaunce of fire. Therefore this is worthy to be knowen, that the Substaunce is one thynge, and the Accident an other thynge, & mete it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus. The soule is one thing, the feare of God is an other thynge. Man maye be without the feare of God (as many one is at this day the more pitie) therefore the feare of God is an Accidente, the soule is a Substaunce.

The vse of the Accident.

None man could be knowen from an other, neither yet any other thynge, if it were not for the Accidentes which happen vnto thē. As when I would knowe an herbe, a stone, a beast, a mā, I must geue & proper accidētes, declaring & same to be of this or & coloure, separating al such by description frō al other as well of that kind, as of any other sorte els.

A. iij. **T**he

The arte

The vse and commodite, which we haue
by these five commune wordes, cal-
led other wise Predicables.

The first vse.

There be .iiij. especiall commo-
dities. First thei shew the lar-
genesse, and the narrownes of
the most general wordes, cal-

led other wise Predicamentes, which
hereafter folowe: so that here by, ye
may percepue how much euery worde
comprehendeth in it selfe, & how farre
it may be applied. The seconde profite

The second vse.

is, that euery thing is defined by these
five commune wordes, forasmuch as al
thynges the more narrowe they be, are
alwayes defined by wordes that are
more large. As by the general word, by
kind, by the differēce, & the proprietic,

The third vse.

Thirde they are good to iudge the
knyttynge of wordes, and to se what
thyng may truely be ioyned to other,
for there is no Propositiō, nor yet ioyn-
ynge together of any sentence (accor-
dyng to the commune orde of nature)
but they alwayes agre to these aboue
reherfed Predicables: so that either
the kind is spokē of the singular or pro-
pre name

Of Logique. Fol. 13.

The name (which is euer some one per-
 son, as thus: Cicero est homo. Cicero
 is a man) Or els the general word, the
 difference, the propriety, or the accident
 are al spoken either of the kynde, or of
 some one person. As thus: Homo, vel
 Cicero, est animal ratione pre-
 ditum, loquendi facultate habens, albu,
 longum, latu. A man, or Cicero, is a liuing
 creature, endued with reason, hauing
 aptnes by nature, to speake, being
 white, long, and brode. So that no pro-
 position can be, but the partes of the
 same are comprehended within these. v.
 comune wordes. Fourthly, the general
 worde, the kynde, the difference, & pro-
 priety are ioyued together necessarily,
 so that when you name one, al thother
 folowe. Therefore when a propo-
 sition is made from the kynd, to the general, to
 his difference, or propriety: it is euer
 more an vndoubted true Proposition:
 as this: Homo est animal ratione pre-
 ditum, loquendi facultatem habens.
 A man is a liuing creature endued
 with reason, hauing aptnes by nature
 to speake. A man cannot be except he be a

The fourth use.

L. v. liuing

The arte

liuynge creature, endewed with reason
& hauing aptnes of nature to speake.
The Accident notwithstanding is not
necessarilý spoken of the Subiect, but
is there casuallý, & may be chaunged:
As thus, Homo est albus. Some man
is white. This Proposition may be af-
terward false, for he may be blacke, or
altre his cõplexion some other way, so
that the Accidēt is often altered, & an
other succedeth in his roome. Ther-
fore it is good to be known, when you
haue a Proposition, whether it be vn-
doubted true, for euermore, or els may
be false at any time. And all Scholers
ought as diligently to knowe these .v.
commune wordes in al their doynge,
as those that learne to write, shoulde
diligētly marke their letters. By this
trade, order is best hadde, when euerý
cause is brought to these .v. commune
wordes: the general wordes first cõsi-
dered, next after, the kindes folowing
vpō the same wel obserued, & sette as
though they ware in arape, after that
the differences, the properties, yea and
the Accidentes also placed accordyng:
ly.

Of Logique. Fol. 14.

ly. As Tullie in his Offices shewyng what that thyng is. which we cal honeste: first speaketh generally, next after he setteth forth the sortes, and kindes of honestie, partynge them into iij. heade vertues. wherupō he declareth the difference & the proprete of every one, and lastely he toucheth thinges that belonge vnto every vertue, & sheweth thynges y^e happen in this life.

¶ Of the Predicamentes called in English the most Generall wordes.

A Predicament is an ordre of single wordes, wherin thynges of one kynde, are couched and comprehended vnder one woorde, which is moost generall.

A Predicament is nothyng els in English, but a shewing or a reherfing what wordes may be truely iopned together, or els a settynge furth of the nature of every thyng, & also shewing what may be truely spoken, and what not. And for this cause Artes were inuēted, that the truth might be knowē, and every thing vttered with his propre wordes. For when I say, A man is a crea:

The arte

a creature, I knowe this Proposition hath his propre woordes, and that like as man is a substance, so is the creature, which is the general worde unto hym, which both are in one Predicament, and the orde in this Proposition is obserued accordyng to the art, for we muste alwayes begynne at the lowest and go vpwordes, which orde agreth also to nature, when thynges lesse knowne, are declared by thynges that are more knowne, as shall more plainly here after appere.

Division of Predicaments.

The Predicamentes are diuided into the Substance, and the Accident.

The firste is both called the Substance, and is a Substance in diede. The other are Accidentes, as not being of the Substance, but cleauing therevnto.

The commodite of these Predicamentes is great. First, where as they be deuided into the Substance & Accident: it is a good lesson to knowe euermore the Substance, from the thyng which is accidental. And again, of these most general woordes ariseth this profite,

site, that yf you wil define any thyng,
or shewe the nature thereof, you may
know in which of al these store houses
the woorde resteth, which shoulde ex-
presse the nature of an other.

Thirdly, yf one wil bestow a litle
diligēce, herein, searchyng where eue-
ry woorde is seateled, and knowyng to
which of al these most general wordes
he may best referre it: he shal faithful-
ly know the nature of all thynges, no
man better, thē the which, nothyng is
more necessary, & this difference is be-
twixt the .v. commune wordes, other-
wise called the Predicables, and these
most general wordes, called Predica-
mentes, that the Predicables, set forth
the largenesse of wordes, the Predica-
mentes do name the very nature of
thynges, declaryng (and that substan-
tially) what they are in very deede.

Difference of
Predicables and
Predicamentes.

A note of certein thynges diligently to be
obserued before the rehearsal of the
most general wordes.

Consideryng ambiguite bredeth
error, moost warenesse ought to
be vsed, that the doublenesse of
no one

The arte

no one worde decepue the hearer. The cause of all controuersie, is either the not wel vnderstanding, or els the wylp vsyng of woordes, that in sense haue double meanyng. Aristotle the Schola maister, to al Scholers geueth good warnyng, that all men bee right ware in any wise to haue the righte vnderstanding of euery seueral worde.

There be wordes that vnder one & the same title, comprehend the nature of many thynges, as these woordes folowynge.

As { a Crowne.
a Noble.
a Tyne.
a Sage. } A Crowne signifieth the Crowne of a mas heade, & also signifieth a crowne of gold, suche as is curraunt, or els suche as Kynges weare at the day of their coronacion. A shrewde boy, seying of late dapes a Priest, clarkely shauen in the crowne, at what time frensh crounes did beare an high prce here in Englād saied to the Priest fulle unhappely in this wise: I pray you Master person, (quod he) How goeth Crounes now with you, where at the Priest was abashed,

bashed, and woulde rather haue lost a
Croune in diede, then that his croune
should haue ben so curstly and in such
wyle taunted.

Nobles signifie not onely the pee-
res of a Realme, but also they are the
good felow nobles in a mans purse. A
priest had a noble for preachyng a fune-
rall sermon, vpon the death of a wor-
thyfull man, the priest purposyng to
gratifie the dead, and with dew prayse
to commende his liberalitie, saith.
surely he was a good man, a vertuous
man, yea, he was a noble gentle man.
I think if it had ben his happe to haue
had a roial, he had called hym a roiall
gentleman to. Tyme noteth both the
space of howze, day and yere, and also
we call an herbe by that name, whiche
groweth in gardyns. Sage also beto-
keneth an herbe, and yet we call wyle
men, sage mē: so that euery one of the-
se wordes haue a double meaning, and
ioyned onely together by felowshyppe
of name, by nature, and in very diede,
do very muche dissente. Therefore this
ought euermore to be marked that all
wordes

The arte

in order allowable

wordes be wel noted according to their
natures, that y rather we may escape
errour. Those are only to be receyued
and vled, for the maintenaunce of all
truth, whose name, & nature is al one,
or the which are euermore to be taken
and vnderstanden after one sorte. As
Homo, a Man, signifieth none other
thynge but man. A Tree signifieth no-
ne other thynge in all the worlde but a
tree only, and so of other. If any word
bee vled that hath a double meanynge,
restraine the largenesse therof, and de-
clare howe you will haue it taken, by
meanes whereof, the fraude shal soner
be auoided, & the truth better knowe.

The Predicamentes are
in number. 10.

1	Substantia.	The Substaunce.
2	Quantitas.	The Quantities.
3	Qualitas.	The Qualities.
4	Relatiua.	The Relation.
5	Actio.	The Manner of doing.
6	Passio.	The Suffering.
7	Quando.	When.
8	Vbi.	Where.
9	Situs.	The Seating.
10	Habitus.	The Apparelling.

Substantia

Substantia, the Substaunce, or being, which Cicero calleth Nature, is a thing which standeth by it selfe, and needeth no helpe of an other, but hath his propre being & substaunce naturally, or thus.

The Substaunce is a thyng which hath his propre being of hymselfe, and conteyneth accidentes whiche happen therunto, neither can any substaunce be sene, sauing onely the accidentes, as the colour, the greatnes, and suche like qualities of man are sene, but the very substaunce cannot be sene.

Not substaunce can
be sene.

The diuision of the
Substaunce.

The Substaunce is diuided into the first, and second. The first substaunce is called every singular person, or propre name:

as Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Homere.

The second substaunce comprehendeth both the general word, & also the kinde of every singular person, as thus Tullie, Cesar, & Hannibal with other.

Likewise this word (a liuing creatur) being a substaunce & general word to

D.j. every

The arte

euery propre name conteineth al thinges particularlie that haue lyfe.

It is profitable to marke the order of substance, set furth in a table a litle before, for we maie by thesame, deuide seuerally euery substance, of all thynges in thys worlde, the whiche when we knowe, and remembre in our myndes, we perceiue euidently, the difference, betwene God, and his creatures, & seying the thyng created of God, and the properties there with all, we rest vpon thesame, and lerne the vse, and propre comoditie of many thynges here in yearth. We maie define many thynges, by thesame table: as we maie define God, man, heauen, yearth, beaustone, and any thyng els that is a substance.

The propertie of Substance.

1. The substance receaueth by alteration of it selfe, and at sundrie times, diuerse and contrarie accidentes, and yet the substance is not contrarie of the owne nature.

2. No substance can be either greater or lesse then it is by nature, although

though according to the breadth or largenesse it appere to be other wyse.

3. No substance can be sene with our eyes, but onely the outward accidentes, wherby we iudge and knowe euery seuerall creature.

Of quantitee.

The quantitee, is the greatnes of a thynge, or the nombze. And proper it is to this moſte generall worde, to be deuided, as greatnesse, is deuided into seuerall partes, and nombzes into euery seuerall nombze.

Quantitee is. ii. waies considered.

The one is called Continua quantitas, that is, when the question is asked howe great or brode any thing is. And therefore the length, the latitude, and the depenesse of bodies artificiall, are herein obserued: the vse whereof, is moſte sene in Geometrie.

The other is called discreta quantitas, when the question is asked, how many thyngeſ there be, & is occupied altogether in nombzing. The vse of this is perceiued in Arithmetique.

The arte

¶ The propertie of quantitie.

Quantitie hath
no contrary.

1. The quantitee hath nothing to be contrary vnto hym, for great & litle are not contraries accordyng to their quantitie, but they are Relatiues cōpared the one with the other.

Quantitie neither
encreaseth ne dy-
minissheth.

2. No quantitee doth receiue of the owne nature any thyng either greater or lesser, but is alwayes one, & although it happeneth that one lyne be longer then an other, yet accordyng to the quantitie, a short line is as muche a line, as a longer lyne is.

3. By quantitee also one thyng is compted either equall or els vnequall vnto an other thyng.

¶ Of qualitie

The qualitie, is a forme, or shape of the body, or mynde, wherof some name is deriued, as of wisdom, men are called wise, of iustice, men are called iuste.

The habite in a
thyng.

There be thre maner of qualities, whereof the first doth contain the habite, otherwysse called, the perfect habuyng of any thyng. The other is, a forwardnes, in any thyng, gottē bi labour
and

The forwardnes
in any thyng.

and trauaile, not geuen by natures goodnesse, or els wee maie call it, the halfe attaynyng of that, whiche we go aboute to haue, wantyng perfection, for lacke of full tyme, and is called in Latine dispositio, as to haue meane knowlege, & not to be fully instructed in þe practyse of iustice, is dispositio. Againe to be fully learned, to haue accomplished all thynges, due to ryghteousnesse and Justice, is called in Latine, habitus as who should saie, the absolute atteynyng, and strong hold of the same. The pith of this worde habitus, can hardely be vttered with one worde in this our tongue. Notwithstanding it maie in mo wordes be opened, for the better vnderstandyng of it. For euen as ware chaufed with the hand, is made softer, euen so some partes of man are made by vse more apte to compasse any thyng. He that vseth oft to speake frenche, shall by continuance, obtayne perfectiõ: he that vseth much to write, at length shall haue a redde hande, and this is called habitus. So that no mā hath knowlege, or perfecte skill in any

The full attayning of anythyng

The arte

thyng, except he get it by labour, & acquaint nature with trauail. Notwithstanding, I must nedes confesse, that all natures be not like apte, to receiue knowledge. Some are geuen to one thing, and some to an other. Therefore they, which by nature haue a promptnesse, shall soner attein perfection, then any other can do, if by labour and earnest trauaile, they wyl stretch to attayne that, wherunto they are apt, and with good endeuour, fillip nature forward. God geueth some one man a passing gift, to serche the influence of the starres, to another he graunteth, a naturall enclination to Musike, and all heauenly harmonies. So that if either of these two, wold seke to folow their naturall aptnesse, it were moste lyke they should excell. Other that do not fynde nature so fauourable, can neuer come to any suche perfection.

The full attai-
nt of two waies
considered.

The full attaining of any thyng by long time, is two waies considered, for either it is of the body, or els of the minde. Perfection, gotten by helpe of the body, is when men can by muche vse, leape,

leape, wrestle, or cast the barre, better then any other : or els do excell in any handie craft, aboue the commune sorte,

The habite of the mynde, that is to saie, that constaunt hold of any thyng, whiche is in the mynde, eyther conspyeth in knowlege, or els in practise. In knowlege, are comprehended all artes as Gramer, Logique, Astronomie, &c and all other learning, wherunto wit can attemp. That habite of the minde, whiche is in practise, and by good aduisement is chosen, standeth in the wil of man. As all vertue, & all vice doeth. Of vertues these be in mannes wyll. Just dealing euermore, manhode in suffering all harmes stoutly for honesties sake, and temperaunce of lyfe in forbearing lust, and filthie glotonie. These vertues though their ofspring be from God, yet tyme maketh them perfect, in the eyes of man. Other vertues are geuen of God wholy, and altogether without mans labour to attemp them. As faith, hope, charitie, and all other like giftes of the holy ghoſte.

The second forme, is called y power
D. iij. strength

The arte

strength, or prouesse of nature, in latine Naturalis uis. And the contrary hereto, is called the weakenesse of nature, whē she hath denied her power, to any one thing, in Latine it is called Imbecillitas nature.

The naturall
strength.

The natural strength, is an aptnes of nature, geuen either to the body, or to the mynd. To the mynd, as the aptnes to learne, and the promptnes of memory. To the body, as aptnesse by nature to waile, for a horse to be quicke and stirryng, for a birde, to be apte to flie, for a fische, to liue in the water, (the which man cannot do) for an Asse to be slowe, for a stone to be hard. &c. Natural weakenes, is when nature diminisheth her gift, as whē she denieth aptnes to learning, as we see many dull wittes for learning, and much unfit to waile. Nature hath denied some men, health of body, that thei are neuer wel at ease, some men are so sicke in their braine, that they are neuer wise, some are capons by kynd, and some so blunt by nature, that no art can whet them. An Asse will neuer be swifte, a stone will

Will neuer be soft of nature. Al qualitties be instrumentes of nature, wherby she worketh, as heate, is the instrument of fire. The heate & cold in the iuice of herbes, are instrumentes, wherby men either are healed, or els past healing, for this worlde.

The third kynd comprehendeth, the passiōs of mā, called in Latine, perturbaciones, & also those qualities which tary a good while, and moue man, eithers this waie or that waie. passions.

A perturbaciō, or els affecciō, is a so dein chaūge of y mind, & also of y body

There be. iiii. stirrings principall, whiche are in al the mynd, whereof al other haue their of spring.

{	Libido, seu cupiditas.	{	Lust or desire.
{	Leticia.	{	Mirth.
{	Egritudo.	{	Grief.
{	Merus.	{	Feare.

The whiche are stirred vp, by some motiō of the mynd, either desiring any thing earnestly, or abhorring the same.

There bee fyue qualities of the body, whiche moue the senses, and are called thinges offered to the senses, as colours, either whitenesse, blacknesse,

The arte

or any like, moue the eyes. All soundes and noises that be made, moue the hearing, as coughing, speaking, braying of a Diere, lowing of a Cow, or neighing of an horse. Sauours moue the smelling, as perfumes, swete odours, the strong smell of ordure, or of such filth. Sauces moue the taste, as bitternes, tartnes, sowernes. Such qualities as are touched, moue the sense of touching as hardnes, softnes, roughnes, plaines

The affectiōs, called patibiles qualitates, (the qualities that tary a good while) differ from sodein passions, for as much as these tary not long, but sodainly come, and sodainly goo, as blushing in a mans face, sodain feare, sodainly to chaunge coloure, and waxe pale. The other tary longer, as enuie, ambition, loue, continuall feare, greedinesse, with suche other.

The fourth comprehendeth the figure, and forme of any thing. The figure comprehendeth the shape of thinges that haue no life, as the fashion of the Element, of trees, of floudes, of an house, a shippe, a cote, and suche like.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 22.

The forme cōteineth the portraiture of al liuyng thynge, as the very liuely image of man, of an horse, or a Lion, as we cal a man wel fauoured, or hard fauoured.

The proprietie or qualitee.

1 There is somewhat contrarie vnto qualitee, as vertue, is contrarie vnto vice, witte vnto folie, manhode, vnto Towardise.

2 The thynge conteynyng or receyuyng any qualitee, may be said to receyue either more or lesse. As one man is thought to be wyser then an other, not that wisdom it self is either greater or lesse, but that it maie be in some man more, and in some man lesse.

3 By qualitee, thynge are compted either lyke, or vnlke. Those are lyke whiche are of lyke qualitee, and haue proprietees both accordyngly.

The arte

The table of qualittie.

Of the mynde.	The Qualitie.	Of the body.
Gotten by Studie.	Of the mynde.	Given by nature,
	Gotten by Study.	as the natural in- clination to any thyng.
Learning skill with a man, and harde- ly goyng auaie.	Learning skill with a man.	Goyng some a- waie, as the af- fections.
As knowledge, whiche either co- nisteth by practised skill.	Practised skill.	Or els by specu- lation, and by the only obseruaciō of thynges naturall.
Either of vertue,	Of vertue.	Or els of vice.
As Iustice.	Temperance.	Fortitude.
	Temperance of iust dea- lyng of ene- ry singuler persone. As Cato, So- crates, Pla- to.	

Of Relatiues.

Relatiues are those, whiche
are comprehēded with other,
or the whiche are named, one
with another, and (as a man
would

would say) haue a mutual respect, one to another.

The other predicamētes before rehearsed, were absolutely spokē, so that we maie vnderstande by one, and the same woorde, what it meaneth. As we may perceiue what a man is, although we ioyne nothing to hym, we knowe what Justice is, although we compare him with none other thing. But these Relatiues, cannot bee so well vnderstanden, except we ioyne some thng to them. As whē I saie a father, I can not so call him, except I vnderstande a sonne that he hath. So that euery body is called a father, in respect that he hath a sonne, or els not. Again, no body can be called a Schole Master, except he haue scholars. There is no husbād except he haue a wife.

Therefore we maie se, that Relatiues are referred euermore to another, neyther can they be taken absolutely, without hauing respect, to some other worde. There is no worde, but we may confidre the same to bee a Relative, if we referre it to some other thng, and there:

*Relation must be
in all wordes.*

The arte

therefore we maie go throughout all the predicamētes, with this one place, and finde relation of euery one of the.

Relatiues properly so called.

Those that are referred to some thyng, are of two sortes. First thei are properly so called, as the father, and the sonne, the master, and his seruaūt, neither can they be considered, excepte they be compared with some other, for when one is called father, he is properly so called, because he hath a sonne, & thereof hath he his proper beyng.

Relatiues vnproperly so called.

Again relatīues, vnproperly so called, are those seuerall wordes, whiche are knowen, & haue their beyng, euen when they stande alone: and yet considered with other, thei haue diuerse respects, as loue, is the loue of the thing loued. Or thus, loue beholdeth the thyng loued. Faythe beholdeth that thyng, wherunto it leaneth. And therefore where as Paule saith, we beyng iustified by faythe, haue peace before God, it is as muche to saie, that we are not receiued for the worthinesse of the qualitee, but for his sake, that is the sonne of God. For I praise you, wherunto

unto leaneth saythe, or what thyng
doeth it els behold? Saupng only our
Lorde Iesus, that died frely ones for
al. Or els thus, Relatiues are so cal-
led, (and yet vnproperly) whiche are
not accordyng to their proper beyng,
but accordyng as they are so named,
wherof the sixe predicamētes that fol-
lowe, beare the name. As he that doth
any thyng, is referred to a thing doen.
Wherē the two places that folowe
are declared, which signifie, to do, and
to suffer. By the place (vbi) where,
one neighboꝝ is cōpared with his next
neighboꝝ. By the place (quando) whē,
A childe of six yeaꝝ olde, is compared
with a child of the same yeaꝝ. By the
place (Situm esse) that is to be seated
or to lie any maner of waie. He that
lieth vpright, is cōpared with him that
lieth doune grouelyng. In all these
the proper beyng, is not declared, for
a childe maie be six yeaꝝ of age, al-
though he be not compared with anoꝝ
ther, and therefore it is called relatio
secundum dici improprie. But a man
can neuer be a father, saupng onely in
confi:

The arte

Relatiues are al
waie true by con
uerſion.

In relation two
thynges are to
be marked.

conſideraciō of his ſonne. And yet note
this one thyng, it is proper to all Re-
latiues, alwaies to be true, euen by cō-
uerſion. And thus, whoſoeuer is a fa-
ther, the ſame hath a ſonne. Whoſoeuer
is a ſonne, the ſame hath a father. Who-
ſoeuer hath faith, that ſame man lea-
neth to Chriſt onely. Whoſoeuer lea-
neth to Chriſt onely, that ſame manne
hath faith. There are two thynges to
be marked in relacion. The ground of
euery thyng, and the ende wherevnto
it hath reſpecte, or conſideracion. As a
father is the ground, in that he doeth
begette, and hath reſpect to his ſonne,
in that he is begotten. The ſonne is
the ground, in ſ he is begottē, & hath
reſpect to his father, whiche did beget
hym. And thus likewiſe in all other.

The proprietie of Relatiues.

1 Relatiues receiue contraries, as
vertue is contrarie to vice, not that it
is referred to vice, as yet they two are
contrarie.

2 Relatiues, whiche properly ac-
cording to their naturall beyng, are
euer both at one and the ſame tyme, &
also

also lose their names both, at one, and the same tyme, as a man is so sone called a father, as he hath a sonne, but so sone as the childe dieth, he is no more called a father to that child.

The Table of the Relatiues.

{ Relatiues are compared one with another.	{ By nature.	{ As by the cause and the effect, the father, and the sonne, are considered.
	{ By some manner or waie used.	{ The Magistrate, and the Magistrate, the King, and his sword carried before him are compared together.
	{ By degrees in calling.	{ The lord, and his seruant the aduocate and his client.
	{ By kynted	{ The brother and sister.
	{ by mariage	{ The sonne in lawe, the mother in lawe.
	{ By countenaint.	{ The graunter of a lease, and the tenant.
	{ By accidental happening.	{ A poete, to be a liar, a physician, to be a man queller, or a lawyer to be a thefe.
{	{ By natural kynd.	{ A man, a woman.
	{ By yeres.	{ A young man, an old man.
	{ By condition of life	{ A poore man, a riche man, a freeman, a bonde man.

The maner of doynge, in Latine called, A Gio,

E. i.

Agere

The manner
of daye.



Gere seu, facere, is when we are saled to bee occupied in a matter, that is before vs, or when our labor is extended, vpo a weaker or lesse thing, and in this place, are contained all verbes actiues as to write, to dispute, to bankette, to begette, to encrease, to diminishe, or to chaunge, and to speake at a woorde, all those are cōteined in this place, whiche answer to this questio, what doth he or what dooth it: excepted alwaie verbes pertainyng to the senses or affeccions, as to heare, to taste, to see, to enuie, all whiche haue the passiue significacion.

Every accion ei-
ther naturall, or
voluntarie.

Every accion is either naturall, or voluntary. That is called naturall, whiche is doen by the might of nature as to begette, or to bryng furthe, to encrease, or decrease, to alter by qualitie, as to be moist, dry, cold, or hot, to moue frō place, to place. That is called voluntary, whiche dooth betoken any thyng dooen freely, as to teache, to write, to read, to play the merchaunt man, or to do any other accion. And herunto maie be referred every mānes dutie luyng.

Perpetuo

Of Logique. fol. 26.

Perfectio called in Englishe a suffering.



Atque fieri, seu accipere, to suffer to bee dooen, or to take, is the effecte of the accion, & to make it plain, it is a verbe passiuē, euen the same, which the Grammarians vse, as to be taught, to be encreased, to be diminished, all these are passiuēs, and are referred to this predicament.

Vbi. where.



Bi is an order, or predicament whiche cōprehendeth the description of places, wherein some thing is reported ether to be dooen, to haue been dooen, or els hereafter to be dooen. As to be at London, to be at Cambridge, to be at home to be in a chamber, to be aboue, beneth on the right hande, lefte hande, before, or behynde, & whatsoeuer is answered to this question, when I aske where any thyng is, or wher any thyng is dooen. This place serueth for coniectures, ether in praisynge, or dispraisynge.

Quomodo. when.

E.ij.

This

The arte

This predicament quando, containeth the difference, and diuersitie of times, as nunc, nōdū heri, pesterdate, nōdū, in the night tyme, interdiu, in the daie tyme. This place also geueth light to confirme causes. As to proue that one is painful, I may say suche a one studieth daie and night, somuche as nature can beare: Therefore he is a painfull man.

Situm esse, to be seled.

Situm esse, is then considered, whē a mannes body is in any wise placed, as to lie a side, to stande vpriight, to sit, to leane, to lye grouelpng, to lye wide open.

Habitus, the arayng or clothyng.

Some call this Predicament habitus integumentum, that is a coueryng or apparelyng of any body, as to haue a cote to weare a gowne, to bee harneised, to haue a iacke, a hearte of malle, a coate armoure. Also to goo gorgeously, as to weare cheines of golde, to haue bracerettes, rynges, ouches, and stones, to haue a Scepter or Mace in his hande.

Thirdly,

Of Logique. Fol. 27.

Thirdly, to possesse gold, siluer, lande,
wife, and children, or to contein any
thyng, as the hogges hedde doeth hold
wine, the barne holdeth corne. &c.

The vse and commoditie of
these Predicamentes.

If you will define any worde
and know the propre nature
of the same, ye muste needes
knowe these .x. predicamen-
tes. As for an example, if ye will know
what a man is, ye muste haue recourse
to the place of Substantia, and ther ye
shal learne by the same place, that man
is a liuing creature, endued with rea-
son. If ye will knowe what vertue is,
ye must go to the predicament Quali-
tas, and there ye shall see, that vertue
is a constant habite of the mynde, mak-
kyng them praise worthy, in whom it
is. If ye will define the nature of a fa-
ther, seke for Relatiua, & there ye shall
learne, that he is a father, that hath a
sonne, he is a Maister, that hath a ser-
uaunt, and so furthe of the rest. Ther-
fore, ye must needes haue these predica-
mentes redy, that when soeuer ye will

Define

Define

The arte

define any woorde, or geue a naturall name vnto it, ye may come to this store house, and take stufte at will.

Of a definition.

A definition.



There is nothyng in all this whole art of Logique, more necessary for man to knowe then to learne diligently the definition, and diuision of euery matter, that by reason may be comprehended. For he that first well vnderstandeth what he doth go aboute (knowyng fully the nature of euery cause propounded) shal lesse erre in the whole discourse folowynge, and easly shal it be for him to auoyde false argumētes, if he can learne first to se the very nature, & substanciall propertie of euery thyng.

A definition
of a worde.

A definition is two waies considered for either it is a definition of a worde, or of a substance. A definition of a worde, is any maner of declaracion of a worde, as, a realme, is so called, because it is by a kynge ruled, and merely to late it. A woman hath her name so geuen her, because she byrngeth wo vnto man.

A definition of
a substance.

A definition of the substance, is a
speache,

Speache, whiche sheweth the very nature of the thing, and every perfect definition, is made perfect by the general worde, & his difference ioyned together.

So that whatsoeuer is defined, it is alwaies the kynde or sorte of some one thing as thus. Man is a liuing creature, endued with reason: man, is the thing defined, and the other (that is, a liuing creature, endued with reason) is the definition.

There bee foure rules to bee observed, in every perfect definition. Firste, that the definitiō containe no more then the thing defined, nor yet that the thing defined, containe any more then the definition doth. Again, we must take hede that the definitiō expresse the very nature, and substance, of the thing defined, or els it is no good definition.

Rules to be observed in a definition.

Thirdly, we must se that the definition be plain, and open, without ambiguitie, not hauing any obscure or farr fetched wordes.

When Plato had defined a man, to be a liuing creature, hauing two fete and without fethers. Diogenes that

scoffing

The arte

Plato.

Diogenes corke

scoffyng Dogge, whiche loueth to take aduantage, vpon small occasion, seying Plato vpo a tyme, most earnest in teaching his scholers, sodenly chopt into the schole, and setting a Locke in the middest of them, whiche had all his fethers pluckte of, beholde qd he, here is Platoes man, whom he hath painted out so clercky vnto you. Because this definicion was not plain & open, Diogenes thus leasted, as ye haue heard. Notwithstanding, Plato his sayng was true enough, and good enough also, if it had pleased hym, so to vnderstand it. For Plato his meanyng, was of a creature, that by nature lacketh fethers, not of one that had his fethers pluckt of, and so the definicion is without faulte.

Who soeuer purposeth, either to teache, or to learne, to perswade vehemently, or plainly to expound, it is for hym right necessary, alwaies to bynde himself, to a certain appoynted order, and particularly to gather that thyng the whiche he myndeth at large to expresse. For so shall he se what he doth,
and

and not swarue as some dooe, but kepe his matter, as he ought to do. Wherby bothe he shall teache better, and other shall learne the soner.

It is an old sayng, and worthy remembrance, being as true as it is ancient, Qui bene distinguit, bene docet. He that dooeth diuide well, dooeth teache well. And Socrates in Phaedro Platonis, praisynge muche the manner of diuidynge, saith at length, that if he knewe a man, whiche could well diuide, and seuerally set euery thyng in his place, he would folowe hym, as though he should folow God hymself. In what miserable blyndnes wer we, if we knewe not the difference, betwixt the lawe and the Gospell, the whiche onely we do knowe, by the benefite of diuision. There be many fonde people, whiche haue muche dyspraised all temporall lawes, and Ciuill lawes, thynkyng it mete, that all common weales should onely haue the Gospell, & none other Lawe at all. This mate seme to some, a gaie sayng, where as in deede, it is bothe foliishe & wicked. For there

E. v. is

The arte

The politickall
lawe.

is a difference betwene Politicall lawes, and the Gospell: for the Politicall lawe, doth cause an outward discipline to be obserued, euē of the wicked so that thei dare not offend outwardly for feare of corporall punishment. The Magistrate, whiche hath this charge, is ordeined of God, and first his charge is, to set furthe the ten Commaundementes, geuen to Moles, in stonie tables, and to cause thesame to bee obserued vniuersally, punishing the offenders for their euill deedes, corporally. After this, he muste enacte other particular lawes, as occasiō shal serue which do not dissent from these. x. considering these lawes are generall, and therefore, particular thynge maye be drawn out of the. As where it is said, Thou shalt dooe no thefte, the Magistrate seeing falsehode in bargayning, and muche deceipte vled to defraude one another, straight causeth it to bee proclaimed, that all suche as vse deceipt in bargayning, commit theft, and shalbe attainted thereupon as felons the whiche man in so dooing, hath fully filled

Of Logique. Fol. 37.

filled Goddes commaundement. Now again, as for Breachng of the Gos-
spell, it is another maner of thng, for
thereby synnes are forgiven, the inheri-
tance of life everlastng graunted,
and an ever liuyng Churche of man-
kynde, gathered to bee Goddes chosen
people, and also the true knowlege of
God, perfecte righteousnesse, and the
life everlastng, is kindled in the hartes
of all godly, through the power of
Goddes holy ghost. But there be fewe
that will obeye willngly, and with al
their hartes, the wordes of the Gospel
in suche wise.

The lawe of
the Gospel.

Neither can any lawe bee able rigo-
rently to force the inwarde thought of
man. Therefore, the outward Magis-
trate, though he cannot bynd mennes
consciencs, frō the thng that is euill
yet maie he labour to withdrawe them
from doyng euill, and in deede if lawes
wer not, men could not liue. Therefore
the Politicall regiment, and the Gos-
spell are two diuerse thnges. This
shorte distinccon, geueth light to many
waightie matters, the which thng
when

The arte

When men knowe not, thei wander in
greate darknesse, and for lacke of light
fall into error.

What a diuision is.

Diuision.



Diuision is, a diuidyng of
that, whiche is more comon,
into those, whiche are lesse
common. As a definicio ther-
fore dooth declare, what a thyng is, so
the diuision sheweth, how many thyn-
ges are contained in the same.

Diuision of
a worde.

A diuision, is either the diuidyng of
a worde, or of a thyng. A diuision first
of a worde, is whē any worde that signi-
fying diuerse thynges, is diuided into e-
very seuerall significacions that he hath
as if I would diuide this worde, canis
into a dog, a fishe of the sea, & a sterre in
the element, thus might I say, canis is
either a dog that liueth vpon the earth
or a fishe, or els a sterre in the element.

Diuision of
thyngs.

A diuision of the thyng is, .iiij. waies
considred, for either it is whē the gene-
rall, is diuided into the kind, the whole
into his partes, or els when the sub-
staunce, is diuided into the accidentes.

thus,

Of Logique. Fol. 31.

The generall is diuided into his kynd thus, as an element is diuided into the fire, the aire, the water, and the perth. A common weale is diuided into the state of the people, whiche beare rule, and also into that power where the best and wisest haue their gouernance, and thirdly into ones hande, whiche alone beareth the stroke and is chiefe Magistrate.

A common weale
diuided. in. waies

The whole is diuided into his partes as thus. The body is diuided into the hed, bely, handes, and fete. A man is diuided into body, & soule. and this kynd of diuidyng, is properly called a partition. And the very difference betwene a diuision and a partition is, that in a diuision where the generall, and the kynd are, the generall worde is spoken of the kind it self, as *Iusticia est virtus* Justice is a vertue, where as it cannot bee so, when the whole is deuided into his partes, that the whole should be spoken of his part, as *I cannot saie, caput est homo*, the hedde is the man. For the hed is not man, nor yet the bely neither, although thei bothe be partes

The arte

A partition.

The moral lawe.

The Judiciall
lawe.

The Ceremo-
niall lawe.

tes of man. We haue euermore neede of
this particiō in all matters. The lawe
of Moses is diuided into thre partes,
for either it is Morall, Judiciall, or
Ceremoniall, neither is this partition
necessary for Moses common weale
onely, but for all other regimētes that
be. The morall lawe standeth for ever,
and is not altered at any tyme, but is
receiued from tyme, to tyme, even as
Moses receiued the same of God, in
stony Tables. The Judiciall lawe is
nexte, the whiche although we bee not
bounde to obserue, as the Israelites
wer, yet must there be actes of Parlia-
mēt made, for the reformation of thyn-
ges that bee amisse, and Magistrates
appoynted to punish, suche as breake
the ten commaundementes, called the
morall law, and euen so mate we iudge
of the ceremonial lawe, that although
it appertain nothyng to vs, to kepe
suche Ceremonies as Moses and Aar-
ron haue enacted, yet it is needfull that
there be an order in all our doopnges,
and that wee resorte together to the
temple reuerently, and that the paren-
tes,

tes, appoynt their childezen a tyme, to learne at schole, and for their seruantes, a tyme to do their true seruice.

The substance is diuided into his accidentes, as thus, of menue, some are free, some are bond.

Substance di-
uided into his
accidenten.

Another maner of diuidyng there is contrary to this, as when the accidentes, are diuided into their substances as thus. Of good thynges, some are of the mind, some of the body, and some of fortune. Also there is a diuision when accidentes are diuided into accidentes as of good thynges, some are honest, some profitable, and some pleasaunt.

Accidenten diui-
ded into substan-
ces.

Accidenten di-
uided into acci-
denten.

It is necessary to be obserued in euery diuision.

First, it must be prouided, that the diuision as muche as maye be (for it cannot alwaies be so) ought to be made with twoo contrary differences, fully conteinyng in themselves, the whole compasse or widenesse of the generall woorde, or that whiche is diuided: for it is a faulte to forget any thyng, or let slip any part.

Rules needfull
for diuisions

Again, the differences whiche di-
uide

The arte

uide the generall worde, beyng ioyned bothe together, muste bee egall to the saied generall worde, and the partes coupled together, must bee as muche as the whole, or els the diuision is not good. A liuyng creature is diuided into his twoo differences, as into a thynge hauyng reason, and a thynge that hath no reason. Now whatsoeuer is a liuyng creature, the same is a thing that either hath reason, or els that lacketh reason. And again, euery thynge that is ended with reason, and without reason, that same is a liuyng creature. So that in euery diuision, the members, or partes that doo diuide by conuerision, are turned with the thynge diuided, & euen likewise it is with particion. as I haue spoken before of diuision. whereas Logique hath two partes, iudgement and findyng out of thynges, euen as I say, Logique is nothyng els but iudgemēt, and findyng out of thynges. so of the other side, iudgemēt, and findyng out of thynges, is nothyng els, but Logique it self. Whereby appereth a plain conuerision, that whatsoeuer the one is, the same

Of Logique. Fol. 33:

the same is the other, whiche thyng must diligently bee obserued in euery diuision. For yf the members that do deuide, bee either more or lesse than the thyng deuided: streight way the diuision is not good, for according to a precept that we haue in Latine. *Membra diuidentia semper cum diuiso cōuertit debent.* The partes that do deuide must alway be equall with the thyng deuided, and turned by Conuersion with the same, or els the diuisiō is not lawfull.

Fault in diuision

The maner of handelyng a single question, and the ready way howe to teach and sette forth any thyng plainly, and in order, as it should be, in Latine

Methodus.

In handelyng of any single question, the preceptes and rules geuen before in the commune wordes, in the mooste generall wordes, in the definition and deuision, do very good seruite, & helpe towardes the ordering of euery such matier. The whole nature of suche questions are thoroughly sene by vsyng of this ordre. Euery single question is eight

ff. wayes

The arte

Asking whether
it be or no,

wayes examined, first to aske whether
the thyng be, or no, As thus: Is there
any one man that may be called wise?
Is there any law? Is there any frend-
ship vpon yearth? This questio is of-
ten proued, either by experience, or els
by authoritie of the wise. Therefore in
questioning what the thing is, we must
declare the very nature, as yf I shall
speake of frendship, I wil first bee at a
point of what frendship I must speake.
For frendship is of two sortes. The o-
ne is true and perfect frendship, which
commeth from the harte for vertues
sake, and is onely among good men: the
other is fained fauour, when one for
lucre beareth a faire face outwardly,
and sedeth inwardely a maliciouse ho-
make. And this is the commune frend-
ship, wherof the wicked only are par-
takers. The second question is, to aske
what a thyng is. And this cometh fro
the definition, which is of two sortes,
either of the substance of any thyng,
or els of yname. Of the name: as thus,
a realme is that countrey which is ru-
led by a king. Of the substance thus.

What a thing is,
and how it may be
called.

A

Of Logique. Fol. 36.

A realme is, a gathering of people together, being able to live, and with stande other for preservation of themselves, abiding severall. The lawe is an ordinance whiche commaundeth thynges in order, to be done, & forbideth the contrary. The thirde question is, when the partes, and every severall kynd is considered, and for this question the division and partition do much good. As the Lawe of the Gospel, and the political law. The fourth question is, to aske what are the causes, and especially what is the efficient cause, and what is the final cause, or the ende of any thyng. The efficient cause of al good lawes, is God, and his minister. The finall cause, or the ende, is to live uprightly in the feare of God, and to walke all the dayes of our life in the observacion of his holy will. The fift question is, when the effecte, the office, or propre working is examined. As the effecte of the lawe is, to conserve the state of manne to continue peace Universally, to encrease wealth, and make love betwixt

Howe manyfold
the thyng is de-
vided.

What be the cau-
ses.

What are the ef-
fectes or propre
working.

If it.

all.

The arte

What happe
thereupon.

What are disa-
greynge.

What examples.

al. The sixt question is when thynges be asked that happē after, or the which haue great affinite, or likelyhode together. As if lawes be kept and folowed. Wee se our childrens children ware to welth. We se much neyghbourhode, & good will to helpe the niedie, and so forth. The seuenth is to aske what are disagreynge. As from the lawe, dissenteth rebellion, stubbourneesse, pryde, with other. The eight question is, to bypnyng in witnesse, & to show by whose authorite the lawe taketh place. The scripture teacheth that God gaue the Lawe to Moles, and Paul with Peter also, and Christ himself commaunded euery man to obey the higher power in al thynges, that are not directly repugnaunt from the wil of God. Thus one question is eight wayes examined, and the maner taught theres by to frame it in deuote ordre, so that he which kepeth well this trade, can not faile in any cause that he taketh in hande. And because they maye the rather be remembred, I will sette them altogether.

As thou

- As touchyng the lawe**
1. Whether it be, or no.
 2. What it is.
 3. What the partes are.
 4. What the causes are.
 5. What are the effectes, or proper working.
 6. What are next adioynyng, what are like, what happen thereby.
 7. What do disagree, or what are contrary.
 8. What example there is, or authority to proue it.

And this lesson ought diligently to be learned of al, that euermore thei begynne from the generall, and come to euery seuerall parte. As in declaryng what vertue is, first to tell the nature of it generally, and after to handle euery vertue by it selfe. And this ordre both Tullie hath folowed in his booke de Officiis, & also Aristotle in his Ethikes hath done the like, to the great admiracion of al those that be learned,

Ordre to be obserued.

Of a Proposition.



When the very ordre of nature requireth that first of all we shoulde speake of seuerall wordes, and as a man would say, teache one his letters, & show him the maner of spellng, before we teach him to rede, and afterward ioyne sentences

The arte

tences together, & frame Propositions by knittung seuerall wordes in ordre, for it is the very offyce of the minde, first to knowe, and then to knitte. neyther can any child utter a sentence, before he learne to speake a worde. Again whē nature hath taught seuerall wordes, then the minde iopned together, deuiceth, and afterward geueth a iudgement whether they be wel or no. for a man were litle better then a brute beast, if he could but onely apprehende seuerall wordes, hauing no gift, or aptnes to iopne thē in ordre, and so iudge howethynges are iopneth together. But seeing God hath kyndeled this light in man, that he can both iopne, & iudge, we wil now speake of the knittung together, and the ioinyng of wordes in a Proposition.

¶ Proposition.



¶ Proposition, is a perfect sentence spoken by the Indicative mode, signifyng eyther a true thing, or a false, without al ambiguity, or doubtfulness, as thus. Every man is a liar.

There

Of Logique. Fol. 34:

There be two partes in a Proposition, the one is called Subiectum (that is to saye, that where of somwhat is spoken,) the other is Atributum, commonly called Predicatum, that is to say, that which is spoken of any thyng, as in the aboue rehearsed proposicio. Every man is a liar: Man, is that whereof this sayng (to be a liar) is spoken, and this same sayng (to bee a liar) is that which is spoken of man.

The partes in a Proposition.

Every proposition is two waies divided, either it is a single sentence, standing of one perfect sentence, as Justice is vertue, or els it is a double sentence having two propositions in it, as thus. If Justice bee a vertue, it is a good thyng, praisse worthe.

A Proposition is two waies divided accordyng to the Substance.

That Proposition is called false, the whiche either natural reason proueth to be plaine false, or the experience of man declareth to be untrue, as thus: A stone doth feale. The soule of man is mortal. Experience sheweth or at the least Scripture affirmeth the soule to be immortal, & nature teacheth vs that no stone hath the sence of fealng.

F. iiij.

The

The arte

A Proposition di-
uided accordyng
to the qualitie.

The second diuision of a Proposition,
accordyng to the qualitie.

A Gainie Propositions do either
affirme, or denie, as this propo-
sicio. Pleasure is a good thing,
doeth affirme that pleasure is
good. Againe, pleasure is not a good
thing, doth deny that pleasure is good.
That Proposition doth affirme, when
any thing is reported to be in any thig.
That Proposition doeth denie, when
any thing is denied to be in any thing.

A Proposition di-
uided accordyng
to the quantitie.

Proposition v-
gersal.

Generall signes.

The thirde deuision of a Proposition,
accordyng to the quantitie.

Thirdely all Propositions are
either, general, particular, in-
definite, or singular. Those
Propositions are called gene-
ral, or vniuersal, the which haue a ge-
neral signe iopned to the firste part of
the Proposition, as thus. Every coue-
tous man is poore. No man both lo-
ueth, & is wise, no not one. No man is
euermore happy. Generall signes are
these: Omnis, Nullus, Quilibet, Ne-
mo, Every bodye, Nobodye, All the
worlde, Not one in al the world.

Particu-

Of Logique. Fol. 37.

Particular Propositions are these, ^{Proposition particular.} where a Particular signe is added to the former parte of the Proposition, which doth not containe all but parte or a few, as thus: Some mē feare God. Some men are to muche desierous of glorie. The particular signes be these: ^{Particular signes} Quidam, Aliquis, Pleriq̃, Plerunq̃. A certain man, Some body, All mē for the moost part, often times.

The Propositions are called Indefinite ^{Proposition indefinite.} (that is to say, vncertain) where the former parte of the Proposition is a general woorde without a signe, as thus: The soule is immortall. Manhode is a vertue. Younge menne are riotouse. Olde menne are couetous. And note this diligently, that those indefinite Propositions (whose last rehearsed parte is necessary, & is so spoken of the former part, that it doth alway agree to the same, & to the whole nature of the same) do import as much as a general Proposition, as in the aboue rehearsed Proposition. The soule is immortall. this worde (to be immortall) whiche is spoken of the soule, as

f.v. greeth

The arte

greeth not to one man, or to certayne,
but to euery man liuing. Whē the Acci-
dentes are spoken of the former part,
it implieth as muche as a particular
proposicion doeth, as: Homo homini
prestat, ingenio, uirtute, doctrina.
(Man is better one then an other, in
witte, learning, and vertue,) is no
more to say, than Quidam homo ho-
mini prestat. Some one man is better
then an other.

A singular Proposition, is when a
propre name of a man is conteyned in
a Proposition, and is the former part
of the same, as Cicero is an Oratour.
Alexander is a Warriour.

¶ The vse of a Pro-
posicion.

When men by occasiō of talke, falle
at variance, & can not agre vpon their
matter, bepng both earnest to knowe
the truth, it is good to bring the whole
matter to some one issue, and there re-
sting vpon a pointe, to debate that
part onely, before they go any further
the which is called of the Logicians, a
Proposicion, of the Rhetoricians, the
state

is thus most ne-
cessarie.

state of the cause, which is as much to say, as the point where upon they shal stand or rest to trie their matier. Now because euery Proposition is. iij. wayes diuided, accordynge to the substance, the qualitie, and also the quantitie, good reason it ware to trie euery cause by these thre partes also.

By the first we know whether it be a single Proposition, or a double.

By the seconde wee perceiue whether it do affirme or deny.

And by the thirde also we see howe largely it doth extende, the which. iij. pointes are right needeful to be marked.

C The repugnaunce of Propositions.



Repugnaunce, is the diuerſitie of two propositions, which haue both one ſubiectum, (called the former part,) & one attributum, whiche is the reherſed parte, and in ſenſe ſpoken of the former.

The repugnaunce of Propositions

There be. iij. in nombre, called in Latine: Contraria, Subcontraria, Con-

cap. 107 The arte

Contradictoria, and Subalternæ.

Generall contrarie Propositions, are those, whereof the one doth generally affirme, and the other doth generally deny, as thus: Omnes homines gloria ducuntur. All men are moued with glory. Nulli homines gloria ducuntur. No mē are moued with glory.

Particular contraries, are two particulars, whereof the one doth affirme, the other doth deny. Aliqui homines gloria ducuntur. Some men are moued with glory: Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur. Some men are not moued with glory.

Contradictory Propositions, are whē the one is **Uniuerſal affirmatiue**, & the other **particular negatiue**. or els when the one is **Uniuerſal negatiue**, & the other **Particular affirmatiue**, as thus: Omnes homines gloria ducuntur. All men are moued with glory. Aliqui homines gloria nō ducuntur. Some men are not moued with glory, and likewise backward.

Subalternæ, are those, which be either **Uniuerſal affirmatiue**, & **Particular**

cular affirmative, or els Universal negative, and Particular negative.

The nature of a Proposition the
waies deuised.

Propositio Categorica (other
wise called a single Proposi-
tion) is deuised into true and
false Propositions.

They are true Propositions, which
agre to the matter, and are either ne-
cessarie, or els suche as may bee either
true or false, called in Latine fortuite
or contingentes.

True Proposi-
tions.

Necessarie Propositions, are assu-
redly true, and known so to be either
by nature, or els by experience.

Necessarie Pro-
positions what
they be

Of those that necessarily be knitte
together are these. The propre name,
the kynde, the general worde, the dis-
ference, the proprietie, the definitiō, the
causes, the propre worke of causes, and
some Accidentes that cuer tarie, as
thus: Cicero est homo. Cicero is a
man. Homo est animal ratione predi-
rum, aptum ad risum, A man is a li-
uynge creature, endewed with reason,
apt to laugh. Dies est necessario, quo
niam

And which they
be.

Changeable
Propositions.

The arte

niam Sol exoriens est. It must needs
be day, because the Sonne is vp. Ignis
calidus est. fier is hotte.

Those Propositions are changea-
ble, which may be true, or chaunce to
be so, as: fewe Preachers are ambi-
cious. fewe kynges heare the truth.
And whēsoever the Accident is spokē
of that which conteyneth hym: every
such Proposition is called changeas-
ble or that which may be true, as:

Water is made whot, here we
se that it chaunceth to was-
ter (contrary to her na-
ture) to be warme,
and therfore it
is called
changeable as the which
may chaunce or be
chaunged.

(2)

The Table of repugnaunt
Propositions.

All men are
moued with
glozie.

Generall
contrary.

No man is
moued with
glozie.

Contrary

Contrary

Generall Affirmative

Generall Negative

Contrary

Contrary

Some men
are moued
with glo-
zie.

Particular
contrary.

Some men
are not mo-
ued with
glozie.

Here

No doubtfulness
in the speech.

BEre we must bee diligent that
in al such repugnauncie of Pro-
posiciōs, there be not doubtful-
nes in any word, & that alwaies
there be one maner of wordes that go
before, & also one maner of wordes that
ende the sentence, platulpy and without
double vnderstandpng. For yf I sape
thus: Man doth synne, Man doth not
synne. Herein is no repugnaunce: for
the man of God, whose synnes are re-
demed through Christes death, by the
vertue of his faith, the same man doth
not sinne, accordyng to S. Ihon. He
is of God sinneth not: but that man
which foloweth the flesh, & hath geuen
ouer himself to the lust of this worlde,
doth synne deadly. Therfore the parte
muste not altre the nature of eyther
Proposicion, the tyme also must be all
one, the maner of doyng of one sorte, &
the place likewise must be like.

The vse.

This diuersite of proposiciōs is ve-
ry necessary to discerne the truth, fro
that which is false, for when we ioyne
two Proposicions that are dissonant,
we

We shal easely trie the chaffe from the corne, the whiche when we haue done, we make the better sticke to the truth, with full assente, the contrary beyng ones disclosed and reiected.

De conuersione, of the turnyng of Propositions.

Conuerſion is the chaungyng or Conuerſion
alteryng of wordes in a Proposition, when þ former part (where of any thyng is reherſed) and the hynder parte (which is reherſed of the former) are chaunged, the one, into the others place.

There be. iij. maner of Conuerſiōs, Simplex, per Accidens, per Contrapositionem.

A plaine Conuerſion is, when both plain conuerſion
the Propositions are lyke in all thynges, both in ſygnēs, and also in affirmacion, or negation, ſayyng only that of the laſt reherſed, is made the former part of the ſentence, & the former part, is made the laſt reherſed part.

Suche Conuerſion is made, when both Propositions be either Uniuerſall negatives, or els particular affirmative,

The arte

matiuēs, for the first thus. Nemo ti-
mens Deum, cōtaminat se adulterio.
Ergo, Nemo contaminans se adulte-
rio timet deum. No man that feareth
God, defileth hymselfe with adultrie,
therfore, no man that defileth himself
with adultrie, feareth God. Here we
make se the Conuersion plaine, as the
rule aboue reherſed teacheth. For two
particular affirmatiues, this ſhalbe an
exāple. Quidā aulici, boni ſunt. Ergo
quidam boni, aulici ſunt. Some cour-
tiers are honeſt, Ergo ſome honeſt me
are courtiers.

A conuerſion by
accident.

A Conuersion by accident, is when
the former parte of ſentence, is made
the laſt reherſed parte, and the laſt re-
herſed parte, made ſ former part, both
the propoſitions affirming, or denying
ſaying onely that the ſignes be chaun-
ged, that is, the one being Vniuerſal,
the ſeconde being Particular. Firſt a
Conuersion is made of two affirmati-
ues, thus. Omnis virtus eſt laudāda,
Ergo laudandum aliquid, eſt virtus.
All vertue is to be praiſed, therefore
ſome thynge to be praiſed is a vertue.

A con-

A conuerſion of two negatives, thus.
 Nemo malus foelix, foelix igitur (ſapiens cum fit) non eſt malus. No euill
 man is abſolutely happy. Therefore an
 abſolute happy mā (ſepug he is godlie
 wyſe) cannot be euill. This kynde of
 Conuerſion is very profitable for hym
 that will diſpute. For where as we rea-
 ſon often frō the generall word, to the
 kynde, we muſt nedes uſe this maner
 of Conuerſion, as thus. If all exerciſe
 be good, then this kynde of exerciſe is
 good, and ſo of other.

A Conuerſion by contrapoliſion, is
 when the former part of the ſentence
 is turned into the laſt reherſed parte,
 and the laſt reherſed part, turned into
 the former part of the ſentence, both
 the propoſicions beynge vniuerſal, and
 affirmatiue, ſaying that in the ſecond
 Propoſicion there be certayne negati-
 ues enterlaced, as thus.

A conuerſion by
 contrapoliſion.

Omnis homo auct aliquid videre,
 audire, ſcire.

Ergo quod non auct aliquid vide-
 re, audire, ſcire, non eſt homo.

Euery mā deſireth to ſee, to heare, or
 to know ſomewhat, therefore what ſoe-
 uer

G.ij.

uer

The arte

Reasoning by the
conuersion.

uer he is that desireth not to see, to
heare, or to know somewhat, that same
body is not a man. This Conuersion
is profitable, and serueth well to rea-
son by. Thus reasoneth Christ by this
Conuersion against the Jewes in the
viii. Chapter of John. Qui ex deo est,
verba Dei audit, vos igitur cum non
audiatis. ex Deo non estis. He that is
of God, heareth the woordes of God,
You therefore because you heare not,
be not of God. This Conuersion con-
futeth the Jewes playnely, & proueth
that they are not of God. If we wyl
reason from the generall worde to the
kynd, or from the greater, to the lesse,
we maie vse this conuersion very wel.
Omnis homo est animal. Ergo quod-
cumq; nō est animal, id nec homo est.
Euery man is a liuyng creature, ther-
fore what soeuer thynge is not a liuyng
creature, that same is not a mā. Take
awaie the generall worde, & there can
no kynde remaine at all. From the su-
perior vniuersall, to the inferior, thus
we maie reason. All pure golde loketh
yealow, therefore whatsoeuer loketh
not

From the vniuer
sall superior to
the inferior.

not yealow, & same is not pure golde. This conuerſion ſerueth wel to make an Argument in the ſecond figure, as I will declare hereafter, the whiche ought diligently to be obſerued.

¶ A leſſon to be obſerued,

Of ſingular woordeſ whiche are proper names of thynges, or els determinately do betoken ſome one certain thyng, no conuerſion is made, becauſe no argument is made of particulare woordeſ or ſentenceſ, whereunto the whole nature of conuerſion ſerueth only. Therefore if one ſhould ſaie vnto me, ponder is a horſe mille, the conuerſion were amiſſe to ſaie, ponder is a mille horſe. for what idiothe knoweth not, except he had a horſe head, & here the ſenſe is altered, & that it is. ij. thynges to ſaie, a horſe mille, and a mille horſe. So that of ſingular propoſitiōſ declaring the nature of one ſeueral thyng, no true conuerſion can be made both in worde and ſenſe.

¶ The uſe.

firſt, Conuerſion profiteth for the euident openyng of propoſitiōſ. As if

G. ij. ¶

The arte

I should saie. There is nothyng profit-
table but the same is honest, and howe
then, canst thou make a diuorcement
betwixte honestie and profite, as
thoughe the one could bee without
the other.

Agayne it serueth well to make
shorte argumentes, As thus. No chri-
stian is an vsurer. Ergo no vsurer is
a Christian. Some Bpshoppes are
good, Ergo some good men are Bish-
shoppes. Thirde lie it sheweth howe
to reduce the seconde and the thyrde
figure bepng both vnperfite, to the mo-
des of the first fygure, as I will shew
more at large hereafter.

Propositio Hypothesica. that is to saie a
double Proposition.

A double propo-
sition.

Propositio Hipothetica, is a
sentence with two single Pro-
positions knitte together al-
waies, with some Coniunctio,
as thus. Si iusticia est virtus, est lau-
dabilis. If iustice bee a vertue, it is
praise worthe.

There be thre maner of double
Propositions.

A douc

Three partes of a
double propo-
sition.

If Double Proposition standeth
of. iij. partes wherof the one is
a condicional Proposition af-
firming a thynge to bee eyther
true or false, with an (if.) As thus. If
faith be vpon y^e earth, some men feare
God. If the worlde continue still as it
doth, walowing in moſte abhominable
ſynne, God will at length puniſhe the
offenders very ſore. Al whiche propo-
ſitions are euer true, when the partes
are ſo knitte together: that the latter
parte, muſt nedes folowe vpon that,
whiche goeth before. The ſecond part
is, when a propoſitiō hath a diſiuncti-
ue, which knitteth the ſentence vp, as
thus. Either it is daie, or els it is night
Suche Propositions are true, when
both the partes are true: and the ſame
alſo are false, when either of the par-
tes are false. The thirde part is, when
coniunctions that do denie, are ioyned
together, as thus. Battayle being not
lawfull, is not to be deſpyed.

By all whiche double propoſitiōs
wee maie reaſon formally in dyuerſe
cauſes, as thus by the firſt. If faith be
G. iij. vpon

The arte

Upon the pearth, some men feare God, but no mā feareth God, therfore sayth is not upon the pearth. Agayne, if we feare God, we are in charite, but we are not in charite, therefore we feare not God. By the seconde thus. Coue: touse mē either be they seruautes of God, or els of the deuell, but they are not the seruautes of God, Ergo, they are seruautes of the deuell. By the thirde thus. Battail beyng not lauful, is not to be vled, but battaill is lauful Therefore it is to be vled.

The vble of all those thynges, that haue bene spoken of a Proposition.

I will vble this proposition for an example. All treuth purchaseth hatred. It is a single proposition by substance. An affirmatiue by qualitie, & an vniuersall by Quantitie. The contradictory is. No treuth purchaseth hatred, the whiche is false. Therefore this is true, Some treuth purchaseth hatred. the conuersion by the accident. The treuth purchaseth hatred: Ergo some thyng that purchaseth hatred is treuth.

¶ Of makynge an Argument.

I haue reherſed hether to al ſingle wordes, what the nature is of euery one, & in what generall worde thei maie be founde. I haue ſet forth the nature of a definition, and a diuiſion. I haue taught alſo to ioyne theſe ſeueral wordes into a propoſition, and make theſame a perfect ſentence. Nowe therefore by goddes grace, I wyl ſhew the maner how to ioyne ſentences together, & to proue a matter by knittynge propoſitiōs hādſomely in an argument, or by placynge the propoſitions accordyngly. Therefore there ought good diligence to be vſed in this behalf, for as muche as it is the clerklyeſt part of al, and the hardeſt piece of worke, to frame an argument aptly, and to knowe the very reaſon, why thynges are ſo knit together.

¶ What an argument is.

An argumēt, is a waie to proue how one thyng is gathered by another, and to ſhewe that thyng, whiche is doubtfull, by that whiche is not doubtfull.

¶ To finde out the reaſon, that ſhall

G. v.

proue

The arte

proue, (in Latine) called Medium (in Engliſhe) the double repeate.

The fyndyng out
of an argument.

After this ſorte we maie finde the
reaſon, whereby to proue our matter.
When we haue a queſtion or ſentence,
that we wold either confirme, or con-
fute, Aſke the cauſe of our ſelfe, why,
and wherefore that thyng, whiche is
ſpoken of the former parte in any ſen-
tence, ſhould be ſo applied to the ſame.
And to make the matter more playn, I
will make this queſtion. Eſt ne auarus
pauper? Is a couetous man poore or
not? I maie thus reaſon with my ſelf.
Why ſhould a couetous man be called
poore, what affinitie is betwixt them
two? Marie in this point, they both
agree, that like as the poore man, euer
lacketh and deſireth to haue: ſo the co-
uetous manne euer lacketh, wantyng
the uſe of that whiche he hath, and de-
ſireth ſtil to haue, beyng neuer content
though god geue enough. Then ſeyng
it is euen ſo, that both do lacke, and
both do deſire to haue, this ſame rea-
ſon is the onely cauſe, whereby myne
argument is made perfect. ſo; thus I
maie

maie frame myne argument aptly.

The framing of
an argument.

Whosoever lacketh, and desireth evermore to haue, that same man is poore.

A couetous man lacketh, and desireth evermore to haue.

Therefore a couetous man is poore.

Thus this argument is made perfecte by askyng this questiō, whether a couetous man is poore? As hereafter I wil shew it more at large, by other examples, to make the thyng more plain.

There be foure kyndes.
of argumentes.

A perfecte argument.

An vnperfecte argument.

An induction.

An example.

A perfect argument is an absolute gathering, or reasonyng, whereby the last sentēce, whiche we would proue, is confirmed by other proposiciōs and sentēces, more vniuersal, & better known, than the thyng which is proued: containing in themselves, the reason, why the last sentence is true, and why

The arte

Why thei are applied to the same. This kynde of argument, is from the general worde, to the kynde, as thus. If I wyl proue theft worthe of punishment, I must first aske the question, why? And that thyng that cometh to my mynde, more vniuersall then theft, comprehending the offence of theft in it, maie serue to make the argument. As I maie thus reason, that theft should be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischeuous dede, and then thus I knytte vp mine argument.

Euery vice or mischeuous dede is to be punished.

Theft is a vice, or a mischeuous dede.

Therefore thefte is to be punished.

Here we se the propositions, or sentences wherof the first is called Maior, that is to say, the proposition at large. The second is called Minor, that is to say, the lesse or seuerall propositiō. The third is called conclusio. That is, the lapping vp of all. And here we must note, that like as there be thre propositions, even

Of Logique. Fol. 47.

even so there be thre diuerse endinges, The termes
the first.
called in Latine, Termini, of p which,
the one is called the terme at large, in
the first proposition onely, and after-
warde is referred, to the former part
of the conclusion, called subiectum cō-
clusionis. The second terme is called The second.
the lesse or seuerall, whiche is in the
second proposition, & this is the worde
whereof the question is made, and is
spoken of in the conclusion. The third The third.
is called the double reparate, which is
twise reherſed, before the conclusion,
and therefore it is twice reherſed, be-
cause it is p knitting together, of the .ii
propositions, & is the cause also, why p
former part of the propositiō, (whereof
a thyng is ſaid,) and the laſt reherſed
part (beyng attributed to the part go-
yng before) are ioyned together in the
concluſiō. As to make the thyng playn
by the former argument, I will proue
this conclusion. Theſte is to be puni-
ſhed. Theſte is called the former part
whereof this worde (punished) is ſpo-
ken, and this worde (punished) there-
fore is called the laſt reherſed part, be-
cause

Example of the
ii. termes.

The arte

Double repete.

cause it is spoken of theft, which went before. Nowe to make myn argumēt, & to proue this sentēce true, I must seke a worde, which is more generall then that whiche is proued. And that worde that cometh to my mind, and is pertainyng to the cause, beyng more vniuersal: (for euery thynge that is proued, is proued by a thynge more knownen) that same worde or reaso, is called the double repete. Whose propertie is twise to be rehersted in an argumēt, and that in the first and seconde proposicion, neuer enterpyng into the conclusion, as thus. Euery vice is to be punished, (vice) is the double repete, which must be rehersted in the seconde proposicion, (for I saied before) it must be twise rehersted because it maie be euident, that the former part of the conclusion, is in very deede comprehended, vnder the former part of the first proposicio. And then the argumēt is made as foloweth.

{ Euery vice is to be punished.
 { Thefte is a vice.
 { Ergo thefte is to be punished.
 Here we se the double repete (whiche

Of Logique. Fol. 48.

the proueth the matter) is twice reher
sed in the first, and second proposition,
and entereth not into the conclusion.

The terme at large, is in the first pro
position, and the terme seuerall, is in
the second proposition, and enter both
into the conclusion. So that we maye
se that, which proueth the thynge, doth
not entre into the conclusion, but is
twice reher sed in the two propositions,
and so the conclusion foloweth, by rea
son that these .ij. wordes, vice, & theft,
agree in a third altogether, & whatsoe
uer is said of the one, is said of y^e other,
and nothynge can be comprehended vn
der the generall, but al the kyndes ha
ue the same contained in them, whiche
in this proposition, are referred to the
general. (Al vice is to be punished) vn
to vice, is referred this worde, puni
shed. Therefore, whatsoeuer is cōpre
hended vnder this worde, vice, as theft
adulterie, wrong dealing, murder: this
worde, punished, is reher sed of them al:
because it agreeth to the generall, & is
reher sed of the same. As I maye rea
son thus. All vice is to be punished.

Terme at large,
terme seuerall.

There

The arte

Adultery. } are to
Therefore { wrong dealing. } be pun-
Murder. } nished

For if that, whiche is generall, is to be punished, then the kyndes. or sortes in thynges, are also to be punished. According to this sayng. Whatsoever is truely, and altogether reherſed, of the generall, that same also is reherſed of the kynde, whiche is included in the generall.

Rule.

There be. vii. Rules, especially to be obserued, for the makynge of a perfite argument called Syllogismus.

Rules for an argument.

First, that in euery perfite argument called Syllogismus, the first proposicio be vniuersall. I call that proposicio vniuersall, when there is omnis, that is to saie, all: or els nullus, that is to say, none, in the proposicion. As for example. Every vice is to be punished, this proposicion is vniuersall, because it hath omnis, in it, whiche signifieth al, or euery one. Likewise I call it particular, when the proposicion hath quidam or aliquis, that is to saie, certaine
or

Of Logique. fol. 49.

or some body, quidam aulici sūt honeſti, some Courtiers be honest.

¶ The second rule.

If one of the propositions bee particular, or negative, the conclusion is particular, or negative. I cal that proposition negative, when nullus, or nemo, (that is to saie) none, or no body, is in the proposition. As nullus Christianus est foenerator, no Christian is an vsurar.

¶ The third rule.

In a perfecte argument, bothe the propositions, can neither be negatives nor yet particulars together, for euen as of twoo negatives, there foloweth nothyng, so of twoo particulars, there foloweth nothyng. Therefore, when any suche argument is made, we maie boldly saie, it is not lawfull, because it is in no Mode, as it is verie plaine to see in makynge of this argument folowynge.

Some Courtiers are riche,
Ponder felow wil be a courtier
Therefore he shalbe riche.

Or thus.

¶ i.

Some

The arte

{ Some bishoppes are good.

{ Suche a one is a bishop.

{ Therfore he is a good bishoppe

This argumēt is not lawfull, first, because by my rule I am taught, that of pure particulars, nothyng dooth followe, as Quidam (some) is a particular. Ego, I, is a singular woorde, or signifying, as much as a proper name, & again it is in no figure, as hereafter I shall shewe. Thirdly, it is mete that the first part of the second proposition, should be included in the first proposition, wherof some what is reherſed, or els it is no good argument, in the first figure.

{ Some kynges be righteous.

{ Nero is a kyng.

{ Therfore Nero is righteous.

This is no good argumēt, because that Nero (whiche is the first worde in the second proposition, of whom some thyng is reherſed) is not comprehēded vnder the former part of the first proposition, whiche is some kynges, for this former parte (some Kynges) doth not speake of Nero, nor comprehend suche
as

Of Logique. fol. 50.

as he is, but honest, and godly disposed
gouernors. And yet in weightie causes
such argumentes haue been vsed, euē
of those, that would haue drawē vs frō
the obedience of gods holy worde, and
perswaded some that we wer free, frō
the obseruacion of any one thing, com-
prehended in Moses lawes. As thus.

The lawe of Moses is abolished
from the Gentiles.

The lawe of the ten commaun-
demētes, is the lawe of Moses.

Ergo the lawe of the .x. commaun-
dementes, is abolished from
the Gentiles.

Wheras this first propolition, com-
prehendeth not all the lawes of Moses
but the Lawes Ceremoniall, whiche
wer as figures, ordeined in declaraci-
on of Christes coming, and there-
fore, the scripture saith untill Ihon,
the Lawe was, and the Prophetes, si-
gnifying that in Ihons tyme, he was
come, in whom the olde Ceremoniall
lawes, wer fully verified and fulfilled
whiche at his cōmpng, began to cease,
sepng in hymself, was the fulfillng of

Ceremoniall la-
wes abrogated.

Th. ij. the

The arte

Moral lawes
must be obser-
ued of all.

the lawe, not that wee should not ob-
serue the moral lawes of the heauenly
preceptes, commaunded by **GOD**, for
Christe hymself, repeteth the obserua-
cion of theim, yea, he byndeth vs to a
more straightnesse, that not onely wee
should dooe no euill, but that also wee
should consent to none euill: therefore
this first proposicio, is not general, but
particular, & so though the ceremontial
law be gone, yet the moral law tarieth
still, accordyng to **Christes** holy will.

The double
repete.

Medius terminus, called the dou-
ble repete (whiche is a worde reherfed
in bothe proposicions) muste not entre
into the conclusion, because the other
two partes, called termini, be proued
by this, and brought to the conclusion,
by reason thei agree with this thirde,
the whiche two, otherwise could not
entre into the conclusion, if this dou-
ble repete, wer not mencioned in bothe
proposicions, and kept out it self from
the conclusion, as is euidently to se by
an argumentacion.

The .v. rule.

In a perfect argument, called Syl-
logismus

logismus, there ought not to bee mo
wordes in the conclusion, then was be-
fore rehearsed. For mo thynges to be in
the cōclusion, this example shall serue.
whiche Antonius maketh, in the firste
booke of Tullie de oratore.

Unprofitable thynges are not
to be taught.

In Philosophie are vnprofita-
ble thynges.

Ergo Philosophie is not to bee
taught.

This argumēt is to be denied, because
there is more in the conclusion, then
was rehearsed in the twoo first proposi-
tions. For this should haue been the
conclusion. Some vnprofitable thyng-
ges, whiche be in Philosophie, are not
to be learned, not that Philosophie it
self, is to bee reiected, for els we might
make this argument likewise.

Drunkenes is not to be allowed
An drinking is often times dron-
kenesse.

Therefore drinkyng at any tyme,
is not to be allowed.

Therefore we must frame our argu-

ment

The arte

ment so, that nothyng bee more in the conclusion, then was in the other propositions. As thus.

{ Drunkenes is not to be allowed
In some drynkynge is oftē tymes
drunkennes.

{ Therefore some drynkynge is not
to be allowed.

The. vi. Rule.

But three termes in an argumentacion, then three, for otherwise there is no good argument.

Every politicall magistrate ought to kepe vnder, disobedient persones, with corporall punishment.

{ Peter is an Apostle.

{ Therefore Peter should punish
the disobedient.

In this argument is no ioyning together, of the first proposition, and the second: for the politicall Magistrate, & an Apostle, are two maner of thynges. Therefore it hangeth together like germaines lippes, as we vse to saie.

The. vii. Rule.

Why the double repete ought to be mencioned in both propositions, ought to

Of Logique. Fol. 52.

to be no doubtfull worde, for doubtful
wordes make .iiij. severall termes, whi-
che should not be, as thus.

bee no doubt-
full worde.

No bondman is free.

Anabaptists
reason.

All that beleue the gospel tru-
ly, are free.

Ergo none that beleue the go-
spell truly, are bond men.

This argumēt is false, and must be
denied at the first, because there be .iiij.
termes, for in the first propolicion, free-
dom, is taken for suche a libertie as mē
do vse in common weales, to make ser-
uauntes, and apprentises free, in the se-
cond propolicion, fredome is taken for
deliuerpug the soule from the wrath of
God, from sinne, and frō death euerla-
sting, as we rede in the scripture. Whō
the sonne hath made free, thei are free
in very dede, not that this fredō taketh
awaie all orders in the common weale,
that no man shall haue an appretise, or
a bondman. For although the father in
heauē, through Iesus Christ hath made
theim free from synne, and that once
for euer, yet are thei still apprentises,
and bond by a politicall lawe, therefore

fredome thoo
waies taken.

Th. iiij.

we

The arte

We maie se that there be.iiij. partes or termes, considering he speaketh of one libertie, in the first propolition, and of another in the seconde, so that the argument is not good. A like argument there is, whiche one made to Diogenes

A Sophistes
reason to Dio-
genes.

{ That whiche I am, thou art not
I am a man.
Ergo thou art none.

There is an ambiguite in this verbe (I am) for if it be vnderstanded in the first propolitiō, that this worde (I am) is not considered, accordyng to the generall substance, but accordyng to the qualitie, or rather proper being, speaking of the diuersitie of men, as whē I liue, I haue myne owne body, my flesh and myne owne bones, thou hast thynne owne proper vnto thee, and not that I am thou, nor yet thou art I: Then it is well said, that whiche I am, thou art not. But if I vnderstand this word (I am) in the first propolitiō, as a substance vniuersal, or rather general copulatiue, to bee reherſed of the inferior, then it is good. For as I maie saie, Diogenes is a man, Aristotle is a man
so

so I maie saie of all men. Whereby we
maie se here also. iij. partes, or termes
and therfore the argument must be de-
nied at the firste, geuyng this reason,
that I haue shewed before.

Notwithstandyng, Diogenes answere
red this Sophist very pretely, and abas-
shed him at the first. For whereas he pro-
pounded the same vnto hym, & thought
therby to haue geue hym a fople, Dio-
genes streight vpon rehearsal of this said
argument, told hym thus, thine argu-
ment is true enough felowe, if I should
reherse it vnto thee my self, and neded
then no solution at all: for thy maners
beyng naught, makes thee to be no mā

Diogenes
answere.

¶ Settlyng or playng of an argument.

In that I haue set furth the
preceptes, which are to be ob-
serued in an argument, I will
declare how to settle and place
an argument, that any body maie geue
a reason, why euery worde is set in an
argument, in this, or that place. First,
therefore wee muste consider, there
bee three figures, whiche serue for the
makynge of an argument, and modes also.

Settlyng or pla-
cing of an argu-
ment.

2. v. whiche

The arte

Whiche teache the ordering of proposi-
tions, whether they shalbe vniuersall,
particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue, I
will define them bothe after this sort.

¶ figure.

¶ The first figure

A figure is a lawfull placing of the
double reapeate, in the .ii. propositions,
and euen as a double reapeate is placed
so we maie iudge with ease, in what fi-
gure the argument is. The first figure
is suche an order of propositions in an
argument, that the double reapeate must
be the former part, in the first proposi-
tion, & the last reherfed part, in the se-
cond proposition, whereupon the con-
clusiō doth folow. And the reason that
it must be so, is because that whereas in
this figure, the argument is euermore
made frō the generall, to the kynd vni-
uersally (for the first proposition euermore
in these .ii. figures, must bee vni-
uersal, either affirmatiue, or negatiue)
and by reason of the said generall, ther
is somewhat reherfed of the kynd: one
of the propositions must bee so placed,
that it maie evidently appere, that the
kynde is included in the generall. And
therfore the generall is spoken, in the
second

Of Logique. Fol. 54.

Second propolition of the kind.

A mode is a lawfull placing of propolitions, in their due qualitie, or quantitie. I call that in the propolition a qualitie, when it doth affirme or deny. I call it a quantitie, when it is either vniuersal, or particular. Unto the first figure belong. iiii. modes, whiche maie be perceiued by these foure wordes.

mode.

Qualitie in a propolition and quantitie.

Foure modes to the first figure.

Barbara.
Celarent.
Darii.
Ferio.



These foure wordes signifie nothyng, but seruyng for notes onely and markes, wherby euery propolition is known, either to bee vniuersall, or particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue, must not bee forgotten, if we will make an argument truely in the first figure, for euery argument that is made in this figure. is in one of these. iiii. modes, or els it is no argument of the first figure. If the double repete be the former part in the first propolitiō, and the last reherfed part in the second propolition,

The arte

sicion, it is in the first figure, notwithstanding, except it be in mode also, it is no argument. Therefore we must learne to place an argument in mode also. And for the better knowlege of this thing, note that in these modes, there be .iiij. vowels to be considered, and marked. That is to say, A. E. I. & O. And the rather to helpe memory, I haue framed a rule for these foure vowelles, in these two verses.

A, dooeth affirme: E, dooeth deny, whiche are bothe vniuersall:

I dooth affirme, O dooth deny, whiche we particular call.

For where we se A in Barbara thise we must consider y these. A. A. A. in this one word, declare vnto vs. in. vniuersal propositions affirmatiue. E, declareth a proposition negatiue vniuersall. As in Celarent we se twice E, wherby we are taught that the argument (if we make it in this mode) must haue two vniuersall negatives, and one vniuersal affirmatiue, by reason of A, which is in the midst of Celarent. I dooeth signifie a particular

Of Logique. Fol. 55.

particular affirmatiue. O. doth signifie
a particular negatiue, as in Ferio, the
first must be a negatiue vniuersall, the
secōd an affirmatiue particular. Again
the consonautes, as firste the capitall
letters placed in the beginning of eue-
ry mode, as B. C. D. F. and also the final
consonant letters, whiche are included
and be within ^s wordes of euery mode
both of the second and third figure, as
C. M. P. S. euery one of these haue their
proper meanynge. As B. in any mode,
of the secōd, and third figure, declareth
that the argument of that mode, beynge
not plain for vnderstādyng, or not true
in sense, or perhapps, not apt to proue
a present cause, the same may be redu-
ced to the mode Barbara, of the first fi-
gure, whiche shall make the argument
appere more plain: C, sheweth ^s right
pathe to Celarent: D, openeth the gate
to Darii: F, maketh faire passage to
Ferio: G, that is not in the beginning
of any the Modes, of the seconde and
thirde figure, but placed within the
wordes, declareth that the contra-
dictorie of the conclusion, must bee ta-
ken

The arte

ken, (if ye will reduce the argument to the firste figure) ioyning thereunto, and vsing as a thyng graunted one of the propositions, with the conclusiō altryng the other proposition, that remaineth, by contradicciō also: & beside setting one of the twoo propositions in the others place.

P. sheweth that the proposition must bee altered, by conuerſion of the accidente, S, telleth that the proposition must be chaunged, by plain conuerſion.

¶ What is a reduccion.

What is a reduccion.

A Reduccion is a right frampng of an argumēt, and (as a mā would saie) a newe probaciō, by another mode & figure, of that thing, which was proued before, bothe by the second and third figure: as thus. To make a thing otherwise, then it was before, to reduce it, or to bring it to more plain vnderstandng, in the shape and forme of the first figure, is called reduccion.

¶ The diuision of a Reduccion.

The diuision of a reduccion.

A Reduccion is of twoo sortes. The one is a demonstraciō, whiche sheweth the argument more plainly,

plainly, that before was couched darkly, the other is a reduccion to that, whiche is impossible, commonly so termed, because in any suche alteration, the contradictorie is vsed in the other argument, when any suche reduccion is made, from the seconde or third figure, to the first figure. And this rule is for ever true: that two contradictories can neuer be bothe true. The first called a demonstratiue, or the vponing reduccion, is made by conuerſion of the propoſitions, and by displacynge of the ſame, ſettynge one in anothers ſtede, ſayynge onely, the concluſion is alwaies one, and kepeth his place ſtill.

Propoſitions

Demonſtratiue
reduccion.

The other crooked waye (called of the Logicians, Reductio ad impoſſibile) is a reduccion to that, whiche is impossible, when the contradictorie of the propoſitions is vsed, and brought to the firſte figure. So that theſe two Argumentes, after the reduccion is made, can neuer bee bothe true, conſiderynge the contradictorie. As for example, in the mode Baroco, and the ſecond figure.

Reduction to
impoſſibilities

all

The arte

- Ba. All true Christians, refuse to
get goddes vngodly,
ro. Some merchautes refuse not
to get goodes vngodly.
co. Therefore some merchautes
are no true Christians.

Here if myne aduersary shall saie,
that the conclusion foloweth not wel,
and that though the other be true, yet
the consequent is false, I make force
hym by reduccion, to graunt it to bee
true. And therfore, takyng the contras-
dictorie of the conclusion, and placyng
thesame in the seconde proposicion, and
alteryng the seconde proposicion, by
contradiccion also, makyng it the con-
clusion: I shal force hym to graunt my
first argument to be true. As for exam-
ple, I will take the contradictorie of
the conclusion, whiche is: Every mer-
chaunt manne is a true Christian, and
likewise the contradictorie of the se-
conde proposicion, puttynge the one in
the others place, and thus I will rea-
son. If my firste argument bee false,
then this argument is true, because
it is the contradiccion of my first.

All

Of Logique. Fol. 57.

**Al true Christiāns refuse to gette
gooddes vngodly.**

**Al merchauntes are true Chris
tians.**

**Therefore al merchauntes refuse
to get gooddes vngodly.**

**Every one seeth that this argument
is false, beyng the contradiction of the
other: Ergo the firste reason is true.
And this is the vse of Reduction by a
contradictorie, violently to force the
graūt of our sayng. For if this reason
be false, the other muste bee true, but
this is false: Ergo the other is true.**

**That these thynges may be more eui
dent to make an Argument, both in fi
gure, and mode, and so to reduce the
same, and bynge it to the argumentes
of the first figure: I will first geue ex
amples for every mode of this first fi
gure, that one maye plainly see the
whole matier as though it ware in a
glasse, remēbyng alwayes, that these
modes serue for this figure, which fi
gure is knowen (as I said before) whe
the double repete is the former part of
the first Proposition, and the laste re**

I. i.

herled

The arte

herfed part of the feconde propoficion. And where as I fayd before that certayne argumentes wer in no mode, althoug they ware in the firfte figure, & therfore not good becaufe they ware not in one mode, and figure, thefe fhall be to vnderftand, they ware not in one mode, becaufe the firft propoficio muft be vniuerfal euer, or els it is not good. Now therfore here folowe examples of the firfte figure, and of the modes thereof.

The firft figure.

C The firft example is a perfect argument, beyng vniuerfal and alfo affirmatiue.

The firft figure.

Bar: Al honest thynges are to be embzased.
ba: Al chriſtian lawes made by a chriſtian Magiſtrate are honeſt.
ra Therfore al chriſtia lawes made by a chriſtia magiſtrate are to be embzased.

C A perfect argument vniuerſal negatiue.

Ce: No contēner of the Maſgiſtrate is a chriſtian.
All

Of Logique. Fol. 58.

Magistrate. { Ia: All Anabaptistes are con-
temners of the Magis-
trate:
rent Therefore no Anabaptist
is a Christian.

A perfect argument particular
affirmative.

Apprehendeth the fa-
uour of God. { Da: What soever apprehen-
deth the fauour & grace
of God, the same on-
ly doth iustifie.
ris: Faith only apprehendeth &
faour & grace of God.
s. Ergo faith only doth ius-
tifie.

A perfect argument particular
negative.

Extorcioner. { Fe: No extorcioner is godly
ris: Some riche mā is an ex-
torcioner.
o. Ergo some riche man is
not godly.

The first figure helpeth moost of al
in teachyng or setting forth the thynges
at large which we wold haue knowe.
All Artes haue their general preceptes,
I.ij. and ther

The arte

and therfore the vse of them is practis-
sed in this figure. The Philosopher
saith. Every good thyng the more cō-
mune it is, & better it is. The Logiciā
saith: Al thynges are made for some o-
ne ende. Scripture sheweth, that eue-
ry man is bound to loue his neighbour
as himself. Every one of these general
lessons serue well for this figure, and
may with ease bee framed for proufe of
our matier. Also if we minde eyther to
confute or confirme any cause, it ser-
ueth very wel. Neyther can any cause
be mēcioned, but the same may in this
figure be fashioned, considering every
question hath here an apt frame, bee it
either vniuersal, or particular, affir-
matiuē, or negatiue.

The seconde figure is. Where the
double repete is the last rehearsed part
in both Propositions after this sorte
folowynge, and there bee foure modes
belōgging to the same figure, as it shal
appere, which al they haue these foure
vowels in the. A. E. I. O. so that they
make the Proposition to be vniuersal
or particular, affirmatiue or negatiue,
as it

as it was before.

Note that the conclusion is alwayes negative, for asmuch as the first, & the second, are alwayes repugnaunt, neyther do they agre in the double re: peate, called Medius terminus. And therfore the conclusion is negative by contraposition, whereof I spake before when I entreated of the conuer: sion, or turnyng of propositions.

The second Figure.

An Argument vniuersal negative reduced to the first figure, by plaine conuer: sion of the former proposition.

Ex: No iust man before God
hath an vnquiet, and
doubtful conscience.
sa: Al they that trust to bee
iustified by their wor:
kes, haue vnquiet con:
sciences.
re: Therfore none trustyng
to his workes, is iuste
before God.

The second figure

An argumēt vniuersal negative, reduced to the first figure, makyng the seconde proposition altered by plaine conuer: sion, to be the former and first Propo: sition.

The arte

sicion, and the first propolition to bee the second: and the conclusion also to be altered by plaine conuerſion.

- Q**uestiōneſſe of the minde.
- Ca:** The Chriſtian righteouſneſſe, is the pureneſſe of the minde.
- me:** To weare a tipete, a coule, a ſhaue croun, is not the purenes of the minde.
- Ares** Therfore the outwarde attire is not the chriſtian righteouſneſſe.

A Particular argument reduced to the firſt figure, altering onely the firſt propoſition by plaine conuerſion.

- Con-ſe-
quēce
Philoso-
ſophie**
- Fe:** No true diuine contenteth Philoſophie.
- Fi:** Some Engliſh preachers contēne Philoſophie.
- no** Ergo ſome Engliſh preachers are no true diuines.

A This Argument is reduced to Barbara only takyng the cōtradictorie of the ſecond propoſition and the conclusion, and ſetting theſe, ſ. the one in others place.

To

Of Logique. Fol. 60:

Bar All Christians refuse to
gette goodes vngodly.
Pro Some merchautes refuse
not to gette goodes vngodly
Co Therfore some merchautes
are no Christians.

To get
goodes
vngodly

The vse of the second figure.

In debatynge matiers which stande
in controuersie, wee may gette muche
helpe by this seconde figure, for euer
more when wee dissent from other in
opinion, this figure helpeth muche for
lappynge vp of our argument. As if one
should say. All workes are allowed be
fore God, that are doen of a good entet
I might aunswere thus, no Hipocritic
cal workes, no propiciatorie massig, no
meritorious prayng, although they be
doen for a good entet, are yet to be al
lowed before god. And so I might replie
& frame mine argument in this figure
against the aboue rehersed sentence.

The. iij. figure is, where the double
repete is the former part in both **Pro**
posicions. And there be. vi. modes of the
same figure. Note also that the cōclu
sion must nedes bee particular in this
I. iij. figure

framing of the
thirde figure.

The arte

figure where the former parte in both propoſitions is the double repeate, for like as we reaſon in the firſt figure from the general worde, to the kynd that is from the vniuerſal, to the particular, ſo in this figure wee reaſon from the kinde (whiche is leſſe) to the generall worde, which is more vniuerſal, but ſo not withſtandynge, that the concluſion be particular. and therfore this kynde of Argument is very good. For the Species, or kinde, beynge ones put, the general, muſt nedes folowe.

¶ The thirde figure.

¶ This Argument is reduced to Darri, the ſecond Propoſitiō beynge altered by conuerſion of the Accident.

The thirde figure.

Com- mune weale.	{	Da:	Euery commune weale is goddes ordinaunce.
	{	rap:	Euery commune weale hath nede of lawes, & armoure.
	{	ri	Therefore ſome lawes & armoure are Goddes ordinaunce.

¶ This Argument is reduced to Ferio, the ſecond Propoſitiō beynge altered onely by conuerſion of Accident.

¶ Vertue

Of Logique. Fol. 61.

Fe: No vertue shoulde hee
eschued.
lap: All vertue hath her wo
with her.
ton Therfore some wo should
not be eschewed.

C This Argument is reduced to Darff, the
second Proposition nothing altered, but
onely sette in the first place, and the firste
sette in the seconde place, beyng altered by
plaine conuersion, and the conclusion in
like maner.

Di: Mercie onely forgeueth
spunes.
sa: All mercie is purchased
by faith:
mis Therfore by faith onely
forgeuenesse is obtey
ned.

C This Argument is reduced to Darff, the
seconde Proposition altered, by plaine
conuersion.

Da: Al Hipocrites cōpte will
workes highe holines.
ti: Some Hipocrites haue
ben Bishoppes.
si Therfore some Bishop
pes haue compted will
workes high holines.

f.v. This

The arte

This argumēt folowing is reduced to Bar-
bara, the conclusiō first beyng altered by
cōtradiction & made the first propoſitiō
the ſeconde ſtandynge as it doeth, and kee-
pyng the own place ſtill: the propoſitiō
at large which was befoze the firſt, nowe
altered and made the concluſion by con-
tradiction.

Battail.	{	Bo: Some battail is not to be eſchewed.
		car: Every battail is full of much miſerie.
		do Ergo ſome miſery is not to be eſchewed.

This argument folowynge is reduced to
Ferio, the ſecond Propoſitiō beyng al-
tered onely by plaine conuerſion.

Mal- cious man.	{	Fe: No maliciouſe man is of God.
		ri: Some maliciouſe man is a Preacher.
		ſon. Therefore ſome preacher is not of God.

The uſe of the thirde Figure.

This figure profiteth much in pro-
upng particulare thyngeſ, and gathe-
ryng of coniectures in cauſes that are
doubtfull, when probabilitie onely
& no aſſured knowlege, bouldeth out
the

the truth of a matier. And because seueral thynghes come soonest to our senses, we vse suche gatherynge most commonly, & by trial of particular causes, assure our selues of þe truth generally.

It is very necessarie þe there should be .iiij. figures, as I haue shewed already. for in euery argumēt that hath the shape of a Syllogismus (for þe inductio and the example haue it not, neyther be they in mode & figure) euermore we reason from the general to the kinde vniuersal, makynge the conclusion vniuersal; or els we reason from the kinde, to the general, makynge the conclusion particular; or els there is a repugnancie of the terme at large, and the seuerall, when they do not agree with the double repete; or laste of all wee ioyne many causes, and many effectes together, whereof is made an Argument, called forites or coaceruatio, that is to say, a heappynge together of thynghes.

The figures necessary.

When wee make an argument, and procede from the general worde, to the kinde, it is in the first figure, and euen by our reason wee learne this, that if the

first figure

The arte

the greater bee not, the lesse cānot be. And thus, if one be not a liuving creature, how can he be a man, if he be a liuving creature, he must eyther be a man or a brute body.

When we procede from the kind, to the generall, makpng the conclusion particular, the argumēt is in the third figure. And this is for euer true, that when the kinde is reherſed, the general must nedes folow.

But when there is a repugnauncie in an argument of the terme of large, and the ſeuerrall, ſo that they agre not with a thirde word, it is euer in the ſeconde figure. And this is plaine to ſee that ſuch an argument muſt nedes be wel concluded, when wee go about to confute any thpng, ſepng that. ij. kindes which are repugnauit muſt nedes be diſſeuered, and ſo the conclusion to be made vpon the ſame. As it is eaſie to ſe in the argumentes of the ſeconde figure. Therefore it is good reaſon that both there ſhould be thre figures, and alſo that the Argument doth wel procede bepng made in any of them.

Some

Of Logique. Fol. 63.

Some tymes an argument is made
whē we couple many causes together
& the very effectes of the same, as thus.

Quermuch gourmandise hyndzeth
digestion in the stomake.

By euill digestion in the stomake,
corrupte blode is engendred in
the liuer.

When euill blod is bred in the liuer
euill humors are spred throught
out al the body.

Euill humours spred throught out
the body, cause a distemperature
in the body, & after that bring
the dropsey.

Therefore ouermuche gourmandise
causeth dropsey.

Gourmandise
causeth dropsey.

Of an vnperfecte argument, called
Enthimema.

An vnperfecte Argument, is an
Argument wantyng some one
parte, the whiche is, when one
proposition is reherſed, and the
conclusion straight brought in there vpon,
as thus. That is not good which
bringeth a man to mischefe. Therefore
mony

An vnperfecte argument.

The arte

mony is not good. The Bible teacheth a man his dutie to wardes God, & his neighbour. Ergo it is necessary to bee knowne, & read of euery bodie. Pleasure bryngeth endles paine after it. Ergo pleasure is to be eschued. These argumentes be vnperfect argumentes wantyng one Proposition euermore, the which if we adde, a perfect argumentation foloweth thereupon, as thus.

Whatsoever bryngeth endlesse paine after it, that same is to be eschued.

Pleasure bryngeth endlesse paine after it,

Ergo pleasure is to be eschued.

These vnperfecte argumentes called Enthymemata, consist partely of likelyhodes, and partely of infallible reasons.

likelyhodes.

Likelyhodes, are those, that often hitte the truth, and yet are not alwayes so, as thus

Suche a yong man talketh often, and that alone also, with suche a yong maide.

Ergo he is in loue with her.

This

Of Logique. Fol. 64.

This may be true, and this may be false. for although the conjecture haue some probabilitie with it, yet is it not for euer true. The other called infallible reasons, or rather necessarie argumentes, muste by all reason bee euer more true, as thus.

Infallible reasons.

Such a woman is brought in bed.

Ergo, she hath had the company of a man.

¶ Another.

The Sunne is risen:

Ergo it is day.

Therefore in all communicacion, good hede ought to be taken, that likelihoodes of thynges, bee not vsed for necessarie reasons.

¶ Of an Argument, called
Syllogismus Expositorius.

This kynde of argument hath euermore a known prope, to be as the double repete in both Propositions: contrarie to the maner of al other Argumentes, and it may be referred to the thirde figure.

An Example made by a known prope.

Paul doth alleage godly saynges of the Ethniques.

Paul

The arte

Paul was a Preacher.

Ergo a Preacher may alleage godly saynges of the Ethniques.

For what soeuer is truely gathered of particular thinges, the same also is propre to thynges generall, and what soeuer agreeth to the kind, agreeth also to the difference, or propriete, of the said noone propre.

Inductio.

An induction.

In Induction, is a kynde of Argument when we gather sufficiently a nōbre of propre names and there vpon make the conclusion vniuersal, as thus.

Abraham was iustified by his faith
Likewise Isaac,
Likewise Jacob,
Likewise Gedeon,
Likewise Dauid,
And all the holy men besides without exception.

Ergo al that be iustified before God, are iustified by their faith.

Can other example.

Dathan

Dathan for disobedience againste Rebeller by
wretchedly
the superiour powre, ended hys lyfe
wretchedly.

Likewise Abiron,

Likewise Choraz,

Likewise Semei.

Neither is there any example to
the contrary.

Therefore all Rebelles, and traitors
to their Prince, and King, shal
die wretchedly.

An other example.

Nembroth although he was a folie
hunter, yet he liued lyke a wretche in
great miserie.

Laban also liued wretchedly,

Pharao was sore plagued,

Amalech, Madian, Abimelech,

Herode, with other were scourged
greuously for their wickednes, neither
is there any example to the contrary.

Therefore the ende of wickedmen
is wretched.

The ende of the
ungodly is wretched.

This kynde of Argument is called
Inductio, because that shewing diuers
se propre names, it enduceth at length
and moueth the mind to make a gene:

R. j.

ral

The arte

call conclusion. Therefore necessary it is, that in suche argumentes al the examples whiche are induced be like, for if any be found contrary, the argumēt is of no force, as thus.

Athanasius liued vnnaried.

Ambrosius liued vnnaried.

Basilus had no wife, and a great manie mo.

Ergo all Bishoppes heretofore ware vnnaried.

Bishoppes married in the primitive church.

The Apostles had wives.

The argument is not lawfull, forasmuche as diuerse haue bene married in the Primitive Church, as Spiridon, Hermes, Philarius, Policrates, Tertullianus, and diuerse other. For it was the maner in y^e primitive church, that honest married men ware chosen to be Bishoppes, & had the charge of Christs flocke. The Apostles also (as Egnatius witnesseth) had wyes as well as other men, and as I thinke vsed them, as other mē do their wiues, or elles asked their leaue, and consent to forbear them.

Socrates vsed a kynde of Induction by askyng manie questions, the whiche

Whiche all when they were graunted, Socrates' induction.
 he brought thereupon his confirmaciō
 concernyng the present controuersie,
 which kynde of argumēt hath his name
 of Socrates himselfe, called by y^e lear-
 ned Socrates Inductiō. As if I might
 reason thus, lamentyng the miserie of
 mākinde, wherin so few are good, & so
 many euell. Alas in what state bee we
 mortal mē, sepyng in al ages there hath
 noue bene almost good. I praie ye how
 many good folke were there when all
 the worlde was drouned? Suerly not
 past eight in all. Howe many were
 found good in the Citie of the Sodo-
 mites when the whole was burnt for
 abhominable sinne with fire and brim-
 stoue? Not ten, no not eight, no not six
 could be found, as it appeareth plain in
 the .xviij. & .xix. Chap. of Gene. Howe
 many in the lande of promise, when sixe
 hundred thousand fyghtyng men wēt
 out of Egypte? Alas but two onely.
 How many did swarue frō God euer-
 liuyng, and bowed to an Idoll in the
 tyme of Helias? forsooth all the peo-
 ple, sayng Helias & seven thousande:

R. y.

How

The arte

Few godlie in
all ages.

How many trybes of the Israelites
folowed God? Two onely, where as
the other .x. clerely forsoke hym. How
many did the lorde compte to be his in
the lande of Syria? None at al, saving
Naham the officer, and the widowe of
Sarepta. Howe manie feared God,
when Tobias was persecuted? To-
bias onely. How many founde Christ,
whā he was here hymselfe vpon earth?
But twelue that he chose as fapthful,
and yet one was a traitour after ward.
Therefore thus maie I conclude the
godlie people in all ages are small in
number.

The vse.

We profite muche by this kynde of
Argument: for hereby we haue p^r assu-
red knowlege of those groundes, whiche
the nature hath grafted in vs. As wher
nature telleth vs y^e the whole is grea-
ter then the partes, we can not other-
wise knowe it, but by shewing it to be
true in this substance, and that sub-
stance, and so in all other, wherupon
we conclude that this generall sayng
is true. Aristotle saith, this argument
serueth

serueth wel to persuaide the multitude,
 when we gather many lyke thynges, &
 at last after suche heappng, conclude þ
 oure argument is generally true. As
 I harde ones a Doctor of Diuinitie,
 whiche was not so great in knowlege
 as he was in tittle, a litle before the ba-
 nishment of the masse, earnestly defen-
 dyng his cause with examples of suche
 and suche worshipfull, as dwelt there
 in the countrie. Doth not suche a man
 (& he) deuoutely heare masse? Doth
 not suche a knyght, suche a lord, suche
 a ladie, and suche a ientlemā full reuer-
 rently come to the blessed masse? The
 neighbours (quod he) if all these do so,
 and none but heretiques folowe the
 contrarie, why should not you folowe
 the best, & forsake þ worst. With þ the
 people (hearing such a patched reason)
 wate wōderfully persuaaded to sale as
 he said, & if nede had bene, ready to ha-
 ue died (but not with him, for he wold
 none of that hymselfe, beyng come ho-
 me spys gaply well) but alone, and to-
 gether themselues, if suche extremitie
 had bene offered. Agayn this kynde of

A Doctors induc-
 tion in behoue of
 the Masse.

The arte

argumentacio profiteth much to dilate
a matter at large, & thereby the truth
maie the rather be allowed, when it is
founde true in euery singulare thynge.

De Exemplo.

An argument cal
led an example.

Marcus Attili^o
Regulus.

Alexander.

Example, is a maner of argu
mentation, where one thynge is
proued by an other, for the like
nes, that is found to be in the
both, as thus,. If Marcus Attilius
Regulus, had rather lose his life, tha
not kepe promise with his enemye, then
should euery man beyng taken prisoz
ner kepe promise with his enemye. If
cities haue bene destroyed for breaking
of wedlocke, then adulterers must ne
des be punished. If Alexander dafoned
a weake souldiour whē he was almost
frozen for colde, and did sette hym in
his owne chaire againste the fier: then
should al captaynes, and men of warre
be tendre ouer there pooze warriours
and base souldiours.

Euer more take hede that in thys
kinde of argument the causes be like of
both sydes, or els the argument pro
ueth not, as thus.

Peter

Of Logique. Fol. 68.

Peter killed Ananias taken with an open lye.

Therefore spiritual ministers, may punish the open offendours, with temporall sword.

The examples are not like. Peter did kill Ananias with the worde, and powre of the holy Ghoste: therefore preachers must not kill the body, but only excommunicate men, accompting them vnworthie to be in the congregacion. The sword is laful for the temporal Magistrate only, & for none other.

Note Peter killed Ananias.

The vse.

He that hath store of examples, is well hable to perswade & willpng hearer, & shal much delight euen the deuotie eared also, that must nedes heare alwaies fine matiers, and straunge examples, to please hys fanisie with all.

Sorites. An heappng argument.

Sorites, vel coaceruatio, is a heappng together of causes, one, vpon an other. A kynd of Argument when the last reversed worde of the first Proposition, is repeted in the first parte of the second.

A heappng argument.

R. liij.

conde

The arte

conde propoficion, neceffarily agreyng
thereunto, and fo goyng ftill forth in
lyke maner, til at the length the laft re
herfed worde be added vnto the firfte
woorde, or former parte of the firfte
propoficion. And it is a kynd of argu
ment muche vfed, whē we ascende vp
ward from the loweft, to the hyghett.
Or els when we go from the caufes, to
the next thyng done. Whiche thynges
done are the occafion of other thynges
befides, as thus.

A man is a liuyng creature,
A liuyng creature is a liuely body.
A liuely body is a fubftaunce,
Ergo a man is a fubftaunce.

Where the Lawe is, there is trans
greffion,

Where there is transgreffio, there
is feare.

Where there is feare, there is re
moyle of conſcience.

Therefore, where the Lawe is, there
is remoyle of conſcience.

¶ An other.

Justification is not without faith.
Faith is not without a repētāt hart

There:

Of Logique. Fol. 69.

Therefore iustification is not without a repentant hart.

No Argumentes be made negatiue: by this kynd of Argumentacion, as thus.

The Gospell is not the Lawe.

The Lawe teacheth vs the feare of God.

Therefore the Gospell doth not.

¶ Or thus.

Christ the sonne, is not in person, God the father.

God the father is ever liuing.

**Therefore Christ is not ever liuing
But these, and suche like be as wise
as this that foloweth,**

Fishe is not fleshe,

Fleshe is meate.

Therefore fishe is none.

**And the reason is: No Argumentes
are made negatiuely by this kynde of
reasonyng. Neyther is the consequent
good, when wordes that agree not ne-
cessarily, are ioyued together.**

**Of euill maners are made good
Lawes.**

**Good Lawes are thynges worthy
K.v. to be**

The arte

to be praysed.

Thyngeſ worthy praiſe are to be deſpyed.

Therefore euell maners are to be deſpyed.

This knittynge is not lawfull, for euell maners of them ſelues, are not ſ occasion of good lawes, but the godlie mynd of good Magiſtrates is the very chiefe cauſe. As the diſeaſe, is not the cauſe of healyng, but rather the Phyſician, and his Medicines, and mans nature, whiche reſiſteth the poyſon of ſickenes is the very cauſe. Agayne in euery heappynge by of argumentes after ſuche ſorte, learne and marke, howe they procede, and you ſhall eaſely ſee falſe packynge.

Thus merie fellowes reaſon when they are at nale.

He that drynkes well, ſlepes wel,

He that ſlepes well, ſinnes not,

He that ſinnes not, ſhalbe ſaued.

Therefore let vs all drinke well, & we ſhalbe ſaued.

Marke the procedynge and ye ſhal eaſely auoide the errour, for although
in

in slepe, we sinne not, yet by drynkynge we cause sin, & although we slepe soundely after, yet no one man, at one time bothe drynketh and slepeth: therefore though in sleppynge he offendeth not, yet in drynking he passeth measure, & therefore the knyttynge is nought worth.

¶ An horned Argument.

Silemma, otherwise complexio, vel cornutus syllogismus, called a horned Argument, is when the reason consisteth of repugnaunt members, so that whatsoeuer you graunt, you fall into the snare, and take the foile. As yf I should aske whether it ware better to marie a faire woman, or a foul. If you saie a faire. The answer I, that is not good, for they comonly say, she wilbe comune, and then I maie saie, ye are touched with the horned argument, if that sayng be true. If you saie it wer good to marie an hard fauored womā, the answer, she wilbe lothsome, & so ye fall into an incōueniēce both waies. Notwithstanding if either of þ parties may be turned into the aduersaries necke agayne,

The arte

agayne, or both of them, it is a faulty argument. And you maye confute the same by inuersion, that is to saie, turninge hys taylor cleane contrarie, as thus. If I shall marie a faire woman, I shall haue great pleasure, and comfort in her: if I marie a browne woman, she shall not be commune to other, for few men will seke after her. Therfore I shall haue comfort both waies.

Christes answer
here beinge bro-
ken on the cheke

Christ himself (as Iohn witnesseth in the. xviij. chapter) vled this same kynde of Argument againste the ministers which stood by, & smote Iesus on the face, sayng: answerest thou the hie priest so? Iesus answered hym. If I haue euell spoken, beare witness of the euell: If I haue wel spoken, why smitest thou me?

Of briefe argu-
mentes.

De Consequentis.

It profitech not a litle, after y^e rehersall of suche argumentes briesly to shew the knittynge of Propositions, and to declare the maner of a short argument vttered by two propositions, whiche are sayde to stande vpon the antecedent and the conse-

Of Logique. Fol. 71.

consequent: as the Logiciens vse to terme them.

¶ The first Rule.

From the vniuersall gatherng to the particular, the argumēt goeth wel as thus.

All officers do their dutie,
Ergo this officer doth his dutie.

But not contrarie.

This officer doth his dutie,
Ergo all officers do their dutie.

¶ The second Rule.

From that, whiche by nature is in any thyng, to y^e whiche happeneth casually, or cometh by some miscuell, the reason is not good. As thus.

Sobze diet is good:

{ A feuer causeth sobze diet.

{ Ergo a feuer is good.

{ An other argument vled by the
Rompe byshop.

Synne doth not beget man.

The worke of lust begetteth man.

Therefore lust otherwise called concupiscentia, is no synne.

The second proposition is not true,
for wicked concupiscence, came in by
mans

The arte

Nature through
Gods strength en-
crease.

mannes folp, and hath muche defaced
that, which nature first ordeined. Ther
fore nature it self through god, geueth
encrease, whiche is muche contrary to
the wicked lust of concupiscence.

¶ The third rule.

Thynge disagreeing, are not con-
sidered both one waie, and with one
respekte.

The Gospell willeth vs to make
no difference of meates.

The Physicians apoint vs a diet,
and forbid vs this and that.

Ergo the Gospell, and the Phys-
icians teache thynge contrary.

These do not disagree, considering
their endes are diuerse. The scripture
forbiddeth superstition, in the obserua-
tion of daies: the Physicia hath respect
to the state of mannes body.

¶ The fourth rule.

The argument is good, when sub-
stances are set, according to their pro-
pre differēces. But when they are set,
the one against the other, according to
their accidentes, which are agreeing to
both, y^e argumēt is not good, as thus.

It is

Of Logique. Fol. 72.

It is lawfull for you, not to drinke
Wyne.

Ergo to drinke wine, is vnlawfull
Where as this woorde lawfull, is
commune to both, aswell to drinke, as
not to drinke. the argument which the
Sophiste made to Diogenes, made by
this rule be confuted.

The .v. rule.

Euery thyng, the more that other
thynges are through it, the same is al-
waies the more it self. As thus.

{ Water is hote through fire.

{ Ergo fire is more hote.

Another.

{ Some loue to marie for goodes.

{ Therefore they loue goodes best
of all.

Some argumētes made, according
to this rule, are nothyng true, & ther-
fore it is good to geue warnyng of the.

to haue it both
place and where
not.

It is wel saied, & truely, this rule
holdeth in causes, that are next adioyn-
nyng, and the whiche wholy compasse
a matter: not in those causes, that are
fetcht farre of, and beynge but halfe
causes,

The arte

causes, partely and by the waie, geue onely the occasion. As thus.

Duide came to be a Poete by his Master.

Therefore his maister is the greater Poete.

The argumēt is not good in those causes, that are but half causes, for Duide is not a Poete, onely because he learned Preceptes of his Master, but also because he had a greate aptnes by nature, and a wonderfull witte, to do better then another.

*S. Augustines
sayng vpon the
churche.*

Some hold fast vpon a sayng of S. Augustine, and buylde wonders vpon that text. I would not beleue the Gospell saith Augustine, except the Catholike churche did perswade me. And here vpon saie they.

The Gospell is beleued, for the churches sake.

Ergo the churche is of more auctoritie.

And here they heape a nombꝛe of mischiefes. Therefore (saie they) the church maie make lawes, & apoint traditions, whatsoeuer they be. But I
aunswere

Of Logique. Fol. 73.

answer thus, the Antecedent is false:
For I chiefly beleue the Gospel, con-
sidering God is the author: and seeing
the wonders that he hath doen, I geue
credite to it for his sake. I graunt we
do beleue the Gospel, for the churches
sake, but yet principally, for that God
is the chiefe author, that perswadeth
vs to receiue his worde, and after the
churche (as the second cause) telleth vs
that the Gospell is the truth of God.
Therefore if they wil make this suche
an argument, as they seme to say it is,
then this that foloweth, is of as good
force, for in al thynges it is like.

Howe shoulde I
know the church
or which wate it
had not the gospel
afors instructed
me.

This childe is a good boy, gramercie
rod.

Ergo the rod is better then the boy.
The chiefest cause of the boies good-
nesse, is God himselke whiche sendeth
his grace vnto him, the second cause is
his good frindes which chasten him for
his offence, and lastely the rodde, as an
instrument whereby the feate is
doen, helpeth forwarde to
bryng the boy to some
goodnesse.

L. 7. The

The arte
Of the second
part of Logique, called
Inuentio, that is to say, the
syndyng out of an
Argument.



Inuentio.

Hereto wee haue treat-
ed of the former part of
Logique, called in La-
tine Iuditium, that is to
say, Iudgement, or skil,
to declare the nature of
euery worde seuerally, to set the same
woordes in a perfecte sentence, and to
knitte them vp in Argument, so that
hereby wee might with ease espie, the
right frame in matiers, howe they a-
gree beyng lapped vp in ordre. Nowe
therfore the other part shalbe set forth
whiche is called Inuentio, whereby
we may finde argumentes, & reasons,
mete to proue euery matier where v-
pon question may ryse. This parte is
the store house of places wherein Ar-
gumentes

Of Logique. Fol. 74.

gumentes rest, vnto the whiche if wee conferre the matier which we entende to proue, there will appere diuerse arguments to confirme the cause. Like as they therfore that digge for golde in ground, do searche narrowli the vaines of the pearth, and by diligent marking the nature thereof, at length finde out the mine, whiche ones beynge founde, they straight byng it to light, for the onli behoue of mā: So he that wil reason wisely, as well for the comune profite of other, as for his owne priuate gayne, muste be a very diligent labourer, and cōsiderynge matiers are put to the proufe, wherin oftē resteth doubte, his parte muste be euermore to marke the nature of his cause, and to seeke cōfirmacion thereof in euery parte. First by the definition, the cause, the effecte, and propre office. Againe to see what is contrarie, what is lyke, and what thynges bee incident thereunto, the whiche all when he hath doen, he shal see at lengthe, that some one Argument aboue al other, serueth beste to confirme his cause, the whiche when

L.ij. With

The arte

with trauaile, he hath founde out, he may bryng to light and vse, accordyng to his wil.

¶ What a place is.

A place.

A similitude of
parable of hun-
tyng.



Place is, the resting corner of an argumēt, or els a marke whiche geueth warnyng to our memoize what we may speake probable, eyther in the one parte, or the other, vpon all causes that fal in question. Those that be good hare finders wil sone finde the hare by her fourme. For when they see the grounde beaten flatte round about, & faire to the sight: thei haue a narrow gesse by al likelihod that the hare was there a litle before. Likewyse the houtesman in huntynge the fore, will sone espie when he seeth a hole, whether it be a fore borrough, or not. So he that wil take profite in this parte of Logique, must bee like a hunter, and learne by labour to know the borroughes. For these places bee nothing els, but couertes or borroughes, wherein if any one searche diligently, he may finde game at pleasure. And al-
though

Of Logique. Fol. 7:

though perhappes one place faile him,
yet shal he finde a dousein other places,
to accomplishe his purpose. Therefore
if any one wil do good in this kynd, he
must go from place to place, & by sear-
chyng euery borough, he shal haue his
purpose vndoubtedlie in mosse part of
thē, if not in all. We se that euery pro-
posicion doth either affirme a thyng to
be true, or els denieth that it is true.
Therefore when any thing is constant;
ly saied, it nedeth somewhat euermore
to confirme it. As for example, The sa-
cramētes are necessarie in the chirche
of God. I may proue this sayng true,
by reasonyng from that place which is
called the end of euery thyng, as thus:

In al argumentes
either we affirme
or deny.

Argument vpon
respect of the end.

To geue testimonie of our faith, &
to nousel our selfe in the practise
therof is very necessarie.

The Sacramentes geue testimonie
of our faith, &c.

Ergo the Sacramentes are very
necessarie.

Sacramentes
necessarie.

When any Proposition doth denie,
it is nedefull to haue a thirde woorde
L. iij. which

The arte

Which may agree with one parte of the
proposicion. As if one should thus say.
Manne is not iustified by his workes.
The place of repugnaunt wordes that
doe altogether disagree geneth iuste
matier. And therfore I may say, Man
is not iustified by his workes, because
he is iustified by his faith onely. For
if mercie come by grace, and that fre;
lie, then workes cannot saue vs.

I shall proueth the firste,
therfore the second
is for ever
true.

Of Logique. Fol. 76:

The denifion of the places, which
are. xxiij. in nombre.

Some are inwarde places, called, Loci interni, and they are	{ Partely in the very substance, as	{ The definition. The general worde. The kynd. The propriety. The whole. The partes. The yoked worde.
	{ And partely incident to the substance, as	{ Wordes adioyned. The maner of doyng. The thyng conternyng.
Some are outwarde places, called, Externi, that is not in the substance or nature of the thing, but without it, and these are,	{ Either knytte with a nigh affinity, called, Cognata of the which	{ Some are causes, as { The efficient cause. The ende.
	{ Some are those whiche springe of the causes, called, Conuenta as	{ The effect The thyng appointed for some ende.
	{ Either applied to the thing, not being the cause thereof, but onely geuyng a name thereunto, called Applicata, as	{ The place The time. Thynges annexed.
	{ Or els they be Accidentes, whereof there be. v.	{ Thynges chauncing Sentences of the sage. The name of a thing Thynges compared. Thynges like.
	{ Or els they are repugnauncies, as	{ Discordantes. Thynges differing.

L.iiij. There

The arte

Of the definition.

There be seven places which are in the substance or nature of the thynge.

The definition.

The general worde.

The kynde.

The proprietie.

The whole.

The partes.

The yoked wordes.

The definition.

Definition is a perfect sentence whereby the very nature of the thynge it selfe, is sette furth and expounded. You may reason fro this place, both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely, as thus. Fortitude is a vertue, that fighteth in the querel of right. I maie reason thus from the definitiō to the thynge defined, if I will proue fortitude praisse worthy.

From the definition to the defined

Da; whatsoeuer is a vertue, fightyng in the querell of right, & same is praisse worthy.

Si; Fortitude is vertue, fighting in the querel of right
1. Therefore fortitude is praisse worthy.

If I will define a good thynge, and proue that money is not good, I may reason thus.

¶

Of Logique. Fol. 77.

Ce: No suche thyng is good,
as is desired for respect
of an other ende.

sa: Al mony is desired, for re:
spect of an other ende.

re Therefore no mony is good.

C The general rule.

To whom the definition doth agree
to the same also doth the thyng defined
belong. And contrary wise, both affir:
matiuelly and negatiuelly.

C The maner of reasonyng.

If Socrates be a liuing creature en:
dued with reason, then is he a man, if
he be a man, he is a liuing creature in:
dued with reason. If he be not a liuing
creature, &c. Then he is not a man. If
he bee not a man, then is he no liuyng
creature, endued with reason.

C The Use.

The nature of euery thyng, is kno:
wen by the definicio, and therefore this
place aboue al other is most necessary.

C Of the general worde.

The general word, is spoken of
many, & differ eyther in kynd,
or els differ in nombze, when

The general
worde.

L.v.

the

The arte

the question is asked, what it is, wee may reason negatiuely, frō this place, thus.

Sce: No vertue may be called wastfulnes.

Ans: Liberalitie is a vertue.
rent Therfore liberalitie may not be called wastfulnes.

C The general rule.

If the general word be taken away, the kynde tarteth not. If the generall worde do remaine, it shall not streight folowe, that the kynd shall ensue. For it is no good Argument, if I see a tree a good way from me, to say thus: It is a tree, therfore it is an apple tree. But I may say thus well negatiuely, it is no tree. Therfore it is neyther Apple tree, nor yet any other tree.

C The maner of reasoning.

If euery creature by nature loue it self, then man doth loue hymself. If euery vertue be praise worthy, then in thadministraction of iustice, to geue euery man his awn, it is praise worthy.

C The vse.

The generall worde, declareth the large;

Of Logique. Fol. 78.

largenesse of any thyng, so that where the general taketh no place, the other that be inferior cannot be. As if their be no liuing creature, in some one house, then there muste nedes be no maner of man in the same house.

¶ Of the kinde.

The kinde beyng reckened e: the kinde.
mōg the places, is taken to be any one thyng that is lesse general than an other, & by this shifte euen propre noumes or names of thynges shall serue for the kinde, and go in steede therof. Therfore as we reason from the kinde to the generall, so may we reason from noumes propre to their kyndes. From the kinde to the generall, an argument is made onely affirmatiue, as thus: If iustice be to be despyed, then vertue is to be despyed. Such a man is a flanderer; ergo he is a naughtie man.

¶ The general rule.

To whome the kynd doth agree, to the same also the general doth agree.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

If sobriete be praise worthe, then
vertue

The arte

vertue is praise worthe. If drunkennes
be deuellish, the surfeiting is deuellish.

The vse.

The necessaries
of this place.

The kynde is general to every pro-
pre name, & therfore in describng the
nature of every noun propre, we haue
much nede of this place, to knowe vnder
what kynde every seuerall thng
is comprehended. Againe what soeuer
is defined, that same is the kynde of
some one thng, so that hereby wee
learne howe farre this woorde stret-
cheth being ordeined to sette forth the
nature of every propre name.

Of the difference and propriety.

The difference
and propriety.

From the propriety, and differ-
ence, argumētes are deriued
both affirmatiue, & negatiue.
he can reason a matier artifi-
cially, therfore he is a good Logicien.
Aesope coulde not vtter his minde at
large, but did stammer, and staie much
in his speche, therfore he was no Ora-
tour. By the propriety ye may reason
thus: Suche a man feareth God, put-
teth his whole truste in God, and los-
ueth

Of Logique. Fol. 79.

ueth his neighbour as himselfe. Ergo he is a right Christiā. And likewise ye may reason by conuersion. Such a one is a christiā. Ergo he feareth God, &c.

¶ The general rule.

When the proprietie, or difference is graunted, then the kind straight foloweth, take away the same, and there remaineth no kynde at all.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

Whosoever is endued with reason, the same is a man.

¶ The Use.

The difference, & the proprietie declare natures workyng in all thynges liuyng, and therfore they helpe wel to shewe what every thing is by his propre gift. We spake before of a Methode, or directe ordre to be vsed in all our doyng: and herein we may wel see the vse therof. for hether to we hādeled those places which do nothyng els but comprehend the nature of a perfect definition. now, whereas the place foloweth of the whole and his partes, it is nothyng els but the right maner of a perfecte diuisiō. the places that folowe after,

Declarers of natures workyng.

Methode.

The arte

after, declare the causes, the effectes,
what be incident, what be disagreynge
from the matier, shewing example and
testimonies of the auncient.

Of the whole and the partes.

The whole, and
the partes.

The whole two
wayes taken.

The whole is that same which
consisteth of his partes, and is
deuided two maner of wayes.

First there is the whole in sub-
stance, which standeth of such partes
that if one be taken away, the whole
decayeth straight, neither can it after-
warde kepe his name, as it did before.
For an example. A man is deuided in-
to body, and soule. Take away the bo-
die, who compteth the soule to be that
man, which before had his body ioyned
thereunto? Wee say the soule lieth
when the body is dead, but no mā saith
the soule is the very man, euen as we
called hym before, when he was com-
pact of both.

Againe there is the whole absolute
with his partes, which serueth to make
the whole perfect, addyng suche thyn-
ges that although they be awaye, yet
the whole notwithstanding remaineth,
and

Of Logique. Fol. 80.

and hath his name still, as when a man is made of bodie, and soule (which are the partes of his substance, and cannot be away) yet hath he other partes, whiche although they bee awaye, the whole notwithstanding kepeth his name still. As if a man lose his hande, his arme, or one of his fete, yet is he called a man, and these be called partes integrales, that is to saye, the partes whiche finish the whole, and make it perfect, after that it hath those partes which make the substance.

¶ The general rule.

If the whole be, the partes of the substance must needs be. As if a man be alive, the body, & soule both, are alive.

¶ The maner of reasonynge

If Philosophie be good, then it is good to know the nature of thynges, the way of ordering mans life, and the skill how to reason probablie, for Philosophie it selfe is devided into these thre partes.

¶ The use.

Here by wee learne to examine the
whole

The arte

Whole by the partes, that if we cannot obteyne our purpose to haue & whole graunted, to examine it by the partes, and force our aduersarie to assente to some membze.

Partes integrales.

The intregrale partes, which make perfect the whole, and cause the bignesse thereof, are deuided into partes like, or not like.

Partes like.

Partes like, are those which are alwayes like, and deuided euermore into like. As the fleche, bones, sinewes, fier, water, gold, yron, wyne, wood, stone. Euery part of al these, is called as much as the whole. as a piece of flech, is called flech, a piece of wood, is called wood a droppe of water, is called water, as wel as a gallō of water is called water. They be called in latine Similares partes, because they are named like vnto the whole, for a piece of flech is as well called flech, & as much hath it the name of fleche, as a whole ore hath. The partes whiche haue not like names to the whole, are partly principal, & partly not principal. the principal partes are they which in no wise may be away without

Partes not like.

Without losse of the whole it self: as þe partes of mannes body, whiche cōtein life, cannot bee awaie, without losse of the man. As the hed, the bely, the hart, and the entrailes. Yet notwithstanding, the partes of these cannot be called, like to the whole, for no man saith that a pece of the hart, is the hart, or a pece of the hed, is the hed, and so in the other.

Those whiche are not principal partes, maie be awaie: and the whole not withstanding remain stil, as the hādes the fete, the legges, and the armes.

¶ The generall rule.

When the chief partes are taken away, the whole nedes decaieþ: the chief partes beþng brought altogether, the whole must nedes folowe.

¶ The maner of reasonyng, bothe negatively, and also affirmatiuely.

Suche a man hath learned morall Philosophie, naturall, and Logique, therfore he is a Philosopher.

Some Priestes can neither write well, speake well, nor yet recite authors, accordyngly. Therefore thei
M. i. are

The arte

Five thynges
required in an
Oratour.

are no Grammarians. This man is no
Rhetoricien, because he cannot place
his thynges in good order. For whereas
v. thynges be required in an Oratour,
first, to inuent, after to place thynges
inuēted, thiedly, to set furthe the mat-
ter in good wordes, fourthly, to remē-
ber all these, and last of al, to vtter the
same distinctly, and with a clere voyce:
If one lacke any of these. v. he cannot
bee called an Oratour. Therefore I
maie saie, suche a one hath an euill me-
mory: Ergo he is no oratour. Or suche
a one hath no vtteraūce: Ergo he maie
not bee called an Oratour. In the ne-
gatiue parte, it is enough to take one
part awaie, for the disallowyng of any
thyng. But if I wil affirme any thing
by the partes, I must take all the par-
tes, and not one, or two partes. For he
is not an Oratour, that can inuēt ones-
ly, or place thynges in good order ones-
ly, ercepte he can do the whole, as it is
required. Again he is no good oratour,
that can teache onely, or delite, but he
is absolute, that can bothe teach, delite
and also perswade.

A generall parti-
ciō of an oratour

The

Of Logique. fol. 82.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

Wee reason from the parte to the whole, affirmatiuely, and negatiuely, thus. Suche a one can neither iudge the knittynge of woordes together, nor frame them in order, accordyng to the arte, nor auoyde any subtilties. Ergo, he is no Logicien.

¶ The vse.

The partes set furthe the whole, and are a great beautifyng of the same beynge seuerally handeled, and in their natures set furthe at large.

¶ Of wordes yoked together.

Soked woordes, whiche beynge wordes yoked.
deriued of one, are chaunged in speakyng. As of Sapiens, sapientia, sapienter. A wise manne wisdom, wisely. Here we see that of a wise manne, is deriued wisdom. I maye reason from this place, bothe affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. If one be not wise, he hath no wisdom, if one bee wise, he hath wisdom. If one dooe circumspectly, he is called a circumspect manne. If it bee no miserie to dye, then death is not miserable.

M.ij.

Suche

The arte

Suche a one is a Philosopher, therefore he hath studied Philosophie. Arguments deriued from hence, haue great force, if the onely poked wordes be ioyned together, without addicion of another, or els they are not strong. As thus. Preachers be euill liuers. Ergo preaching is euill. This argument is not good, because of the addicio. For preachers and preaching, are onely the poked wordes, and therefore thus I should saie. There are preachers: Ergo there is preaching.

¶ The generall Rule.

When one of the poked wordes is added, or put awaie, the other also is added, or put awaie.

¶ The maner of reasoning, both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely.

Suche a one is a Priestly minister, Ergo he is a priest. Suche a man hath serued the King nobly. Ergo he is a noble man. The preacher handled his matter learnedly. Ergo the Preacher hath learning. How call ye hym witte, that hath no witte at all? Is there no honestie in suche a man? I maruaill then,

then, why thei call hym honest.

The use.

Wee maie learne by this place, to knowe what thynges are, beeyng considered in other. For if I would knowe whether it be good, or no, to bee a man of honour, and to haue rule in the common weale: I may learne by them that dooe rule, what it is to bee a ruler, or a man of honor, and how daungercus a calling thei haue, that are placed in high estate. If I would knowe what wisedō is, best it were for me to marke their doynages, that are wise men.

Of wordes adioyned to the substance and yet not of the substance.

Wordes adioyned, are called wordes adioyned those accidentes, wherby the singular woorde, or proper name, hath another name, then of the very substance, as vnto Cato, (whiche of his substance is a man) wisedome doeth happen, wherby he is called wise. Vnto Cicero also (whiche by his substance is a man) there happeneth eloquence, wherby he is called eloquent. So that he hath another name

M. ij. then

The arte

Vertue diuersely
considered, diuersely
placed.

Woorde adioy-
ned, perceiued ei-
ther by sense, or
els by vnderstan-
ding.

then his substance geueth, whiche is
to be eloquent, and this is the woorde
adiopned. All quantities, qualities, and
those that are comprehended in the pre-
dicament of relation, are referred to
this place, when thei are considered to
be comprehended in a substance. Vertue
referred to the mynd, whiche con-
teineth it, is a woorde adioyned: compa-
red with vice, it is a contrary, referred
to iustice, it is a generall woorde. Woor-
des adioyned are perceiued, either by
the senses (as those, whiche are subiect
to the senses) or els by vnderstanding.
As swiftnesse maie be considered to be
in a manne, although we see hym lye a
long. And so wee saie, suche a Lacque
runneth wel, although we do not then
presently see hym run, but we remem-
ber that he hath runne, saipng now, as
wee haue seen before in deede. Again
some woorde adioyned, are by nature
in the thynge, whiche containe theim, as
heate is naturally in fire. And because
we see that the same heate, although it
neuer go awaie, yet at all tymes, it is
not of like strength: but at some tyme
lesse

lesse whote, then at another: We iudge the same heate to be an accident. Some wordes adiopned, are not naturally cleaupng, but by some other waie, are iopned to the thng conteinyng them as heate in water, set vpon the fire.

¶ The generall rule

If one of the wordes adiopned, bee in the subiect, or thing conteinyng, the other also is like to bee there, whiche foloweth vpon the firste. As thus, *Ca:* to is a man worthy praise, because he is ware, sober, full of experience. Praise foloweth vertue, as the shadowe doth the body. Therefore, whosoever hath modestie, and greate knowlege of thngs: the same man of necessitie winneth praise, and fame, that canot dye. Again if the wordes adiopned bee, the subiect that conteineth them, muste nedes bee also, as thus. If God be all goodnesse then there is a God.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

Christ came to this worlde, bepng gentle and milde. Ergo Christ came not to destrope the lost Shepe, but to saue them. Scholars bee Godly, verteous,
M.iiij. and

The arte

and occupied in learnyng. Ergo it is a gracious deede, to helpe suche of them as haue nede.

The vse.

We maie by this place, either praise or dispraise, setting furth the nature of men, and iudgyng thē by their woꝝkes.

The maner of doyng or sufferpnyng, called. Actus.

The maner of do-
yng or sufferpnyng

The maner of doyng, or suffer-
ring is, when we are supposed
to be occupied, or affected any
maner of waie, either in doyng
or in sufferpnyng. There be as many ma-
ner of doynges, as there be adiacentes
or wordes adioyned. And of these adia-
cētes, feare, sorowe, trauaill, rest, heat
cold, are deriued these: to feare, to bee
sory, to trauaill, to rest, to be hot, to be
cold. And generally all those wordes,
that are referred vnto the twoo predi-
camentes, called the maner of doyng,
and the sufferpnyng, are cōpassed within
this place, if thesame wordes be consi-
dered as accidentes, whiche cleaue to
the substaunce, and maie bothe be pre-
sent, and also bee a waie without losse
of

of the substance. For if thynges doen,
bee waied, accordyng to their proper
maner of dooing, thei are referred to
the two places aboue, called the differ-
rence and the propertie. For where as
we saie. Suche a one speaketh: ergo he
is a manne (for nothyng els can speake
naturally, but manne onely) although
in this case (to speake) bee a maner of
dooing, yet it is not referred to this,
but rather to the propertie, because it
belougeth to manne a lone, and alwa-
yes to manne.

¶ The generall rule.

If the maner of dooing, or sufferi-
ng bee, the thyng conteyni-
ng is also, and
the wordes adioyned also (whereof do-
ing, & sufferi-
ng, haue their of spring)
folowe vpon the same.

¶ The maner of reasonyng
from this place.

If one breathe, the same mā hath life
in him. If Julius Cesar came into En-
gland, then ther was suche a mā called
Julius Cesar. If Richard the. iij. plac-
ed the tiraunt here in Englande, then
there was suche a man in Englande.

The

The arte

The vse.

This place muche helpeth, either for praise, or dispraise. Some Officers bribe the poore, robbe their Master, and waast their atone: Ergo suche are worthe death.

Of the thyng conteynng.

The thyng con-
teynng.

THE subiect, or the thyng conteynng, is a substance, beyng the store house of accidentes, and the verie proppe, to holde vp deedes doen: for neither wisdom, strength, healthe, nor policie, can be at all, excepte thei bee contained, within some one body.

The generall rule.

Take awaie the thyng conteynng, and there remaineth neither adiacent, nor yet deede doen.

The maner of reasonyng.

There is fire, ergo it is hot. Christ was a very man, ergo Christ died, and suffered the panges at his departyng.

Another.

Why doest thou saie, that I owe thee a croune, who I know was neuer yet worth a grote. Melanchthō liueth
and

Of Logique. Fol. 86.

and readeth. Therefore there is greafe learning to be had, where he is.

The use.

By naming a worthy persone, his praise is sufficiently set furth, euē whē his name is once vttered. For what learned man, hearing the name of Cicero, doeth not remember thereby, the full practise and the absolute skil of all eloquence? These places therefore, help as well, for the amplifying of matters, either in praise, or in dispraise, as they do for the steadfast prouing of any cause.

Of outward places beeing not in the substance, but onely touchyng the substance, and without the nature of it.

The first are called, the causes of thynges, & the thynges comyng of causes, whiche onely are ioynd to the thyng necessarily, whereas the other places folowynge, are not coupled necessarily, but are onely ioynd together, by certain alliance to the present matter.

The causes of thynges.

The deuision of causes.

Some causes, are called the verie causes of thynges, euē by their owne nature

The arte

nature : Other causes are happenng causes, the whiche maie perhaps bring furthe the effect, lastly there be causes without the whiche thynge cannot be doen, and yet are thei not any cause to force the effect.

The very cause
of thynge.

The very cause of thynge, is suche a one, as if it be practised in very dede and set furth with other naturall causes, the effect must nedes folowe: & again if it be not put in practise, although the other be put, yet the effect shall not folowe. As for exāple, although one haue clothe, yet can he not haue the vse of it, except the Tailor cut it out And although the Miller grinde, yet we are like to dine without bread, excepte the Baker, do his part also in the batche.

The happenng
cause.

The happenng cause, is such a one as although it bee putte in practise in very dede, yet it shall not streight way so be that the effect must nedes folow. As an Ague maie be the happenng cause, that some one man kepeth good diet, & yet not any forcyng cause : for then all like folke might be compted for sober menne. The cause without the whiche thynge

Of Logique. Fol. 87.

thynges cannot be doen, as thus. The surgean cānot heale a wound, except the dedde fle she bee cut out. The waifarer shall not (or very hardely) come to his forneis end, except he haue some money in his purse. In tyme of warre, it is e- uill trauaillyng, without a passe porte, and this is called in Latii, causa sine qua non, that is to saie, the cause with- out the whiche we cannot, and yet it is not the cause of our iourneyng.

The cause with-
out the whiche
thynges cannot
be doen.

C The disfinicion of a very cause.

A cause in very deede, is a meane, by whose force, some thyng doth folowe.

C There be foure suche causes.

- { The efficient cause. }
- { The ende. }
- { The matier. }
- { The shape. }

The efficient cause, is the work-
ing cause, by whose meanes,
thynges are brought to passe.

The efficiens
cause.

Of those that are working causes,
some by nature byng thynges to passe
some by aduisement, and by a fore pur-
posed choyse. Thynges worke by na-
ture (and that necessarily) which lacke
knowledge

Efficient work-
ing causes two
maies conside.

The arte

knowlege to chole this, or that, & haue
no iudgement, to discerne thynges. As
the Sonne, the fire, hearbes, precious
stones. The sonne, euen by nature, ge-
ueth light to the day, and cannot other
wise dooe: the fire burneth naturally,
Herbes kepe their vertue of necessitie.
The Adamant draweth yron, euen by
nature. And so y^e bloud stone, stoppeth
bloud. Some of these causes worke by
the force and violence of nature, some
by an outward power, beyng strained
therunto. Thei worke by the force and
violence of nature, whose beginnyng,
is within themselves: beeyng ayded by
none other outwarde thyng. As fire
burneth, euen by the naturall force of
heate, whiche is the substance therof.
Thei worke by an outwarde power,
whiche are strained to worke by ano-
ther meane. As water set vpon the fire
wareth hotte, & yet is not hotte by her
own nature, but is made hotte by y^e na-
ture, and might of fire, of whō the wa-
ter taketh heate. In like maner boulet-
tes of leade, shot out of a gunne, an ar-
row out of a bow, a stone out of a sling
all

Adamant.

Causeth wor-
king by the force
of nature.

Causeth wor-
king by an out-
ward power.

Of Logique. Fol. 88.

all these flie not into the aire, by their owne power or might, but by force, and violence of hym that casteth them.

¶ The generall rule.

From the naturall workyng cause, the effect must nedes folowe, as thus. If the Sonne shine, the daye muste nedes bee, whiche is the effect, or workmanship of the Sonne. Suche a man hath eaten Hemlock: Ergo he is popsoned, and in danger of death. Fire is in the Chimney, or in the toppe of the house, therefore it must nedes burne. Take awaie the cause, and the effect cannot be at all: for if there bee no fire, there can be no flame, nor burnyng neither.

The second workyng cause, is whē thynges are dooen by aduiseiment, and by choyse, not by any necessitie at all, for thynges maie as well not be dooen, as be dooen. As if there be a shomaker, there maie be shoen made, and contrariy, if there be no Shomaker, there can be no shoen at all.

¶ The generall rule.

When the voluntarie cause is put, the workmanship, or the thyng doer
maie

The arte

maie folowe. As if there be a Carpenter, a house maie be made. If one rede good authours, and herken to the reacydng of learned men, he maie come to good learnyng.

The maner of reasonyng.

Suche a one hath dronke popson, Ergo he will dye shortly. Christ hath reconciled mankynde to his father, by sufferynge death vpon the crosse: Ergo suche as beleue in this sayng health, shall liue for ever.

Another diuision of causes efficient.

Commaundyng
causes.

Obedient causes

Some efficient causes are commaundyng causes. As the Kyng is the commaundyng cause to his subiecte, to doo this or that. The Master of workes, is the commaundyng cause, to all the laborers. The other efficient causes, are obedient causes, whē the seruaunt worketh at his maisters commaundement.

Another diuision of causes efficient.

Of suche efficiēt causes as do obey some doo their woorkes, as the Mason worketh vpon the stone, the Carpenter vpon wood. Other efficiēt causes that are obedient, are but instrumentes of doyng,

doopng, as hatchettes, hammers, pike
ares, with other. In battaill, the capis
tain is the efficient commaunder: the
souldiour, the efficient obeyer: gunnes
dartes, bowes, and billes, the instru
mentes of doopng. Good hede ought to
be had, that in all causes we make a dif
ference, not confoundng one with an
other, that the nigh causes, and the far
ther causes, be not taken all for one. A
cause farre fetched is this. Such a one
fell out with his neighbour: Ergo he
killed hym. Fallyng out byngeth chis
doopng, chidng byngeth hatred, hatred
causeth fightng, fightng geueth bloz
wes, blowes soue dispatche, soue dis
patchng, is ready death. Therefore, I
myght more probably and nygher to y
purpose reason thus. Suche a one
gaue his neighbour a dedly wounde:
Ergo he hath killed hym. And thus
the argument is made from the nighest
cause.

Examples of
causes.

¶ Another distiction.

Some causes are principal causes,
as the holy ghoſte workng all Godly
mociōs, and stirryng our nature, euer

A. J.

more

The arte

Causēs beynge
the inclination in
man.

Helpynge causes.

Joseph.

The holy ghost
is principall
cause.

The ende.

The end absolute

more to the best. Other causes, are the inclinaciōs in mā, that are either good or euell. Thirdly, there are helpynge causes, whiche are meanes the rather, to further vs in al vertue. As learning practisynge of honest behauour, acquainting our nature euermore with y best. The principall cause, that Joseph forbore, to cōpany with another mannes wife: was the holy ghost, that stirred his mynd with the feare of God. The second cause, was his awne mind, that remembred the worde of God, and the punishemēt dewe for synne. The third cause was, that he accustomed himself, euer to lyue vprightly, and not onely to auoyde synne, but also to auoide the occasion of sinne. There be other diuisions, but I leaue to reherse them, for feare I should be ouer long.

The ende, called Finis.

The ende is, for whose cause any thyng is done, and is twoo waies considered. For there is an absolute ende, wherunto al other are referred, beeyng called the perfection, and chief propertie in any thyng:

thynge: as the chiefeſt ende in any man, The chiefeſt end
in man.
 is to be perfectly endued with reaſon,
 and to attain euerliuing felicitie. The
 chiefeſt propertie in a horſe, is to be of
 a very good courage, & to want no ſto-
 macke: the chiefeſt perfection in fire, is
 to be very hote, and very drye. There The helping end
 is another ende, called a helping ende,
 whiche ſerueth to an higher ende, and
 is onely ordained for this purpoſe, that
 we might attain thereby, the perfecte
 ende of all. As meate, drinke, apparell,
 and other neceſſarie thynges, are hel-
 ping ends for man, to attain the chiefeſt
 ende. For without theſe ends mā could
 not liue. To lyfe honeſtly in this lyfe,
 to be vpryght in dealing with all per-
 ſones, is an helping ende, (as the Phi-
 loſophers take it,) and a teſtimonie to
 the worlde of our faith (as the Chriſ-
 tians take it) for man to liue, world with-
 out ende. To marie a wife, is a helping
 ende, for man to auoyde fornicacion.
 The poore man labourerth, and wher-
 fore? To get his liuyng. Wherfore get-
 teth he his liuyng? That he maie the
 better be able to ſerue God. The ſoul

The arte

diour fighteth at his princes commaūdement, chiefly because God commaūdeth him, next after for loue of the king and his countrey, thirdly and last of all that he myght liue the rather, in quiet at home with his wife, and childre. So that of one, and the same thynge, there maie bee many endes, beynge orderlie considred.

The generall rule.

Whose ende is good, or euell, the same thynge is good, or euell. A sword is good, because it is good for a man, to defende hymself. Faith in Christ Iesu is good, for by faith we are saued. To vndo my neighbour, with lendynge for gain, is moſte vngodly: therfore to be an vsurer, is moſte vngodly. To desire an other mannes wyfe, is vngodly, because adultery, is vngodly. Battail is good, because it byngeth peace. For as men shoulde fight, for this ende, that we myght lyue in quiete, with our neyghbours. If thou wilt be esteemed for a Godly person, accompanie thy selfe with folke of honest fame, & thou shalt be well reported, especially of the honest.

The manner of
reasonyng.
¶ The end. &c.

Of Logique. Fol. 91.

next. It is good to learne, because learning it self encreaseth good knowlege, whiche is thende of our study.

Of the matter or Substaunce,
called, Materia.

The Substaunce called materia is ready to bee framed of the woorkeman, as hym liketh, by the whiche Substaunce, eyther thynges naturall, or els thynges artificiall are made. As first a man, whiche is a naturall thyng, is made of body, & soule. An Image, whiche is an artificiall thyng, is made by the hādpy worke of man, and is grauen out of a stone, or molten in gold, or in brasse. From this place are made argumentes, that both do affirme, and also denie. As thus, if a man haue cloth, he may haue a garimēt made if it lyke hym. But if a man haue no cloth at all, nor yet any suche lyke stuffe that serueth for apparell, howe can he haue a gowne, or a coate? If the Baker lacke incle, how can he make bread. The matters considred two waies. First it is a Substaunce, that lasteth still, as when a house is made of
N.ij. Stone,

The matter of
Substaunce.

Every soueraine is
either natural or
artificiall.

The arte

*These are
artificiall
Substances.*

Stone, wood, and plaister, or an Image of gold, brasse, or siluer: Here the substance tarieth still, although the forme be altered. Likewise when a house is taken downe, the stone, & timber remain still, and keepe their substance, and serue as they did before, either for erection of the same house again, or els otherwise, as it shal please him that is the owner. Again, the substance is that, whiche chaungeth into another nature, and cannot be the same, that it was before: as of meale and water, bakers make their bread: now they cannot resolue the same bread, agayne into Meale, and water, whiche was the former substance.

C The generall rule.

*The Arti-
ficiall
Substance
may be
Altered, but
the Naturall
Substance
can-not.*

When the substance is at hand, the workmanship maie folowe, and the effecte maie appere: But when the substance is taken awaie, there can be nothing made at al. As if a man lacke siluer, how can he make an Image of siluer? There is no stone, wood, nor plaister: Ergo there is no house. But if I reason thus by the substance, that chaungeth into another nature, & cannot bee the

thesame, that it was before: I reason then amisse, as thus. There is no meale or flower, ergo there is no bread: but I should saie rather, there was no meale nor flower, ergo there is no bread.

*This is spoke
of artificiall
Substance.*

The maner of reasonyng.

The Shoemaker hath no Lether, how can he then make a Shooe? The Printer hath no paper at all, Ergo he cannot set his men on worke to printe any thyng.

The shape, called Forma.

The shape, or fashion of any thyng, is a cause whereby the thyng that is made hath bys name, as leather, whē it is made, or fashioned for the foote, is called a shooe. Suche a man weareth a liuery coote garded with Meluet, and all the Peoman seruantes haue but plain coates, ergo he is one of the gentlemen. He hath a siluer pot gilt, and wrought with Goldsmithes woorke, Ergo it is better then a pot, wrought with playn siluer, beeyng of the same quantitie or bigguenss.

The shape.

The generall rule.

M. iij.

When

The arte

When the shappe or fourme is made: the effect, or thyng done may folow: take awaie the shape, & the vse also is taken awaie. A cup is made, ergo a man maie drinke in it: breake the cuppe, and how shal you drinke of the same cuppe. The element goeth compasse wise, because it is round. Reason is called the shape of man. Therefore I maie saie, suche a one lacketh the gift of reason, Ergo he is a foole.

Thynges comyng after the causes, called Euenta.

The effectes of Causes.

Those whiche come of causes, are twoo waies considred, for either they are called thynges that in due time folowe the cause that went before, or els thynges ordeined to some certain ende,

Those thynges whiche come after the cause, and are made of the same, are called effecta, that is to saie, thynges done. And euery argumēt is either deriued from the effect of the matier, of the forme, or of the efficient cause.

From the effect of the matier or substance, called Materia, thus ye maie reason.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 93.

He hath a Sworde made of pron,
Ergo he hath pron. There is a house,
Ergo here is stone, and wodde.

From the effect of the forme.
A boowle beynge tourned, rouleth,
Ergo it is round.

From the effect of the efficient cause.
It is bright day, **E**rgo the sunne is up.

The generall rule.
When the effecte is come forth, it
must nedes bee, that either his propre
cause is then, or els that it hath bene
before.

The maner of reasonyng.
If slaughter be not to be borne in
a commune weale, then these quareller
pikers, these rustlers, & fighters, are
not to be suffered to go unpunished.

The thyng apointed for some ende.
That which is appointed for some
certaine ende, and vnder is called desti-
natum, as a house is buyled to dwell
in. Armour is provided for man to de-
fende himselfe. Medicines are meanes
apointed for man to recouer health. **I**
shewed before that there was an ende,
whiche was a helppng ende, & a meane
to come to the perfect, and mooste abso-
lute

*The thyng ap-
pointed for some
ende.*

The arte

lute ende, for without this appointed meane and promission of God, man could neuer liue, much lesse could he come to any perfeccion in this life, as touching the actions, and worthie feates required of man. Thus we maie reason from this place. Seyng it is lawfull for mā, to defende hymselfe, it is lawfull for man, to weare a weapon. If warre bee lawfull, then money is necessary, without whiche, no man can go forwarde, or set furthe an armie.

¶ The generall rule.

Those thynges that agree to that which is apointed to the end, agree also to the ende it selfe.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

If a man maie lawfullie buye the great Bible in Englishe, he maie then also euen without askyng leaue, reade it at his pleasure.

¶ The vse of all these causes.

The commoditie of these causes is so great, that in setting furthe the vse of them, a man might soner lacke wordes, than want matier. First we knowe that nothyng is done without a cause, and

The knowlege of
causes is right ne-
cessfull.

and therfor sepng this worlde framed
as it is, euerie thyng proportioned in
his due order: wee maie truelie gather
that there is one aboue all, that ruleth
al, whome the Christian calleth God.
In praplsyng or dispraisyng, how can a
man better procede, than by reherfing
the ende of euerie thyng. Again in exa-
minyng and searchyng out the profyte
or disprofite, by thende we knowe what
is gainfull: by the efficient cause we
knowe what maie be done. For what-
soouer is profitable, the same is profita-
ble for some ende, and whatsoeuer we
would haue done, we maye soone per-
ceauie by the efficiēt, if it maie be done.
Pea in causes of iudgement, we maye
iudge, what wil some one mā had to do
this or that, when we cōsider, to what
ende he did this or that. Last of all, we
know hereby, that God hath ordeined
nothing in vaine, and that euerie thing
is ordeined for some one ende. The ende
of Christes death was, to merite mans
redemption. The ende of mans lyfe is,
to trust wholy in Christes passion, and
to lyue thereby for euer.

The arte

Of thynges outwardly applyed.
called Applicita.

They are called thynges outwardly applyed to a matier, whiche are not the cause of the same matier, and yet, geue a certayne denomination to it. There be thre of this sorte.

{ The tyme.
The place.
Thynges annexed, or knytte together.

And these thre are nothing els, than the thre predicamentes or moſte general places, whiche I reherſed before.

{ Vbi. { Where.
Quando. { When.
Habitus. { The araying.

The maner of reaſonynge.

If one liſt to reaſon from the place, called in latin Locus, he may thus ſay Suche a one is in the countrie, Ergo he is not in the Citie. If I will proue that a man being accused of murder vniuſtly, did not offend: I maie reaſon both from the time, and the place. The man was killed in the fieldes, aboute thre of the clocke in the after none, all whiche

The place.

The tyme.

Whiche time this other man came not
abrode. No, he looked not out of his
house all that daie. Ergo this man did
not kill him. Clodius was accused at
Rome, that he had made a spoyle of the
reliques in the temple of Bona Dea,
where as he at the same tyme whē this
dede was thought to be done, was at
Interamna, a village in the countrey
beside Rome. Quintilian saith thus.
Thou hast killed an adulterer, whiche
the law doth permit, but because thou
hast killed the same man in a brothels
house, thou art worthe to die thy self,
yea the nature of the place & tyme maketh
much for encrease of faultes com-
mitted. As when one is not afrayed euē
in the church, and that at service time
to thrust his enemy thorow: likewise
to kill a man priuely by the hye waye,
is thought worthe greater punishment
then if he should kill hym manly in the
open street, and that in the sight of o-
ther. Also to murder one in the darke
night is counted more hapnouse, then
to kill him in the bryght daie. Notwith-
standing these two places are rather
vled

A patronesse
bawdye.

The nature of
the place & tyme.

The arte

used of the Rethoriciens, than among the Logiciens, for when a man is taken of suspicion we go about to proue him faultie by diuerse coniectures. As if he were about the same place, at the selfe same tyme, when a man was slayne, & also had his sworde about hym: we coniecture that he myght haue killed him. Agayne if we perceyue one to be a riotous felowe, readie to fyght with euery bodie, accompaning with naughty packes, and euermore at one end of all frays, waxing pale when he is apprehended, shakynge for feare, or runnyng awaye, when he should be taken: we suspect such a one that he is not altogether chiere. Therfore oratours do vse to marke thynges that go before & facte, as whether he hated the man or no, or what gaine he might haue by his death, and also obserue thynges opened with the faulte, as changynge of hewe, when he is apprehended, or hys sworde to be blodie, or any parte of his apparell, and thysdly thys note what followeth. That is, if he ran awaye, if he could not tell his tale playnly, & so they

Coniectures.

thei conclude as thei are led by suspexion. Some argumentes are necessary. *Argumentes necessarie.* Some probable, as thus, from the consequent. Such a woman is brought in bed with a childe, Ergo she hath had the companie of man. Suche a man had a bluddie sword in his hand straight after the death of his neighbour, even in the same fieldes where his neyghbour was slain, Ergo it is like this mā hath slayne hym. All which argumentes are deriued from the place called Contingentia, as I will shewe it hereafter.

Of wordes annexed, or knitte to the substantiue, called Connexa.

W touching wordes knitte, pe- *Wordes annexed* maie vnderstand, that thei are ioyned outwardly to the Subject, and geue a name vnto him, accordyng as they are. As Richesse are ioyned to a ryche man. For where as Crassus is called a man by his owne substance, yet not withstanding by his richesse, he is called a ryche man. So he that hath a wife, is called a husband. He that hath a maister is called a seruaunt. He that hath a father, is called

The arte

Definition of
knitte wordes.

called a sonne. Wordes knitte, are di-
vided diuersly, for some are called such
as are nyphe, and touchyng the sub-
stance. As to be full of fishe, is agreing
to the water, to be full of grasse, is an-
nered or agreyng to the yearth, to bee
cloudy is annexed or agreing to y^e aire.
Again wordes knitte, are called those
thynges, that a manne weareth, as to
weare a cote, a iacke, a harneis, to haue
shoen, to be merie, to be dustie, and all
suche as are causuall to man. Some
are called annexed, or agreyng, whiche
are knitte to man, and yet not thynges
wozne vpon his backe, but farther of,
and rather perceiued by vnderstanding
then knowen by eye sight. As nobilitie,
powre, fame, authorite. To be an
Officer, a Mayour, a Sheriue, lorde
Chauncelour, comptrollour, or any o-
ther officer in the commune weale, all
these are annexed to their inferiour,
ouer whom they haue authorite. In
this poynt differ wordes knitte, called
annexed, from wordes adiopned, called
adiacentia, that al adiacentes, or wor-
des adiopned cannot bee without the
subiect,

subiect, as heat, colde, whitenes, or any other like cannot be, except they be comprehended with in some Subiecte. For it is propre to euery Accident, to be in some one thyng conteyning him. If there be no thyng conteynyng, then the Accident can not be. Notwithstanding, wordes knitte, are so placed, that one is without the other, and may be, either of thē seuerally, if the one happen to perish: as a houseband is without the substance of his wife, and although his wife die, yet the houseband may be onlpue still, sauyng that he loseth his name to be called housebande, but if a wise man dye, wisdom muste decay also, because it must nedes be in some one subiect, or els it cannot be.

Of Accidentes.

Those are here called Accidēts which both themselves, & the thyng also, may be together, the one with another, & also may be away, the one from the other.

There be
v. of this sort.

Thynges chauncyng.
The name of a thyng.
Sentences of the sage.
The likenesse.
Thynges compared together.

D. 7.

Thynges

The arte

Chynges chauncyng, called
Contingentia.

Thynges chaun-
cing.

Those accidētes are called thin-
ges chauncing, which chaunce
about a thing so, that whether
these thynges chaunce, or no,
the thyng it self may be, or though the
thing be not, these may so chaunce to be.
As for example palenesse, may chaunce
before sicknes, and the same also may
chaunce though a mā be not sicke. And
a man also may be sicke, & yet nothyng
pale at al. Likewise loue & feare. A mā
may loue, although he feare not, a man
may again feare, although he loue not.

Ch: diuersite of thye diuerse places.

The nature of
wordes adioyned.

Wordes adioyned, woordes knit to
another, & wordes chauncing to a thing
diffre thus, that in woordes adioyned,
called Adiacentia, the cause why thin-
ges are so named, is euer in the subiect
neither can the woordes adioyned conti-
nue, except they be cōprehended within
some one substance. Woordes knit, are
of such sorte that by meanyng one, the
other is straight known. As when I
name a Scholemaister, I signifie scho-
lers

Woordes knitte.

Of Logique. Fol. 98.

lers also, although I do not expressely name them. But in wordes chauncyng called Contingentia, wee must at the lest compare. ii. together, that we may better knowe them to be of this place. Therefore if I name this worde (craft) by it self, without any further consideraciō, the it is an Adiacent, or a worde adioyned. If I name this worde (seruaunte) craft is referred to the place, called wordes annexed or knytte, considering craft is mentioned in respect of the seruaunt. If I say thus (a crafty seruaunt) then these two are considered to be in this place called, Contingentia, whiche is a place of wordes chauncyng to a thing so, that whether they chaunce or no, the thyng it self may be notwithstanding. As a seruaunt may be, & yet not crafty. Again one may be crafty, & yet not a seruaunt.

The diuision of thynges chauncyng.

Some go before the thing, some are ioyned with the thyng, some folowe after the thyng.

Thynges chauncyng before. As thus. The skie was very red this mornyng.

D. ii.

nyng.

The arte

nyng. Ergo we are like to haue rayne,
oz nyght.

Thyngez ioynd with the matier
at the very instaunte. As thus. Anger
is in olde men. Ofte fetchyng of wind
declares a sickenes of the lunges. If
the bequether oz maker of any wil, be
online. the will taketh no place, & may
be voide. Such a one goeth gay in his
apparel, spendeth with the best, & yet
hath nothing to maintain his charges.
Ergo it is like that he commeth by his
goodes noughtely.

Thyngez happenyng after. Suche
a one is well learned. Ergo he hath
gone wel to his boke heretofore.

The name of a thyng, oz the interpre-
tacion of a worde.

Name of a thyng
The interpreta-
tion of a worde.

The interpretacion oz name of
a thyng is a word made by the
agrement of men, to signifie
this, oz that. As Philosophus
is that mā whatsoeuer he be, that hath
a desire & a loue, to the knowledge of
wisedome. Therfore if ye wil expound
what a Philosopher is, you may rea-
son thus, from the interpretaciō of the
worde.

Woꝛde. Whosoever he be that hath an earnest loue to Philosophie, and seeketh knowlege thereof, that man is a Philosopher.

Lato hath an earnest loue to Philosophie, & seeketh knowlege thereof.

Ergo Lato is a Philosopher.

Many wittie men take occasion to reason pleasauntely vpon the interpretation of a woꝛde. As I remembre a wittie man, & a worthie man also did, who enueighing at a time against Cardinal Boule, & being vehement in the cause of his country, said thus in the midst of his heat, o Bowle, o hurle Bowle, as though his name declared his euill nature. The tellyng of this makes me to remembre an other. I knewe one whose name was called Dope, and being occasioned to folowe the law concerning a matier of lande, at the first suppression of the Dopes whole power, at what time in dede streight commandment was geuen not to call him by that name: This man being of the same name, and partely of kyndred also

D.iiij. concer:

The arte

concerning opiniō (as the deuill would haue it) durst not ones for his life shew his head, for feare his name should betraie his whole nature, and in dede ha- uing a more fearfull harte then nede was, thought that it might iustely bee compted offence great enough in hym, that it was his euill happe to haue such an odious and euill name, all men as then did euery where almost with outwarde loke vtterly detest. And in dede (the Proverbe saith) he is halfe hanged, that hath an euill name. The which sentence this man I thinke, not well vnderstanding remembred it ouer well: and was rather contente to lose al, thē that thus his peuissh name shoulde lose him, and caste his bodie quite away for euer.

Reformed speech
of metaphore.

Again the interpretacion of a thyng is thē thought to be, whē a Metaphore or translation is vsed, & the meanyng therof take. As when this word Ignis (fire) betokeneth loue. Where as of the owne nature it signifieth fire, as we reade in Diuide, thus.

Quis enim celauerit ignem

Lumine

Of Logique. Fol. 100.

Lumine qui semper perditur ipse suo.

Who can kepe close the fire, or hide
the burnyng heate,

That doth betray it selfe alway
with light of flamme so great.

Wherein is nothyng els signified
but loue, which is so hote of it self that
it must nedes breake out into flammes
& shewe it selfe at one time, or other.

The general rule.

To whom the interpretacion of a
nowne doth agree, to the same also the
nowne it selfe agreeth.

The maner of reasonyng.

Such a child is called dawson, And
he may well be so called, for his father
is but a dawbe.

Of the place called authoritie, otherwise
named sentences of the sage.

Such testimonies may be cal-
led Sentēces of the sage, which
are broughte to confirme any
thing, either takē out of old au-
thours, or els suche as haue bene vled
in this commune life. As the sentencis
of noble men, the lawes in any realme,
quicke saynges, Proverbes, that eiz

Authoritie or
sentences of
the sage.

D. liij.

ther

The arte

Testimonies two
wayes vled.

ther haue bene vled heretofore, or bee
now vled. Histories of wise Philoso-
phers, the iudgemētes of learned men,
the cōmune opinion of the multitude,
olde custome, auncient fashions, or any
such like. Testimonies are two wayes
considered. For either they are such as
pertaine to God, or els to man. Those
authorities whiche come from God, &
are spoken by the holy Ghost, are vn-
doubtedly true, neyther can they bee
false: therfore we ought most reuerēt-
lie to receiue the worde of God, and a-
gre to such textes as are written & spo-
ken, euē as though we heard God him-
self speake, with liuely voice vnto vs.
Mans autozity hath no suche greate
force, although noble mē, learned phi-
losophers, & stoute captaines haue pro-
nounced many thynges moost wisely.
For although Aristotle saith that the
world neyther had begynning, nor yet
at any tyme shal haue endyng: I maye
relect this sayng, (if any mā byng me
it for his confirmacion,) although this
great Philosopher did pronounce the
same. For except I bee perswaded by
reason

Aristotels mynde
as touchyng the
worlde.

Of Logique. Fol. 101.

reason, it is in my choise, either to admit, or to refuse such authorities. Not withstanding, we shoulde not forsake wise mens wordes rashely, but with a modest aunswere desire the aduersarie not so much to sticke to his authoritie, as to proue the same by some good reason. In prophane thynges ye may reason affirmatiuely very well. as thus. The best thynges are firste to be learned, for so doeth Quintilian teache. *Nusquā tuta fides.* It is hard trusting any body. For so saith Virgile. But I cā not reason negatiuely, whē I bring in yue authoritie out of prophane authors. For I reason amisse if I say. There is no suche disease, called the frenche pocques, because Galene the chiefe of Physiciāns neuer maketh mention in al his booke of any such disease. For this euell hath crepte in, sence his tyme, thorough the noughtines of mē. And although it ware then, yet may it be that he neuer hearde of it. Hereunto might be added al such sentences as by the lawe of nature are grafted in man. As these folowynge. Do as thou wouldest

D. v.

dest

The arte

Sentences gra-
fed in man by na-
sure.

dest be doen vnto. Be thākeful to him,
that doth the a pleasure. Honour thy
father and thy mother. Know there is
a God. He that hath not these opiniōs
naturally fastened in his hart, he may
iustly be thought rather a beast, then
man endued with reason.

In matters of Scripture I may reas-
son both affirmatiuely, and negatiue-
ly, Christ saith to his disciples, Reges
Gentium dominātur, uos aut non sic.
Kyniges beare rule ouer cōtreis, but
you must not do so. Therefore no mini-
stres should haue any temporal powre,
because Christ saith so. We may reason
negatiuely thus, we reade not in al the
Scripture from Genesis to the reuelaz-
ciō of saint Ihon, that euer there was
frier, Moncke, Nonne, or Chanon, er-
go let thē go frō whens they came. We
reade not in the Scripture that wor-
shipping of ymages, was euer allowed
to bee Laie mens bookes: Therefore
take down suche ydolles, and let them
serue for other vses.

As friers' ne a-
ny other suche,
mencioned in
Scripture.

Images.

The generall rule for prophane au-
thorities. That whiche is allowed by
al wise

al wise mē, or at the least by the better part: no man ought rashely to gain say it, or thus. Euery connyng man muste be beleued in his own Art.

The maner of reasonyng.

Aristotle thought best that dyokardes should haue double punishemēt: therfore they deserue it. By textes of the scripture we may better reason y mat: ter, as thus. Cursed be he that doth y worke of the Lord guilefully, saith the Prophete. Ergo euil Bishops, or loy: tering pastoures are accursed of God.

Of the similitude, or likenesse.

Similitude, is when. ii. thinges or more, are so compared toge: ther, that euen as in the firste there is one propertie, so in the other there is a lyke propertie, accor: dyng to both their natures seuerally obserued. For like as water by conti: nuance weareth a stone, so there is no: thynge so harde, but by time it may bee compassed, or brought to passe. As spiz: ders make their own copwebbes with: out any other helpe: so some good fel: lowes can byng by nettes, and tell
straung

¶ similitude.

The arte

straung tales without any hearing,
when there is not one worde true. As
the palme tree being overlaid with
weightes, riseth higher, & buddeth up-
ward more freshely: so a noble stomake
vered with much aduersite is euer
more the stouter. And this ought dili-
gently to bee obserued that the thyng
which is brought to make the Similitu-
tude, be like vnto $\hat{\text{y}}$ which is proued.

C The maner of findyng out a
Similitude.

The maner of fin-
dyng out a simili-
tude.

In euery cause that we do purpose
to handle at large, we must obserue dis-
ligently, what thynges are spoken by
translacions, that is, from the propre
signification, to a meanyng that is not
propre. As speakyng in the praise of a
thyng, and callyng hym the bright sun
of the pearth, I maie gather a similiz-
tude by this worde (sone) and make it
thus. Euen as the sunne onely geueth
light to all the whole pearth: so there
ought to bee in a commune weale one
Kpyng that shoulde be ruler ouer al.

C The general rule.

Of similitudes there is like iudg-
ment,

Of Logique. Fol. 103.

ment, that is, even as we thynk of the one, so may we thynk of the other.

CThe maner of reasonyng.

As a dogge standyng at the tables side, eateth that by by and by whiche his maister hath cast to hym, and ever loketh for more, & more: So some when they haue receyued a luyng, for which they hoped before, by and by they are ready, to take another, and although they be ful, yet stil they are hungry.

COf thynges compared.

Thynges are cōpared together in one thirde worde, whereū; Thynges compared. to they both do agre, as thus.

If theste be worthie death, the murther is worthy no lesse. Here yee see that theste & murther are cōpared together in one thirde worde, whiche is death. Comparacions two wayes divided. Comparacions are deuided. ii. maner of wayes, for eyther they bee equal, or not equal. They are equall in this wise, if the father hath aucthorite ouer his sonne, he hath also aucthorite ouer his daughter.

CThe general rule.

where

where thynges are equall, there must nedes be equal iudgement.

Comparacions are vnequal, whē I reason either from the greater to the lesse, or els frō the lesse to the greater. From the greater to the lesse, ye may reason thus. If a Capitain with his whole company be not able to sacke a towne, much lesse one base soldiour can be able to do it. The scholemaster cā not vnderstande the Greke, or the Hebrue tonge, much lesse can the scholer, which neuer learned either of them.

Frō the lesse to the greater, ye may reason affirmatiuely, as thus. Childre can suffre much colde, & cannot young men beate a frost? Custome beareth swynge, & shall reason take no place? Women haue died for there countrey, therefore may not men bee ashamed to feare deth? Noble men are desirous to haue a good horskeper that can kepe their horses wel, and they spare not to geue great stipendes to such, and shall they not muche more bee desirous, to haue a good scholemaster that might Godly bring vp their children, in vertue

Of Logique. Fol. 104.

tue and wisdom? If a horse be not wel broken, the aowner will se that he may be made gentle, & shal not a man, seynng his naturall childe euill brought vp, take paines, & se him brought to some good order? We cā se a spauain, a splēt a ring bone, or suche other disease in a horse, and shall wee not bee as ready to loke, that there be no fautes in our childre, or in the teacher, to whom we geue the charge, to byng them vp in learnng, and good maners?

*Horses fautes
are sone seen, but
childrens maners
are neuer marked.*

The general rule.

If that which semeth to be greater be not added, neither shall that be added whiche is the lesse. Againe if that, which is lesse be added, that whiche is greater shalbe added also.

The maner of reasonng.

The scholer vnderstandeth Latine, ergo his scolemaister also hath knowlege in the same tounge. Negatiuely thus. If God wil not allowe a vowe, made by the daughter, without the knowlege of her father, although the vowe be but for one daye: how muche lesse shal that mariage take place, whē young

A vowe.

The arte

young folke make priue contractes,
without the good wil either obteyned
or yet ones sought for of their parêtes.

An obseruacion for thynges
compared.

This one thyng would be learned:
When thynges are compared together
to know whether they be in that point
either equal, or vnequal. As for an ex-
ample: Suche a lord is not learned, no
nor wise neither: Therfore none of his
men are either learned or wise. In this
point there should be made no compa-
ryng betwixt the lord and his seruaunt.
for al wittie men be not therfore lordes,
no, nor yet al lordes, be therfore wittie
men. No, no, euen the greatest lacke
somt times as wel as other pooer mē do.
Some by enheritaunce are honorable
some by faithful seruice towarde the
Kynge and their countrey, are highly
promoted: Some again by bolde enha-
bling themselves, & some by thrusting
on, choppe in at a wyndowe when the
dore is shutte vpp. Therefore this I
might reason better. Such a lord hath
smal landes and litle substaunce, ther-
fore

A rule for thynges
compared.

fore, his menne being more in number, then his landes can well maintein, and hāgging onely of his sleue, liuing without any other trade, but onely their bare wages, are better able to borrowe then to lende, and must nedes be herie nedp, and yet perhappes maie be more learned, pea, and wittier also, then is their lorde and maister.

¶ Another argument

¶ Poore subiectes get boyes, and shal not mightie kinges, be able to get children: Herein is no comparng at all, suche as is required. For a kyng is not therefore so called, because he can get children, but because he is a man of power, and ordeined of God to rule, for the punishment of vice, and maintenance of vertue. Therefore, thus I maie reason right well. The kyng ruleth: ergo the subiectes must obeie.

¶ The vse.

This place helpeth muche to exhort especially when wee reason from the lesse, to the greater, or contrary. Neither can any one that teacheth, wat the vse hereof, if thei purpose, that their

The arte

saipnges shall take place.

Repugnancie



Of repugnauncie. Repugnauncie is suche a disagreeing state of thinges, that no one thynge can be the same that the other is, by one nature or substance, as thus. Man, and vertue. the one cannot be the same, that the other is.

Repugnauncies
y. waies diuided.

Of the deuision.

Thynge repugnaunt, are deuided into discordantes, and into wordes differing one from another, by any manner of meanes.

Of discordantes, called opposita.

Discordantes.

Discordantes, are when ouerly one word or sentēce, is contrary to another so that the one cannot be the same, that the other is, nor yet bothe at one tyme, can bee in one, and the same subiect, as hot and cold, the father and the sonne, sight and blindnes, light and darknes.

There be foure of this sort.

Contraries.

Relatiues.

Situation.

Contradiction.

Contraries,

Of Logique. Fol. 106.



Contraries, are suche discor- Contraries.

dantes, as cannot be, at one,
and the same time, in one sub-

stance: Notwithstanding,

thei make bothe severally bee, in twoo
Subiectes, or substaunces, at one, and
the same tyme. As whitenes, blacknes,
vertue, and vice, wisdom, and foolish-

nes. Contraries, are twoo waies con- Contraries two
sidered, for some be suche, that if one be waies taken.
not, the other must nedes folowe, and
thei are called in Latin, contraria im-

mediata, that is to say, cōtraries. Wher
nothyng cometh betwene: as thus. A

wise man, a foole. Vertue, vice. Faith
vnbelief. All these are suche, that if the

one be not in a man, the other must ne-

des bee. As thus. Suche a one is wise,
Ergo he is no foole. If a manne be not

wise, it must nedes be, that he is foolish.
We are saued by faith: Ergo we are
condempned by vnbelief.

Again, other contraries be so, that
though the one be alwaie, yet the other

foloweth not therfore of necessitie. For
blacke and white, be contrary, and yet

thei be not so contrary, that if the whit
is. colour

The arte

colour be not, the other must nedes be. For a manne maie be high coloured, or fallowe coloured, and yet not Blacke. Therefore in suche contraries, where some thynge maie bee put betwene the extremes, it is no good reason to saie, that if the one bee not, the other muste nedes be. Note further, that all discor;dantes are not contrary, accordyng to their generall worde, or common accidentes, but accordyng to their proper difference. For if we reason thus.

{ Fire is an Element.

{ Ergo water is none.

The argument is not good, for fire and water are not contrary, according to their general word, whiche agreeth to theim bothe, but accordyng to their proper differēces, as in that fire is hote and drie, it is contrary to water, whiche is cold and moyst. Thus some, that mainteined counterfeited chastitie, went to reason against Mariage, taking an occasion vpon that place of. S. Paule, where he saith: It is good not to touche a woman, where he meaneth nothynge els, but consideryng the Gospel,
spell,

Of Logique. Fol. 107.

spell, then required speedie Preachers,
and that it wer a clogge to be married,
and somewhat an hynderaunce to those
that should trauaill, he thought it ex-
pedient to forbear. Not that he con-
demned mariage, or yet thought wo-
men to be deuilles.

¶ Virginitie is good saie thei:

¶ Therefore mariage is not good.

Where as virginitie, and mariage,
are not cōtrary, accordyng to their ge-
nerall worde, which is (good) but accor-
dyng to their proper differēce: as thus.

¶ Virginitie is a single life, with-
out knowlege of carnall acte.

¶ Therefore marige is not so.

Therefore, this worde (good) in the
aboue reherſed argument, doth signify
a thing graunted of God, and allowed
by his will, whiche doth aswell, com-
prehend mariage, as it doth virginitie
therefore this argument, is of no more
force, then if I should saie,

¶ Justice is good.

¶ Ergo temperance is not good.

And yet there is no manne, but wil
saie, that bothe these twoo vertues are

¶ iij. good

The arte

good. D: thus.

Gentlemen haue soules.

Ergo poore men haue none.

Whereas God hath geuen, bothe high and low, riche and poore, the spirite that shall liue euer. But this I speake, to set furthe more at large, the fondnesse of the other argument, concerning Mariage.

The generall rule.

But a waie one of these contraries where nothynge commeth betwene, called immedita contraria, and the other must nedes folowe, whiche is not true in those contraries, where some thynge commeth betwene the, called contraria mediata.

Relatiues.

Relatiues are those, whiche are compared among themselves, or els referred to some other. As a father, a sonne. A master, a seruant. A Kpng, a Subiect.

The generall rule

If one of the Relatiues be, the other must nedes bee: if the one bee not, the other cannot be neither.

The maner of reasonyng.

Thou

Of Logique. Fol. 108.

Thou art my seruant, why doest thou not knowe me, to bee thy master? Thou art a subiect, and wilt thou take in hande to rule?

Priuacion, is the absēce of that thing, from a substance, whiche by nature, might haue been there. Privacion.

The habite, is the haupng of that thing, in the substance, whiche nature hath graunted to be there.

¶ The generall rule.

¶ Every priuacion, is the destrucciō of that, whiche by nature was.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

¶ Suche a man is blynd:

¶ Ergo he cannot se.

Blindnes, is called priuacion, because it is thabsēce of that thing, whiche either by nature was, or mighte haue been, in the substance. Neither doeth any man, call a stone blynde, because nature hath vtterly denied, the gift of sepyng to all stones.

Sinne is called priuacion, because it is the destrucciō, of that great goodnesse, whiche God powred into man. Sinne.

¶ It is. And

The arte

And therefore God iustly punisheth those, that haue forsaken his grace.

Sentences gainsaiyng, otherwise called, contradiction.

Sentences
gainsaiyng.

Sentences gainsaiyng, are two propositions, the one denieng that, whiche thother affirmeth as thus. Christe is in the Sacrament really: Christ is not in the Sacrament really. It cannot bee, but one of these two propositions, must nedes be false.

The generall rule.

If one of the two propositions, be graunted to bee true, the other muste nedes be graunted to be false. Neither can it be, by any meanes possible, that bothe of them should either bee true or false, at one, and thesame tyme. Alwayes provided, that there bee no doubtfulness in the wordes: for if one worde signifie diuersly, then maye bothe propositions, be either true, or false, at one, and thesame tyme. As thus.

Christes flesh.

The flesh of Christ, profiteth greatly.

The flesh of Christ, profiteth nothing at all.

In

In these .ii. propositions, there is no contradiction, or gainsaying, but that thei bothe may be true, at one and the same tyme, considering thei are bothe diuersly taken. Christes flethe eaten & chewed with our teethe, profiteth nothing, Christes flethe torne vpon the crosse, profiteth muche, as the whiche purchaseth to al beleuers, life for euer.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

If we bee iustified frely, through the only merites of Iesus Christ: then this is false, that we are not iustified, onely throughe the merites of Iesus Christ: but the other is true: ergo this is false.

¶ The vse.

Of priuation, contradiction, and of contraries that immediatly folowe; conditionall argumentes are made, with the addicion of some one coniunction, of the which, when the one is true, the other must nedes be false. as thus. Either the soule is immortall, or els it is not immortall, but the first is true: ergo the second is false.

¶ Of wordes differing.

M. v.

Then

The arte

Wordes differing



Kyng Lud.

Then haue we thuse of this place, when we reason, and proue that one thing is not the same, that another is, as Kyng Lud is not the same, that Julius Cesar, or Brutus was: Kyng Lud builded London, of whom the Citee had his name, beeing called Puddes toun, and after ward, by alteration of letters, called London. Ergo neither Cesar, nor Brutus, builded the same. Discordantes called opposita are not the same, that wordes differing are called differētia. For as muche as wher discordantes be, one thyng onely, is set against another one. As for example. Nothyng can be set against brightnes, as discordant, but onely darkenes, nothyng can be set against heat, but onely colde, and so in other. But in this place, there maie many thynges differ, from some one thyng, and whatsoeuer is not the same, that another is, may be called a woorde differing, in Latine, differens, or disparatum. Socrates is a man, ergo he is not an Dre, a stone, a horse, or any other thyng els.

Thynges

Of Logique. Fol. 110.

Thynges differ. iij. waies, either by nombryng. As euery singuler man differeth one from another. James is one, and Iohn is another. Other differ in their kynde, when thei are comprehended vnder diuerse kyndes, as Beauuis of Hampton, and Arundell his horse: or els Alexander, and Bucephalus. Other differ by the generall woorde, when thei are comprehended, vnder diuerse generall wordes, as this worde Baptisme, and Magistrate, the one comprehended vnder a Sacramēt of God, the other vnder a certain ordinance of God. Lastly, woordes differ by their moſte generals, when thei are placed in diuerse predicamētes. A king manhodde, the one is placed among the relatives, the second is in qualitie.

Thynges differ
four waies.

¶ The generall rule.

We cannot make thynges, that do muche differ, to be of one nature.

¶ The maner of reasonyng.

We reason from wordes differyng negatiuely altogether.

From suche as differ in number, we reason thus.

Suche

The arte

Suche a one is called Thomas, therefore he is not the same, that Ihon is. Peter is not Paule, nor yet Paule is Peter. faithe is not woorkes, nor yet woorkes are faithe.

From suche as differ in kynd, thus, I am a man, therefore I should not be vsed like a brute beast.

From suche as differ by the generall worde.

I did borrowe plain clothe of thee, and why dost thou require raised velvet of me?

From suche as differ in predicament.

Virtue is a qualitie of the mynde, therefore it is no substance.

wee makeeth
matters.

After knowlege attained, exercise is mooste necessarie. And happie shall he bee, that vnto skill, addeth practise, for then learning is best confirmed, when knowlege is put in vze

Therefore considering, I haue sette furthe the places, I thinke it necessary after knowlege of the same, to describe matiers by euery one of theim, as they lye in order: that other maie likewise, when any question commeth in controuerſie,

Of Logique. Fol. III.

uerſie, go through the places themſelves with it, and examine every worde, by every ſeueral place.

And to make this thyng more plaiu, I will go through the places with one certain worde, and loke what helpe I ſhall finde there, for knowlege of the ſame. The worde ſhall bee (a Kpng) or (a Magiſtrate.)

¶ The definition.

The definition of a Magiſtrate. Every kpng, or Magiſtrate, is the miniſter of God, for a good ende, to the puniſhyng of naughtie perſones, and to the comfortyng of godly men.

A kpng declared
by the places of
Logique.

¶ The generall rule.

The miniſter of God.

¶ The kynd.

Either a tiraunt, or a godly Kpng, thone ruleth accordyng to his luſt, the other accordyng to right, and iuſtice.

¶ Wordes poked.

The officer, the office, to beare an office, if the office cannot bee ſpared, the officer cannot be ſpared.

¶ Adiacentes neceſſarily ioyned.

Wiſedom, earneſt labour, cunnyng

in

The arte

in sciences, skilfull both of warre, and peace, these all must nedes be in euery Magistrate.

CAdiacentes adioyned casually.

To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life, all these happen to be in good Magistrates.

CDreeds necessary.

To defende religion, to enact gods ly lawes, to punishe offendours, to defende the oppressed, all these are necessary in a kyng, and are neuer found in any tyraunt.

CThe thyng conteynyng.

Moses, Dauid, Salomon, Ezechias, Iosias. Charles the Emperour Edward the .vi. of that name, Kyng of Englande.

CThe efficient cause

God hymself, or els the ordinaunce of God.

CThe second efficient cause.

Unquiet people, rebelles, disobedient people, are the cause why Magistrates are ordeined.

CThe ende of a Magistrate.

This ende he must nedes obserue,
that

Of Logique. Fol. 112.

that alwaies the people liue in quiete-
nesse, and in honest conuersacion passe
their whole life.

¶ The effect, or els the thynges
doen by a Magistrate.

Peace is made, the realme enriched
all thynges plenteous, but where a ti-
raunt ruleth, al thynges are contrary.

¶ The authoritie.

The. xij. to the Romaines, let euer-
y soule bee Subiecte to the powers.
i. Peter. ij. Be subiect to the kyng.

¶ Thynges incident.

The scepter is a token of iustice, euē
as a sworde is a signe of reuengement,
or wrathe, payng of Subsidies, taxes
Tributes, rent, or any suche like, peo-
men of the Garde, and all other wait-
ters, souldiours in warre, the obedie-
nce of the subiectes, the honor geuen
vnto him, triumphes made, runnyng at
the tilte, fightyng at the barriers, fight-
yng at the tourney. All these are con-
tingencia to a kyng, that is, although
these thynges be not in a cōmon welth
yet maie there bee a kyng, yea, and al-
though there be no kyng in some com-
mon

The arte

mon weale, yet these thynges maie bee euery echone of theim, as it was in Athens, where the people had the rule of the common weale, and all was referred to their iudgement.

¶ Similitudes.

That whiche the Shepheard is to the Shepe, the same is the Magistrate to his subiectes. That whiche the maister of the shippe, is to the shippe, or the maister of an household, to his house, or the hed to the whole body: the same is the Magistrate to his subiectes.

¶ Thynges compared.

Seruauntes must be obedient and Subiect to their maisters, with all reuerence, as we reade in the scripture: how much more then should the subiectes be obedient to their king and soveraigne Lorde, whiche by the ordinance of God, is appoynted to rule, and to haue gouernaunce ouer them.

Ye maie se by this one exāple, that the serchyng of places, ministreth argumentes plentifully. For if ye wil proue a Magistrate necessarie, ye maie reason from the definition, frō the causes, from

Gouernaunce.

Obedience.

Gatherynge of
argumentes.

from the authoritie, fro the thynge cō-
teynynge, from the adiacentes, from s^e
similitude, and make good reasons for
the purpose. Notwithstandynge, I thin-
ke it not necessarie that ye searche al s^e
places at every time, and for every ma-
tier: but that ye searche moſte parte of
them. And although we cannot finde a
good argument in everie one of them,
yet it is wel if we maie gather but thre
or foure good argumentes. As when
we go into a gardine, we ſhal not finde
all herbes growynge there, although
we searche every corner: so when wee
loke in all the places of inuention for s^e
proſe of our matier, we ſhall not finde
in everie place a good argumēt for our
purpose. Not withstanding it is moſte
necesſarie, either when we wil proſe a
matter oure ſelfe, or els trie an others
labour, which is ſet forth at large moſt
eloquentlie: to bypynge the whole ſome
of his long tale to theſe places, & make
an argument in thre lines of that, whi-
che he dilateth into thre thietes.

The be of logi-
que.

And for our ſelfe, if we wil reaſon
a matier earneſtly, it ſhal be profitable

D. j.

to ſe

The arte

to see oure owne argumentes before hand deriued out of y^e places, the whiche shall make vs more bolde to speake, when we shall euidently perceue oure owne reasons suerly grounded.

And the better able we shal be to confirme our own cause, and to auoyde al obiections, when we knowe suerly by this arte, whereunto we maie leane.

For although other shall empeche our dopnges, and wrest oure wordes, yet we shalbe able euermore to kepe oure owne, whiche we plainlie perceue wherof oure argument hath his grounde.

Many spake wisely which neuer read logique, but to speke wisely with a iudgement, and to knowe the verie fountaine of thynge: that can none do, except they haue some skill in this art.

Therefore what diuersitie there is betwixt a blind man, & him that seeth, the same difference is betwixt a wylde man vnlearned, and a wiseman lerned. We haue sene the commoditie of this arte by this one woorde (magistrate) which I did applie to euery place, that myght geue any lyght for the making of an

of an argument. Nowe ye shall haue a question set forth, and both the partes of a proposition referred to the places of inuention, that thereby ye maie knowe wherein the places do agree, & wherein they do not, for where as the places agree (that is to saie, al thinges are referred to y^e one, that are referred to the other) there the proposition is good, and the latter part of the proposition, is truly spoken of the first. But where the places do not agree (that is to saie, some thynge is referred to the one worde, that are not referred to the other) there the thynge themselves cannot agree. I wil vse this question for an example, whether it be lawfull for a priest to marie a wife or no.

And first of all I wil examine a priest, and applie hym to all the places. Next after that we wil refer a wife to al the places, & se when we haue done, where in these two do agree, and wherein they do not agree.

The marriage of
Priests proved
by logique.

¶ From the definition.
A Preacher is a clerke or shepheard.
Whiche wil geue his life for his shepe,
M.ij. enstruc-

enstructed to sette forth the kyngdome
of God, and desierouse to lyue vertuz
ously: a faithfull, and a wise steward
whom the lord doth set ouer his house,
that he maie geue the householde ser
uauntes meate, in due time.

¶ From the generall worde.

A minister a seruaunt, a holie man,
a gospeler, the minister of God should
be vpright in his liuing, faithfully be
stowyng the wordes of truthe.

¶ From the kynde

Chrysostome.

Peter, Paul, Ihon Baptist, Elay,
Eldras, and Steuin, Ambrose bepng a
temporall man was after that a minist
ter of the Church. Chrysostome be
came of a lawer, an earnest preacher of
goddes worde. Peca Peter & Androwe,
both ware fishers, therefore temporall
men may be called if they be worthie,
and desire this spirituall function.

¶ From the Propertie.

Saint Hierome.

To be miete to teache, to be Godly
wise, to do, and to teache all thynge
that they are comaunded. Saint Hier
rome in his Epistle to Nepotianus, as
touchyng the lyfe of Preachers, saith
thus.

Of Logique. Fol. 115.

thus, I will not haue the pleade causes, & to be a brabbling iangler without all reason, but I will haue the to be a faithfull Minister, of the Sacramentes, and very skilfull in the lawes of the Lorde.

CThe whole.

To be brought vp in the scriptures euen from his youth, to be godly in conuersacion, and wholly to be instructed with all thynges, necessarie for a preacher. Whosoever is thus armed, is worthy to be a minister, in the Church of God. This argument is deriued from the whole.

CThe partes.

To inuent matier out of the scripture, accordyng to the aptnes of hys heares, to decke his doynges handsomly, to place his sentences in order, to remember what he speaketh, and to utter his wordes distinctly, playnly, and with lowde voice.

CThynges poked together.

A preachyng, a Preacher, to do the worke of a Preacher. Timoth. iiij. He that by his preachyng edifieth, the same

i. Timoth. iiij.

D. iij.

me man

The arte

me man is a preacher.

Thynges cleauynge, or adioyned to
the substance.

Labour, diligence, witte, knowlege,
sobriete, gentlenes, vertue, mariage, an
earnest desire to byng vp his children
wel, with other such. A bishop must be
without fault, y husbande of one wife,
watchefull, sober, modest, herberous,
apte to teache, no great drynkar of wi-
ne, no fighter, not geuen to filthie lu-
cre, but vpright, voide from brawling,
from couetousnes, &c. i. Timothy. ii.

i. Timothy. ii.

The maner of doyng.

To feade Christes flock, to put his
life in daunger for the flocke comitted
to his charge, to byng vp his flocke, &
family in the feare of god, in y know-
ledge of his woorde, and in due obser-
uyng of the same.

The thyng containyng.

Cicero.

Cicero in the first booke of the Co-
mentaries which he made vpon the Ga-
lathians. i. cap. Let vs not thinke that
the Gospell resteth in the woordes of
Scripture, but in the sense, not in the
outward rynde, but in the very hart,
not

not in the leaues, but in the very roote
of reason. Let the woordes of Christe ^{Piere. i.}
dwell plenteously in you, with al wis-
dome. Collos. iii.

The matter.

The woorde of God. The old Tes-
tament, & the new. Hieremie the first.
Behold, I haue geuen my woordes in
to thy mouth.

The shappe or forme.

The shappe may be taken of the cō-
uersation, speche, spirite, or the maner
of the preachers liuing.

The efficient cause.

God himselfe, the Scripture, good
preachers, Euangelistes, the lord wil
geue his worde, to those that preache,
plenteously. Psal. lxxii. I haue plan- ^{i. Corinth. iij.}
ted, Apollo hath watered, but GOD
geueth encrease.

The ende.

The ende of preachyng is, that the
wicked myght be conuerted to repen-
taunce, and the iust mā kept in his vp-
right liuyng. Ezech. iii.

Thinges done by vertue of.
the cause.

Q. liij. To

The arte

Acts. iij.

To winne men to Christe, to make mens consciences quiete, to moue the to praier. When Peter made a sermon, out of hand there was about. iij. thousand conuerted to the faith of the gospel, that selfe same daie.

¶ What is appointed to hym, and proper to this reasonyng.

To studie earnestlie, and searche the scriptures that he mape proue a true minister of God, to lyeue a good life, & seke to kepe a household, that he maie be herberous.

¶ The place.

John. xbiij.

The churche, the pulpite, the be-
stiarie, the chauncell. I spake openly
in the sinagoge saith Christ, and in the
Churche, to all the Jewes that came
thither, & I spake nothyng in corners.

¶ The time.

A young man, an elderly man, an
old man, to preache early and late. i.
Timoth. iij. Let no man contemne
thy youthe.

¶ Chynges annered.

To haue some stipende for his prea-
chyng. Worthy is the labourer to haue
his

his wagies. Math. x.

The other places folowynge, because they are not absolutely considered, but referred to some other, & euer haue respect to the next woorde, whiche is reherſed in y^e question of that which went before, they cannot ſeuerally be handled in one woorde: and therefore ye muſt marke the whole queſtion, and in one argument comprehend aſwell the wife, as the miniſter. Nowe therefore ye ſhall haue this woorde, vxor, (a wife) deſcribed through out the places

¶ The definition.

A wife, is a woman that is lawfully receiued into the felowſhip of life, for y^e encrease or getting of chyldren, and to auoide fornication. A wife.

¶ The generall woorde.

A wife, is a woman,

¶ The kynde.

A chaste wife, a learned wife, a manerly wife, or els ye may vſe y^e proper names of women, for the kynde it ſelfe, as Lucretia, Cornelia, Portia, Hippocratea, &c.

¶ The propertie.

A. v.

To

The arte

To bryng forth chyldren.

The whole.

The whole woman herselfe altogether.

The partes.

The head, the breast, the armes, the backe, the thighe, the hart, the vaines, blood, and flesh.

Woordes toynd.

Howsewifelyke to do the worke of a wife. She doth the dutie of a good wife; ergo she is a wife. She handleth all thynges housewifely: Ergo she is a good houswife.

Woordes adioyned.

The loue in mariage, care ouer the familie, keppung of herselfe to one husband, to be obedient vnto hym, loue of her chyldren, losse of her chyldren.

The maner of doyng.

To be obedient, to be shew thake, to bryng vp her chyldren well, to liue in mariage with her husbände both at bed, and at boorde, accordyng to the wil of God.

The thyng conteynyng.

The woman her selfe.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 118.

The Matier, and forme.

The bodie, and soule, or the woman and the mā, are the matier of marriage, the coniunctiō it self is the forme of it.

The efficient cause.

God himselfe, the Scripture, let a man be the husband of one wife. They shalbe. ii. in one flethe. The cause that one woman is married to a seueral person, and liketh him before al other, and the mā her in likewise: is God himself first, that kindleth such affectiōs, next after, their consent, and full agreement doth ensue,

i. Timothy. ii.
Genet. i.

The ende.

To bryng forth childre, and to kepe them saufe, and to auoide synne.

The effect.

Childre godlie instructed, the house well ordred.

Thynges apointed for some end.

To please her husbände, to lyue a good lyfe, to prouide thynges necessarie for the furniture of her household.

The place.

The house, the chambze of wedlocke, the halle, or parlour.

The

The arte

The tyme.

Aristotels' minto
what time men &
maydens should
marie.

Boyes begette
boyes.

A young woman, or an olde. Aristotle saith, it is mete for men to marie at .xxvi. for maidens to marie at .xviii. but then was then, and now is now, at thynge in this worlde are ripe before there tyme. I meane not that honestie it self is so, for I neuer knew it ripe as peat, but euer rawe. But thus ye see the time of mariage was not so hastely looked for, as it is now. In this worlde a child shal scant be out of his shel, but he shalbe suer to one or other, & which I doubt. Whether it maie be called a mariage or no: for those that be of ripe peres, nomã doubteth, but if they can agree both, & haue there frendes good wyll (for that ought to be sought for, and also obtained) the mariage is allowed before God.

¶ Wordes annexed or knytte together.

Mariage is referred to this place, for a wife is so called, because she hath a husband, neyther can any woman be called a wife, excepte she haue a husband, therfore she is placed among the wordes annexed, that is, where one thynge

theng is knitte to another, so that the one cannot be, except the other be also.

Nowe that we haue drawn these wordes, the preacher, and the wife, after this sort, throughout the places, so far as we could: we shuld cōpare them together, and se wherein thei do agre, and wherein they varie. Let vs compare the definitions together, and we shal finde somewhat euen there, where these wordes be (desirpug to lyue vertuously) whiche shall geue light for an argument, as thus.

Whosoever desireth to liue vertuously, must mary a wyfe.

from the definition.

Every true preacher of Goddes word desireth to liue vertuously
Ergo every true Preacher must mary a wife.

Now if mine aduersary wil deny the proposition at large, called the maior, then can I do no good with it, except I finde somewhat in the definition of a wife, whiche is agrepug to this aboue rehersted proposition. I finde in thys worde (Wife) that he is married for the encrease of children, and to auoide fornication.

nication. Then I reason thus for the confirmation of my purpose by the argument called Sorites.

Whoſoeuer deſireth to live ver-
tuouſly, deſireth to auoide forni-
cation.

Whoſoeuer deſireth to auoide
fornication, deſireth mariage.

Ergo whoſoeuer deſireth to
live vertuouſly, deſireth mar-
riage.

Againe the generall worde of both
theſe definitions geueth lyght for an
argument. Every wyfe is a woman,
every preacher is a man, and nature
hath ordeyned that man and woman
may live in mariage, (if they be ſo diſ-
poſed) of what degre, cōdition, or ſtate,
ſo ever they be, nothyng in al the ſcrip-
tures to the contrarpe. Therfore I
may reaſon thus.

What ſoeuer is man, that ſame
maie marie a woman by gods or-
dinaunce.

Every preacher is a man.
Ergo every preacher maie marie
a woman by gods ordinaunce.

Even

Euen as I haue done in these places, comparing one to an other, so ye may dooe in the residue, and where ye see any thynge serueth for your purpose, that they agree together on both parties, ye may vse the same: if they do not agree in some places, ye may refuse them, or els somollifie the thynge that suche repugnauncies maye not harme your cause at all. As where it is in the wordes adioyned that a woman is oftentimes ouerthwart, froward, disobedient carcles ouer her children, forasynuche as these be no causes of mariage, they shall not hynder mariage, for a godlie man will beare all aduersitie, and suffer suche euell happe, and not therfore eschew mariage, because these incommodities chaunce in mariage. Now I will enter into the other places which do not seuerally handle one word, but haue respect euermore to an other, and so by the knyttynge together of twoo thynge, or settynge the one against the other, the truth of our purpose is espiyed, and the cause confirmed.

Incommodities
of mariage miti-
gated.

From the similitude,

As

The arte

Similitude of
marriage.

As he is not to be compted a good gardiner, or a good orchard keeper that is content with suche fruit as he hath alredy, only cherishing his old trees, and hath no care neither to cut downe the olde, nor yet to set newe grasses: so that man is to be compted no diligent member in the commune weale, which beyng content with the present compaignie of mē, hath no minde to encrease the nombze of people.

¶ From authoritie.

God the author
of marriage.

If the great workeman of thinges God almightie himself, after the flood beyng recōciled to man, made this law (as we reade in Scriptures) that men shuld not live single, but encrease and be multiplied, that the yearth might be filled: and seying also that Christ hymselfe sence that time hath allowed marriage by a miracle of chaunging water into wine, which miracle was the first that he did vpon earth: & seying Paule also byddeth every man that cannot lyue chaste, to marie, and that it is better to marie, then to burne in filthie desires, and besides this willeth a bishop should

Of Logique. Fol. 121.

shoulde be the housbande of one wife:
it must nedes bee that preachers may
lawful mary, aswel as any other tem-
poral men.

Cfro comparison of the lesse, to
the greater.

It is a shame to se brute beastes obey
the lawe of nature, and man, especial-
ly a learned man, and a preacher, like a
stoute gyaunt to strue with nature, &
to do contrary to het bidding.

CFrom the greater to the lesse.

If the daughters of Lot doubted Lots daughters.
nothing at the matter to lie with their
own father when he was drōke, thyn-
kyng it better to prouide for encrease
by filthie lust, thē that mākynd shoulde
decay: shal not then a Preacher which
shoulde haue regarde for the encrease
of mankind, and also a desire to auoide
fornicacion, marie, if he be disposed, or
other wise can not liue chaste?

COf discordantes.

We may reason from the contrarie
thus, if virginite be a thynge geuen to
aungels and almost aboue māns reach,
then mariage is a thynge propre to mā.

R. J. From

The arte

CFrom the p^rsuacion.

If the lacke of children be a thyng hateful to man, the the haupng of children is a thyng ioyful to man.

CFrom the relacion.

If a Bishop be allowed by the scriptures to be a housband, then is he allowed to haue a wife, and by the scriptures we reade that he is allowed to be a housbande, for Paule saith: Let a Bishop be the housbande of one wife, Ergo he is allowed to haue a wife.

CFrom wordes differng.

That woorde is called a differng worde, whatsoeuer it is, whiche is not the same, that an other is. As thus: A preacher is a man. Ergo he is no God. Priestes be men as other men be, and that some married men per now, haue wel knownen. Therefore he may marie a woman, if he can not liue chaste, considering there is nothyng in al the scriptures to the contrarie.

As I haue doen for the office of a Prince, and the mariage of a Priest, so may I also go thorowe out the places
with

With any other matter, that is now in controuersie.

As faith, workes, penance, the sacrifice of the masse, baptisme, the law, the gospel, synne, flander, rule, preaching, and euery other thyng that mā is bounde to know.

What is faith? Faith is a trust and full perswasion, whereby onely we do assure vs that our sinnes be forgiven vs, and we accepted as iust before god, throughe the merites of Christ.

Faith defined.

¶ Thus.

Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrues. Faith is a sure confidence of thynges whiche are hoped for, and a certaintie of thynges, which are not sene.

¶ The general worde.

A sure confidence, and a certaintie of thynges.

¶ The kynde.

A faith, whiche is occupied about thynges both corporal, and also spirituall, beleuynge that Christ was both God and man, by whom saluacion is attained.

R. y.

The

The arte

CThe difference.

Thynge which are hoped for, and the which are sene.

CThe propriete.

To beleue assuredly, and trust the promises of God.

CThe partes of faith.

Faith diuersely
take in scripture.

The true faith hath no partes. All be it faith is diuersly taken in the scripture, for there is an Historical faith. As I do beleue that William Conqueror was kyng of England. There is also a iustifying faith, wherby I loke assuredly to be saued. There is a faith when one man faithfully promiseth another, to do this or that, and wil stande to his worde. There is also a faith of miracles, wherby the Apostles did cast out deuils, and helped the diseased persones.

CThynge adioyned to faith, and also thynge annexed to faith.

Hope, Charite, to bee good to the poore, to forbear from wicked attēptes, to speake well of all, to eschewe excesse.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 123.

CThe thyng conteynyng.

The minde of man, or the soule of man.

CThe efficient cause.

The woorde of God, or the holy Ghost, stirryng the harte of man, and comfortyng hym in the merites of Chrystes passion.

CThe ende of faith.

Life everlastyng, whiche is geuen frely to every beleuer that confesseth in his hart, Iesus to be Chryst, and assuredly trusteth to be saved by the or heryl merites of his passion.

CContraries.

Unbeliefe, desperation, whereby man fauleth from God, to his utter damnacion for ever,

R. 14.

The

The arte

The places of false conclusions, or deceipt: ful reasons.



Nowe that I haue de-
clared, what an Argu-
mēt is, what the places
of inuencion bee, howe
they serue for the con-
firmacion of any mat-
ter, howe euery thyng is made, in his
due mode, and figure, and also shewed
the obseruaciō of many thynges, wher
by any one, shall both be assured, that
his argument is true, (if it be made ac-
cordyng to the rules) & also may knowe
that it is false, if it be not made accor-
dyng to the same rules; I wil frō hēce
furth, set out the maner of deceiptfull
argumentes, called in Latine. Repre-
hensiones, or fallaces conclusiuncu-
lae, euen as Aristotle hath set thē furth
Albeit, their is no argumēt so deceipt-
ful, but they al may easly be auoided, if
the rules be marked, that are rehearsed
before, concerning the true makynge of
an argument. For accordyng to the old
sayng

Deceptful argu-
mentes, or false
conclusions.

Of Logique. Fol. 124.

Saying. Contrariorum eadem est doctrina. That is to say, of contraries, there is one manner of doctrine, for he, which can handsomly set furth a liō in his shape and portraiture, may iudge with reason a liō euil fauouredly painted, & can with litle difficultie, shewe the faultes in eueri place. So in like manner. if one can make an argumēt, according to the rules aboue reherſed, in his due forme & mode, he can tel also, whē an argumēt is otherwise made the rules can beare. To some mē, these places of craftie that folowe, may seeme straunge, & yet euen in waightie matters, & wicked haue deriued their subtle defences frō these deceitful corners therfore, because such places, may the rather be auoided, & better knownen, I will both sette them furth at large, and also teache aswell as I am able, how to confute them. And first to confute, is nothynge els but to iudge false packing, and to vnloose by reason, thinges knit together by craftie. Therfore the Logicien, if he will do his parte, must not onely fence hymself, for con-

B. iij. firma;

The arte

firmacion of his alone cause, but must also overthrow, the assercion of other, and also by reason, proue their sayings to bee false, whiche by deceipte, woulde enueyggle the weake.

The maner of confutation two wayes considered.

Confutation two
wayes used.

In answere made
to satisfie the
person thre wa-
yes.

For the first, eyther we purpose by disputation, to aunswere fully to the matter, or els secondly (if power want to compasse that) we seke some other meanes, to satisfie the manne, and that thre maner of waies, either by making the obiection seme lesse then it is, or by bryngyng some other example against it, or els by sekynge some meanes, to go from the matter.

We make the argument appere slender, when we receiue it laughynge, & declare by woordes, even at the firste, that it is nothyng to the purpose, and so abashe the opponet.

Again, we turne another argument in our aduersaries necke, when wee bryng another example against hym. Or els when we charge hym, with a like faute, and lay some greater matter in

Of Logique. Fol. 125.

in his dishe. Lastly, we shift away, fro
the violence of our aduersarie, by ma:
kyng some digression, or geuyng occa:
sion of some other talke, whereby the
aduersary, either is drien to forget
his argument, or els beynge blynded
with to much matter, is forced eyther
to go no further, or els to thynke hym
self content. In al which maner of cō:
futation, when we purpose to putte a
man to silence, I woulde with greate
moderacion to be vled, and as litle ad:
uauntage takē by such meanes, as may
be possible. For although it be a poore
help (as in dede it is none other) yet
many a man loseth his estimacion, by
muche vsyng of such fashions. It is a
woorde to se the subtle bryn, of many
bragging bodies which with bold cō:
tenaunce, beare an outward shadowe
of wisdom, haupng only the masking
hysage, and lackyng the naturall face.
They will stande stoutely in mainte:
naunce of an vnt ruth, and with coun:
tenaunce seme to shewe it: pea, and by
their bold bearyng it out almost per:
swade the hearers, that they only haue

R.v.

the

The arte

the true parte, and that other, are al together decciued. They wil say, that no wise man, woulde onesthynke that for shame, which their aduersarie, vttereth without al shame: yea, they wil saye, he speaketh to to babishelp, and so dasheth hym out of countenance, that he shal not wel know what to say, and last of al, they wil trifle and toicmerely, and so with impudent laughyng, make the other pass speakyng. I will not putte any in this Memento, as though they were gilty: but their awne doinges, shal put in themselves, on Goddes name, for me. Notwithstandyng, I would gladly wish (as I said before) that there were a measure vsed, and then suche doynges, might better be borne.

Answers made
to the matter
two wayes.

In general answers
two the wayes

We answer to the matter, two wayes, either generally, or particularly. A general answer is made. iij. wayes. firste when the fault is in the matter, that is to say, in the wordes of either propoicion, when they signifie diuerse thynges, or be diuersly applied to shewe it plainly: and either deny it

Of Logique. Fol. 126.

as foolish, or els dissolue it, as doubteful. As thus, the Libertines reason.

{ What soeuer is naturall, that same is not euil.

Libertines error

{ To sinne is a thynge naturall.

Ergo to sinne is not euil.

The seuerall or second proposition, is not true. And therfore the argumēt is false, in the matter it self. For God did create the nature of man, pure and cleane, and saied, that all was good, whiche he made, at the firste creacion. Neither was it Goddes wil, that man should altre his commaundement, and swarue from the pathe, of his appointed lawes, but rather the suggestiō of the deuill, and the weakenesse of our flesh, brought man to helle, death and dampnacion.

Again, when the fault appeareth in the forme, and maner of making an argument, we must declare that it is not framed, accordyng to the rules, which require that euery argument, shoulde both be in mode and figure, as I haue before sufficiently declared. As thus.

The fault in the forme or making of an argument.

All

The arte

Al Magistrates do reuenge.
Every bold hardyman doth reuēge
Ergo every bolde hardy man, is a
Magistrate.

This argument, beyng made in the second figure, is of no force, cōsidering it is in no mode, of the same figure. For in this figure, all the propoſitions, do not affirme altogether, but one of the euer doth deny, as it appeareth plainly, to him that list to ſe.

The fault both in
the matter and
forme alſo.

Thirdly, when the fault is both in the matter, & in the maner of making we muſt reſuſe the argument, & ſhew the faultes plainly, As thus:

Every ſlaughter, is ſynne.
Every adulterie, is ſynne.
Ergo every aduſtry is ſlaughter.

First the faulte is, that ſlaughter is not wel defined. For in warre tyme, it is lawfull to kill, and every man may ſtand in his awn defence, againſt violent robbers, and rather kill, then bee killed. Thirdly, the argument is in no mode, although it be in the ſecōd figure

The particular avoidyng of an argument,

Of Logique. Fol. 127.

gument, is. v. wayes vsed, either by de-
 claryng in what deceitful subtiltie, it
 is contained, Or fro which of the pla-
 ces, it is wroḡfulli deriued, Or to shew
 the wroḡ frampng in euery mode, & fi-
 gure, Or to make an argumēt, with a
 like reason, and so to auoide the cause,
 Or last of al, to vse the straūge deceit-
 ful places, which shalbe last reherſed.

*A particular argu-
 cing. v. waies*

And now wil I tel particularly e-
 uery deceitful argument, that when
 such a subtle argumēt shalbe vsed, et-
 ther in disputacion, or priuate talke: as
 ny one may espie the fault out of hāde
 and shewe in whiche of these capcious
 reasons, the subtiltie resteth.

And first a false conclusion, is a de-
 ceipt vsed in an argument, wherby one
 vnder the colour of truth, goeth about
 to enueggle the hearer, or thus, a false
 conclusion is an argument, apperyng
 to the ignorant, as though it wer true,
 and yet is nothyng true at al. Aristotle
 doth deuide them into. ii. partes. Some
 be called deceitful argumentes, whe-
 a doubtful worde is vsed, or the kynde
 of speache is straunge, and may be take

A false conclusio.

*False conclu-
 sions two wayes
 deuied.*

two

The arte

Phrases not
known, haue
caused errors.

two wayes, & that the fault is rather
in the kynd & maner of speakyng, then
in the matter oꝝ very thyng it selfe.
Therefore those that be good Grāmas-
rians, & know the properties of wooꝝ-
des, and are skilful in the tongues, can
gallie well solute such errors as bee
made by the mistakynge of wooꝝdes, oꝝ
by false vnderstandynge of phrases,
wherof in very many maner heresies, and
much false doctrine haue had their first
beginnyng. There be again some crafty
subtillties which are not in þe woꝝde,
but rather spryng either of the euell
knyttynge together of the propositions,
oꝝ els of the confusion of thynges, that
is to say, when one thing is falsely ap-
pointed foꝝ an other, as in this propor-
tion, a mā may easely espie false pac-
kyng whiche is in the seconde figure.

{

 Fe: No sinne doth beget a mā.
 St: Concupiscence doth beget
 a man.
 No. Ergo cōcupiscēce is no sin.

The seconde propoſitiō although it
may deceiue a man, that is not ware,
pet

Of Logique. Fol. 128.

pet is it altogether false, because nature which is a thyng ordeined of god, doth begette man, not the wicked impotentie or rather the destruction of nature, whiche afterwarde folowed. Here it is plain that a mingle mangle is made of thynges, when generacion which should be attributed to nature, is referred to cōcupiscence, because it is in nature, & next adioynng vnto it.

Now for the nombze and deuidyng of these deceiptfull argumentes, it is to vnderstand, that there be. xiiij. wher of six are called subtilties in the worde or maner of speakyng, and the other seuen are called subtilties without the word, when thynges are confounded, when the knittynge is altered, and one taken for an other.

The number of
false conclusions.
Or the diuision
of deceiptful ac-
gementes.

Deceptful argumentes.

In the worde are these folowynge.

1. The doubtfulness of worde.
2. The double meanynge of a sentence.
3. The ioynynge of wordes that shoulde be parted.
4. The partynge of wordes that shoulde be ioyned.
5. The maner of speche.
6. The accents.

The arte

Diversity of
subtilties.



¶ These names be comprehended vnder this one worde (doubtful) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth diuerse wayes, that he maye shewe the difference of these doubtfull thynges. For some argumentes haue the doubt in a worde signifieng diuersly, some in the proprietye of the phrase, some in y^e ioyning together of wordes, & some other in the diuidyng, & displacyng of the same, as it shal appere more plainly in the handling of these places seuerally.

¶ The doubtfulness of a worde.

The doubtfulness
of a worde.

Homonymia, whiche may be called in Englishe, the doubtfulness of one woorde, when it signifieth diuersly, is a maner of a subtiltie, when the deceipte is in a worde that hath mo significations then one. And the reason is, that such argumentes are not good, because their are foure termes in the two proposicions, for the double repete, signifieth one thing in the first proposicion, and another thyng in the seconde proposicion. Therefore nothyng is proued in the conclusion,

clusion, when suche doubtfull wordes are placed in a propoſicion. And therefore, when ſuche a ſubtiltie is ſpied, a man maie deny the conſequent, geuyng this reaſon, that it is a ſubtiltie, drawn from this place of doubtfulneſſe.

¶ In example.

Da. Every arme is a ſubſtaunce made of fleſhe, bloud, bones, ſinues, and veines.

ri. God the father hath an arme.

i. Ergo God the father is one that hath a ſubſtaunce of fleſhe bloud, bones, ſinues, and veines.

Arme of double
underſtandynge.

I anſwer: this knittynge is not good and therefore I deny the whole. The reaſon is, becauſe it is a ſubtiltie, of a doubtfull worde, for in the firſt propoſitiō, the arme is conſidered to be ſuche a one, as manne hath, but in the ſecond propoſicion, it is not ſo ment, for it ſignifieth by a Metaphore the power, ſtrength, or might of God.

¶ Another example.

Re. There is none euill in the Citie, ſaith the Prophet, whiche the lord
loꝝde hath not doen.

Euill euen
waies taken.

S. i. There

The arte

ri. There be many synnes and horrible euilles in the citee.

o. Ergo God is thauthor of synne.

I deny the cōsequent. Because there is doubtfulnes in this worde euill: for in the first propolition, euill doth signifie, the euill of punishment, as we call commonly all calamitie, euill, and all punishment euill, whiche are not sinne and in the second propolitiō, euill doth signifie offence, and al naughtines that is committed. Therfore the second propolition, is not agreyng with the first, and therfore thargument is not good.

The mistes of
woordes haue
blynded all our
wyses.

Of no one thyng riseth so muche controuerlie, as of the doubtfulnesse, and double takyng of a word. Scholars dispute, wisemen fall out, lawyers agree not. Preachers waxe hotte, gentlemen strue, the people mutter, good menne geue counsaill, women haue their wordes, this man affirmeth, the other denyeth, and yet at lēgth, the double meanyng beeyng once knowen (when all thynges are quiete,) endes the whole matier. Therfore it is good, first to be well grounded, and suerly to state our selves,

Of Logique. Fol. 130.

selfes, vpon some one assured knowe-
lege, before we talke of thynges doubt-
full, wherein resteth error. Best lear-
ned of all other, is that manne onely in
my mynde, whiche seepng repugnaunt
sentēces, can by reason iudge the truth
Salomon saith in his Proverbes.

God the father from the begin-
nyng, created wisdom.

The vnlearned, the wicked, or the
sedicious Libertine, maie take here an
occasion to proue, that Christ was man
onely, and reason thus.

God the father from the begin-
nyng, created wisdom.

Christe the sonne of God, is the
wisdom of his father.

Ergo Christ the sonne of God,
was created frō the beginning.

Therefore, it muche auaileth to
knowe the double meanynge of euery
doubtfull worde. In the firste proposi-
cion, wisdom signifieth the worde, re-
ueled or preached by the mouth of man
In the second proposicion, wisdom is
taken for the seconde persone in Tri-
nitie, accordyng to, S. Iohns Gospel.

S. ij.

In

The arte

In the begynnyng was the woorde, and the woorde was with God, and God was the woorde. Euery one knoweth, that euery woorde is not God, and yet this woorde (whiche passeth all wordes) is God the sonne, whiche otherwise is called, the wisdom of his father. A certain persone, that is no small foole, as all men full well knowe, that know hym at all, beeyng earnest at a tyme, in commendynge a Bishop of his acquaintance, declared to a noble personage, that this Bishoppe had a goodly base voyce, and made at one tyme (¶ he,) as base a sermō, as he neuer hard the like in all his life before, and therefore worthy to be compted a great clerke, in his foolithe iudgement. Who will not saie that this bishop was basely praised?

William Somer

¶ Ambiguitie.

The ambiguitie.

The ambiguitie, is, when the construction byngeth error, hauing diuerse vnderstandynge in it, as when the woordes be placed doubtfully, as thus. *Cræsus Halim penetrans magnam peruertet opum uim*, Cræsus gooyng ouer the floud

Aloud Halim, shall ouerthrowe a great
 Empire. There is not mencioned, whe-
 ther he shall ouerthrowe his awne, or
 another mannes. By the whiche Dia-
 cle in deede, he being deceiued, lost his
 awne Kingdome, when he thought to
 subdue his enemies, and bying the un-
 der subiection. Therfore when senten-
 ces be spokē doubtfully, that thei maie
 be coustrued two maner of waies, and
 the partes diuersly popnted, make con-
 trary vnderstandpng: thei are referred
 to this place. And the rather to make it
 more open, I haue made two En-
 glishe verses, whiche being diuersely
 red, haue two contrary meanpnges.

{ A robberie dooe not feare: thy
 God, thy maker,
 will punishe not one: GOD
 spareth, be thou suer,
 Otherwise.

{ A robberie dooe not: feare thy
 God, thy maker
 will punishe; not one God spa-
 reth, be thou suer,

There are two verses also in La-
 tine, which because thei be very pretie

S. it,

and

The arte

and may be two waies taken, I thinke
it not amisse to set them furthe here e:
mong the other.

Laus tua, non tua fraus, uirtus,
non copia rerum.

Scandere te fecit, hoc decus exi-
mum.

In Englishe thus.

Verdes sent to
the Pope.

Worthinesse, not wilnesse, godlinesse,
not goodes, brought thee herunto.
Richesse greate, and muche auctoritie,
with worldly honor to come to.

These verses beyng red backward,
either in Englishe or in Latine, begin-
nyng at the laste woorde, haue a cleane
contrary vnderstandyng, as thus.

To come to honour worldly, with
auctoritie muche, and greate richesse.

Herunto brought thee, goodes, not
godlinesse, wilnesse, not worthinesse.

These twoo verses wer written to
the Pope, as worthye suche a one, and
set vpo Masquillus in Rome, euen for
very loue, as I take it: not of thee pope
but of Goddes holy worde.

¶ The .iii. receiptfull argument.

Coniunctio



Coniunctio distrahendorum
a ioyning together of those
thynges, whiche should bee
disseuered, & are either to be
applied to the thynges that go before,
or to the thynges, that folowe after.

The ioyning of
wordes, that
should be parted.

Da- Whosoever knoweth letters,
now hath learned them.

ri- A Grammarian knoweth letters
i. Ergo a Grammarian now hath
learned them.

Here this aduerbe (now) if it had been
referred to the first poynct, which is as
ye se in this word (letters) & the poynct
afterward made, whē this worde (now)
had been put to it, all had been well:
but because the worde (now) is other-
wise placed, and referred to the nexte
sentence, (whiche is now hath learned
theim) it is a false argument, because
this worde (now) should be referred to
the first poynct, as thus.

Whosoever knoweth letters
now, hath learned them.

Agrāmariā knoweth letters now
Ergo a Grammarian hath lear-
ned them.

S. iij. And

The arte

And so this argument is good, beeyng thus placed, but though this subtiltie seme childish, yet old babes haue vsed it, even in the weightiest cause of our redemption, and thought therein to fople the godly, reasonyng in iest after this sort, & yet meanyng good earnest.

Faith without
workes.

{ Faith, without workes, doeth
iustifie.

{ Faith without workes, is a
dedde faith.

{ Ergo a ded faith doth iustifie.

Here, one maie see a false packyng, for in the first proposicio, faith stanzing alone, is referred to the laste woorde, of the same proposicion, whiche is (doth iustifie) in the second proposicion, faith is referred to the twoo wordes (without workes,) so that the same faith, is not meant in the seconde proposicion, that is meant in the first, and the reason is, that woordes are iopned together, whiche should not bee so iopned, for now there are foure termes, whereas by the rules of Logique, there should be but thzee, (faith) is one, (doeth iustifie) is the seconde, (faith without workes)

woorkes) is the third, (a dedde faithe) is the fourth terme. And the reason that there be foure, is, that faithe is firste severally considered, whiche neuer wanteth woorkes folowynge her, as fruite declaring what the tree is: not that the fruite doeth purchase iustificacion, but rather geueth a token, that by faithe it self, where of suche woorkes dooe spring, iustificacion is attained. In the seconde proposition, there is mencioned a dedde faithe, a faith without woorkes, whiche faithe the Deuill hymself hath, where as if the argument were true, there should be none other faithe, considered in the second proposition, then was reherced, and mencioned in the firste proposition. I haue labored the rather at large, to make this matter more plain to the ignorant, not that it so muche needed (for the euasion is easie of it self) but to shewe the is of no greater weight, then the other vnlearned, that this argument abouecherced were.

¶ Of partynge woordes that should be ioyned together.

S. v. Disiunctio

The arte

The parting of
wordes, that
should be ioyned.



Disiunctio coniunctorum, is a diuidyng of thynges, whiche should bee ioyned together, and a makynge of wordes seuerall, or els a disseuerpynge of .ii. partes, which should be but one, for like as by thother place wordes are ioyned together, whiche shuld be deuided, so now by this place, & thing is deuided, which should be al one

The Lawe and
the Gospell.

{ The Lawe and the Gospell, are two diuerse thynges.

{ The worde of God, is the Lawe and the Gospell.

{ Ergo, the worde of God, is two diuerse thynges.

In this argumēt (the word of God) beynge a whole thyng of it self, is diuided, and where respecte should be had, to the two partes ioynly considered together, whiche are nothyng els but the whole: the partes are seuerally vnderstanden, and referred to the whole, not bothe together as thei should bee, but seuerally, with their properties, as thei should not be. For the worde of God is not the lawe onely, or the Gospell

spell onely, although it stande of the
twoo, but is the lawe and the Gospell
bothe ioynd together: for where as a
man is made of body and soule, the bo-
dy is not man, nor yet the soule neither
and yet thei bothe ioynd together,
make by a perfect man.

Another example.

The Articles of our faith, are
xij. in number.

The Articles of
our faith.

To beleue in God the father, and
in Jesus Christ his onely sonne,
are the Articles of our faith.

Ergo to beleue in God the father
and in Jesus Christ his onely
sonne, are. xij. in number.

This argument is to be denied, be-
cause the doubtfulnes riseth of the dis-
uision, for, to beleue in God the father
and in Jesus Christ his onely sonne,
are tharticles of our faith, and yet thei
twoo are not the whole, xij. in number
Therefore, thei twoo being of the. xij.
are wrongly placed, if thei bee diuided
into. xij. Again there bee foure partes,
or termes. for in the first proposition,
this parte (tharticles of our faith) cō-
prehende

The arte

prehende the .xij. in number, but in the second propolition, the double repeate that is (that articles of our faith) do not comprehend all the articles, but two onely, therefore it is an euill argument.

This kynd of argument is vlsed often tymes of those, whiche by reportyng another mannes laboure, and his well doyng, depzaue the same, either by addyng, or diminishyng the same, as by takyng a pece of a sentence out of some doctour, and applyng it for their purpose, or by addyng more then thei find, as bothe diuines and lawers, often tymes ful vngodly haue doen, not regar dyng the whole course, and order of the thynge, but takyng out patches and peeces, to serue their vngodly purposes, whiche in deede made nothyng for thei: neither thei themselves do vnderstand what thei byng, when thei dooe not marke the whole course of the matier. The Romishe, reason thus.

¶ The Romishe rea-
son for iustifica-
tion.

If thou wilt enter to heuen, kepe the commaundementes.
Therefore, keepng the commaundementes, purchaseth heauen.

This

Of Logique. Fol. 135.

This Argument is false, by lea-
ving the best out, for the doctrine of
the Gospell must first be had, our faith
must be fastened, and Christ must sanc-
tifie our dooynge, before they can bee
good. Neither is any thing good, be-
cause wee do it, but because it pleaseth
God so to accept it. It is true, he that
doeth well, shall have well, but who
is he? Even the same body, whiche first
beleueth in Christe, and apprehendeth
mercie by faith, whose woorkes, God
accepteth for good, otherwise he shall
neuer come where God is. Therefore
espie the subtilties of the vngodly, and
flee their fraude.

Woorkes are
good not because
man doeth them,
but because God
alloweth them.

The v place.



Igura dictionis called o-
therwise in good Latine,
forma orationis, the ma-
ner of the speche, is when
the phrase bredeth errour
and the propertie of the tong not well
known, engendreth ambiguitie, as in
theight Cha. of Mat. when Christ bad
those, whiche wer healed of the lepro-
sie: go, & shewe themselves to the priest,
ou

The manner of
speache.

The arte

Confession.

our forefathers applied this sayng, to confessiō, thinkyng that every one was bound in conscience vnder pain of damnacion, to Confesse his synnes to the priest, every yere once, where as Christs meanyng was nothyng so, & therefore thei were muche deceiued, in the maner of speakyng. This order was in the old lawe, as we maie read in Leuiticus, that Lepers came not into the towne, but if any happened to be whole and amended, he was first commaunded to shewe hymself to the priest, that the prieste sayng his body cleane, might be a witnesse to the congregacion, of his amendement, and so the man after that might the rather be suffered to go abrode and be in company with other men.

But euen as thei haue fondly wrested this place to Confession, euen so might light women, and euill disposed wifes, abuse their husbundes fondly, expoundyng saint Pauls wordes in the seuenth of the first, to the Corinthians, where he saith. The wife is bound to the lawe, as long as her husbunde liueth, but if her husbunde slepe, she is at

Of Logique. Fol. 136.

at libertie to Marie, with whom she will. God forbid, women should take this aduantage of their husbandes sleeping, as the Romishe folke haue abused all meane waking. Slepe in this text, signifieth nothyng but death, and yet, might women as well abuse this terte, as other men haue abused Christs sayng, for the maintenaunce of confession. Therfore, the propertie of euery speche, and the maner of speaking, ought alwaies to be obserued: we saie in Englishe some tyme, to some one with whom we are offended, ah sir ah ye are an honest man in deede, and yet we doo not meane, that he is honest in deede, but thynke rather that he is a naughtie felowe. So likewise, Christ when he should be taken of the Jewes said to his Apostles, dormite et requiescite, slepe on sirs, and take your rest, not that he would thei should so dooe, but to their rebuke & shame he spake it. because thei wer carelesse, & toke their reste. So Paule rebukynge the Corinthians, because thei made Heathen men their Iudges, and pleaded their causes vnder

Slepe, wher
it signifieth.

Christe taken of
the Jewes.

Paule rebukynge
the Corinthians.

The arte

under them, saied, if there bee no body
among you, to heare your aduocates causes
make vile persones and abiectes, to be
Judges amongst you. Not that he
would it should bee so, but to their
shame, he spake it, as he saith hymself.
Also vnto this place maie be referred,
the kynde of praise, proper to euery
tongue. As where it is in Gospell. Ag-
ree with thyne aduersarie quickly,
whiles thou art in the waie with hym,
least that aduersary deliuer thee to the
Judge, and the Judge deliuer thee to
the minister, and then thou be cast into
prison. Merely I saie vnto thee, thou
shalt not come out thence, til thou haue
paied the vttermoste farthyng. The
whiche matier, saint Luke rehersyng,
hath these woordes in the laste ende.
I tell thee, thou departest not thence,
til thou haue made good the vttermost
mite. Who doeth not see, that this last
sentence, doth not signifie a condicion,
but rather noteth, that he shall neuer
come out all. For (the spirituall mea-
nyng considered) how can man throug-
hlye condemned to the fire of helle,
deliuer

Heb. xii. ph. 2. 25.
Math. v.

Luke. xii.

considered) how can mā through sinne
 be condemned to the fire of hell, deli-
 uer hymselfe, or paie his raunsome to
 God for his saluacion. A gayn I reade
 this in the first of Matthewe. Ioseph
 as sone as he awoke out of slepe, did as
 the Aungell of the Lorde badd hym,
 and toke his wife vnto hym, and knew
 her not till she had brought forth her
 first sonne, and called his name Iesus.
 How then did Ioseph know her after-
 ward, that is, did he the acte of nature
 with her? No verely, he did not com-
 pany with her carnally at all, but she
 lyued stil a virgine, & he bare the name
 onelie of an husbände or married man.
 As we reade also that James & Iohn
 were called the b:ethrē of Christ, and
 yet were thei not in bloud his natural
 b:ethzen. But some not experte in the
 tongues maie wōder muche at this ex-
 position, notwithstanding if they wold
 waie other places that are in like ma-
 ner written, they should haue no nede
 to meruaile at al. We reade in the viij
 chapter of Genes. when Noe had sent
 a crowe out of the Arke, to bryng ty-

dringes agayne, he sayd that the crowe
came not till the pearth was drie, and
yet we reade not in the scripture that
the crowe came to the Arke agayne at
all, but did rather flie clean away. And
yet the text saith, untill the earth was
drie, the crow came not. The Prophet
saith of God: Thou art fro worlde to
worlde, and yet here is no determinate
tyme mencioned, for God is a lpyng
substaunce for ever. Yea, I thynke we
haue the lyke phrase also, even in oure
Englishe tounge. The stiffe necked
saie thus: I wyl heare no preaching,
till all menne be agreed. And when is
that? marie neuer I thynke. There-
fore those that be ignoraunt in the to-
gues are easely deceyued. Lyke wylse
we reade in the .xij. Chapter of saint
Mathewe, Qui dixerit verbum ad-
uersus spiritum sanctum non remit-
tetur ei, neque in hoc seculo, neque
in futuro. He that shal speake a worde
against the holie ghost, shal not be for-
geuen nether in this worlde, nor yet
in the worlde to come, that is to saye,
he shal neuer be forgeuen, for proufe
wherof

Substance

Of Logique. Fol. 138.

Whereof, a full confirmation that this meaning is true, & ought not otherwise to be take. Saint Marke also speaking of the same matter, hath these wordes. Merely I saie vnto you, al sinnes shalbe forgiven vnto mens children, & blasphemie wherwith thei blaspheme. But he that blasphemeth the holie ghost, shall neuer haue forgiveness, but shall be gilty of eternall damnation. Thus we see that the maner of speche vsed in Matthewe, is plainly opened here in Marke. Saint Luke in lyke maner, whosoever speaketh a worde agaynst the sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him. But vnto him that blasphemeth the holie ghoste, it shall not bee forgiven. And yet not withstanding al this the weake learned referre this place to purgatory, moste vaineely and without al reason. The maner of speche causeth ambiguite, by reason of the affinitie in wordes, as whē one hath lost al the money in his purse, & for lack of cōpne is faine to hold the candle: for an other man whē he seeth the same body do his dutie with his cap of, to his better, to say merely

Mat. 18.

Luke. 12.

L. ij.

by

The arte

Bare, the wages
taken.

Augustines sayng
depraved.

Wordes spoken
by imitation.

by the waie of a lute to þe worstliest per
sone: I praiſe you ſir let this good fel:
lowe be couered, he is bare, where as
bare ſigniſieth a bare purſe: as wel as a
bare head, & is properly ſo ſaid. Again
and moſte aptely this ſubtiltie taketh
place, when ſentences be euell popu:
ted, and the ſenſe thereby depraved,
as ſome that mapnteine iuſtification
by workes, haue ſtraungely abuſed a
terte of Sainte Auguſtine, makynge
the pointe plaine, where as it ſhould
be an interrogatiue, and hath bene of
late peres ſo founde in an olde wryten
hand. The ſentence is this, Qui fecit
te ſine te, nō poſteſt ſeruari te, ſine te?
he that made the without the, can not
he ſaue the, without the? where as ma:
kynge it a playn point in latine, it hath
a cleane contrarie vnderſtandynge, and
maketh muche for the maintenance of
faulſe religion. ſfor it is as much, as who
ſhould ſaie: he that made the, without
the, cannot ſaue þe, without the. More:
ouer, wordes ſpoken by imitation, that
is to ſaie, whan one reherſeth þe which
an other man ſaith, muſt diligently be
obſer:

observed. Paule writyng to the Colossiens sheweth þe noughtines of some men that will kepe simple folke in subjection with there traditiōs, and trouzble the consciences of the weake, sayyng, do not touche, do not taste, do not handle meate, whiche Paule reciteth, in rebuke to the hipocrites and obstinate Pharises, and yet some notwithstanding haue misconstrued the same, perswading themselves þe Paule gaue suche commaundement. Therefore those thynges whiche are spoken by imitation folowynge an other mans speache, must otherwise be vnderstanden, than those wordes whiche a man speaketh of hym selfe, and geueth instruction certainly thereby. Thus far haue I handled these subtile argumentes, which are in the wordes, now wil I reherse all suche false cōclusions as are in the matter. And first this is to be noted, that the faultes of euery argument are either in the wrong defining, and not well settyng forth the nature of any thyng, or els in not aptely diuiding, or lastely not aduisedly weighing

The arte

the causes of thynges, but heaping the
 by without order or reason. The other
 subtilties aboute reherled maie either
 be auoided by well markyng the true
 definition, or els hauyng respect to the
 distion, by declarynge senerally howe
 large every worde maie be taken, and
 what errour maie rise by the false un-
 derstandynge of some one woorde: The
 subtilties folowynge conteyn suche ab-
 surdities, as ryle not vppon the na-
 ture of some one worde, but take there
 grounde of the matter & thyng it self.

¶ There be. vii. in nombre.

1. From the accident.
2. From that, whiche is partelpe
 and after a sorte so, to be full and
 wholy so.
3. The mistakynge of sentences
 gainsayng.
4. The consequent.
5. The cause that is not, put for
 the cause.
6. The cuckoes song, or by thyng-
 ges doubtfull, to proue thynges,
 that are as doubtfull.
7. Many questions asked for one
 thyng.

The

The first receipt.

Allacia accidentis, the receiptfulnesse of the accident, is when diuerse thynges are ioynd together, in one subiecte, that is to saie, when one, and the same thyng, is referred both to the substance, and also to the accident, or els when the accidentes (whiche are not of the very substance of man, but may be awaye, the man liuing still) are not well ioynd together, or els, when we make oure argument ab euentis, that is to saie, by that thyng, which happeneth to a man casuallye, and pronounce the same, to be the very proper cause, why, and wherefore, this or that is so. Of the first, this maie be an exaple,

That same whiche fleshe is, fishe is not.

Fleshe is foode,

Therefore fishe is none.

In the firste proposition, I vnderstand the substance of fleshe, & in the seconde proposition, I meane the accident or propertie, whiche is in them both, and therefore myne argument is

It is, not

The arte

not lawfull because I referred, bothe the substance and the accidēt, to one, and to the same subiecte. For although fleshe and fishe, be not all one in substance, because flesch is one thynge, and fish is an other, and either of the hath their proper being, and distincte substance: yet they agre both in their accidēt, that is to saie, in foode, to serue for the soubstenaunce of man.

Wicked men syn,
euen in executyng
iustice.

¶ No synne maye be committed,
¶ Wicked men, euen when they
execute Justice, do synne.

¶ Therefore, Wicked men maye
do no Justice, being set in
authoritie.

The first propositiō is true, and the seconde also, for whatsoeuer is not of faith, the same is sinne. Neither can any thynge be wel, how soeuer it semeth in our eyes, except our faith be first fastened vpon the free mercie of Christe. Therefore the Jewes, howsoeuer they liue, keppng order, obseruynge lawes, forbearynge riot, yet all their doynges, are nothing but sinne, whatsoeuer they do, seme it neuer so honest, or godly, to the

the sight of man. And yet this argument is not truly layde vp. For in the first Proposition (Synne) is considered by hymselfe, and therefore it is truly said, that no synne maye bee committed. In the second proposition, where execution of Justice is reported to be sinne. it is not so of it self, but because the person is euell hymself, whiche executeth the Lawe, and therefore the offence cometh casually, and as the Logicians saye, per accidens, where as synne before was considered, accordyng to the substance. And therefore, though the officer being naught, offendeth when he ministreth Justice, (because faith maketh al workes good) yet must he do iustice, because it is so commaunded, even as he must assuredly beleue, that Iesus is the Messias, & the promised saviour sent of God. And though the doynge be euell to hym, yet it is good to other.

Again, thus reason some.

By faith we are iustified.

Faith is a worke.

Ergo by workes we are iustified.

This proposition is false, consider

A. b.

ryng

Faith is a worke

sayng that faith, in the first proposition, is the same, through whiche we are iustified, not by the worthines of our beleeving, but through the free mercie of Christ, the whiche we apprehende thoroughly sayth. And therefore we must in this sayng confidre, that faith is referred by relation to Christ, through whom onely, al mercie is attained, and that grace cometh, not because sayth is a worke, but because mercie goeth before, and receiveth freely all beleuers, without worthines either of beleeving or els of doyng any other worke. Therefore in the first proposition, faith being not so taken, as it is in the seconde, we maye saye well, it springeth fro this receptful place, & is therfore not lawfull

In other Argument.
 This man is a wittie fellowe,
 This same man is lame,
 Ergo this same man hath a lame witte.

This is evidently false, because the accidentes of the bodie, are referred to the substance of the mynde, as by this last argument, ye maye see that lamenesse

ness, which is of the body, is attributed to y^e mind. wherby y^e reason is vain
 The third deceit is, when many things are referred to one subject, we make that to be the very next and chief cause, whiche is a casual thing, and cometh by hap vnto any body, as thus.

David is a blessed man.

David is an adulterer.

Ergo adulterers are blessed men

I deny the cōsequence, because it is a deceiptfull argument, by that, which is the accident. ffo: when many thynges chaunce to one manne, we must se what the very causes are of that thing whiche we attribute to the subiecte.

David is a blessed mā. And wherfore? David.

Not because he was an adulterer, for that happened to him casualle, but because he was chosen of God, and had the feare of God before his eyes, and although this happened by the instinct of the deuel, yet he called for grace, repented sore, and trusted in Gods mercie, as the Psalmes plentifully beare witnesse, and this was the cause, why he was blessed.

Pe

The arte

We must obserue, that in this deceitfull argument, although many thinges, are referred to one subiect, yet are they not after one sorte, comprehended in the same subiect, but diuersly considered, as when I ioyne accidentes, both of body, and mynd together, as thus.

{ This felowe is a gospeler,
This felowe is blinde.
Ergo this felowe is a blinde gospeler.

Here ye maie se the accidētes of the mynd & bodie, ioyned together, whiche should not be so. And as for men blinde by nature, I haue knowen suche, that myght more worthely haue bene byshoppes, then other, with all the yces they haue. For though their sight fayled, yet their tōgue serued to set forth the glorie of G^{OD}. But some of our pastors see ouer wel for their own profite, and ouer litle for oure saufe con-
duite.

{ The Anabaptistes reason thus.

{ That whiche is nothyng, deser-
ueth no punishment.
Synne is nothyng.

Ergo

Synne is no-
thyng.

Ergo sinne deserueth no punishment.

In the first proposition, that thynge is ment, which is not at al, but is clean gone fro nature, or els neuer was with in the nature of thynges. In the seconde proposition (synne) is reported to be nothyng, because it selfe beyng nothyng worthe, spoyleth a man of his other vertues, and so ouerthroweth nature, as muche as it can. When we see a man blinde, we iudge that he hath lost his sight. heretn we esteeme the sight, to be a gift geuen of God, and blindnesse to be the taker awaie of that, whiche was geuen of God. In like case, synne is the destruction of that, whiche was, beyng of it selfe nothyng. And so in this case, to do well, is a thyng, the want wherof, is nothyng, the whiche, is sin.

¶ An other.

Whatsoever encreaseth sinne is not to be taught.

*Notes labe en-
creaseth synne.*

**The Lawe of Moyses encrease-
th synne.**

**Ergo the Lawe is not to bee
taught.**

**I answer, the lawe encreaseth not
synne,**

sinne, by the alone nature, but casual:
 ly. For when man himself. is corrupted
 with vice, then the Lawe maketh his
 sinne appere hainous, and encrease th
 the knowlege of sinne in him. So y in
 the firste proposition, the nature of en
 creasing sinne, is considered: in the se
 cond proposition, the casual happening
 is rehersed, whē thynge are euell not
 of themselves, but made euell through
 the wickednesse of y offendour. Al such
 argumentes, muste be aduopded by di
 stinction, that is, ye muste declare the
 double meanynge in y two propositions,
 and then ye haue soluted the subtiltie.

¶ The seconde.

From the parte,
 to the whole.

From that, whiche is partely
 and after a sorte so, to be full,
 and wholy so, and by coloure
 of the part, to geue iudgemēt
 of the whole.

¶ Of this deceipte there be
 foure kyndes.

1. When the sentēce proponed, repug
 neth to that which foloweth, as thus.
 A dead horse lieth in the dicke. Ergo
 it is a horse. Suche horses were good
 to be

to be let for hire, when me runne away with them. It is rather called the Carion or carcase of a horse. Who calleth a dead mā, such a one as he was before.

Agayn, whē fantasie frameth some wōder in a mans head, & a thing is conceived bi imaginaciō which is not at al

Antiques or gargylles are deuised by paynters.

Ergo there is such creatures in dede.

Thirddly when a thyng maie be, and is already in power, to saie streyght it is.

A ragged colte maie proue a good horse,

Ergo the colte is already a good horse.

Euen in weighty matiers of religiō this reason hath bene v̄sed, as ye shall see hereafter.

Fourthelie whē the parte is taken for the whole.

Wyne is euell for those that be sicke of an agewe.

Ergo wyne is euell for all men.

This argumēt is from the particu-
lar, to the vniuersal, the which is easie
to be

The arte

to be aduopded. Therefore errours do often chaunce, when we comprehend the whole, speaking onely of the part, or when we make the spgne, to bee the very self thyng, and although ye haue had chylde the examples before, only to make the matter plaine, ye shall see that in weightie matters, this deceitfull argument hath bene vled.

Lawyers. We heare many now a daies crye out and saie, the lawyers are naught, they meane no truthe, but onely seeke for lucre, where as no man I thinke condemneth all lawyers, although he haue iust cause to accuse somme wretched lawyers. Some saie agayne that **priesters.** priestes haue left fornicatio gaily wel, and are neuer suspected now a daies for adulterie, beyng yoked in lawfull marriage: But some spare not to say agayne, that they haue made an exchange, leaping vp whoredome, and following couetousnesse, the deuil and al: marie God forbidde that all priestes should so do. And in dede if anye one should so reason, I would reckon bys argument to be comprehended within the

Of Logique. Fol. 145.

the compasse of this false conclusion.

Thus reason the Anabaptistes.

Unrighteousnes is altogether
reproued.

In euery kyngdome is muche
vnrightheousnes vsed.

Unrighteousnes
in euery kyngdō.

Ergo euery kyngdom is alto-
gether reproued.

By this meanes we shall haue no
kyngdome, no law, no political order,
no trade, no discipline, no iudgement
for offendours. But this argument is
to bee reiected, because it is deriued
fro the part to y^e whole. For although
many thynges be amisse in a political
body, yet the whole therfore must not
be dissolued, the lawes muste not be
abrogated, nor yet good order abādo-
ned: for the chiefe thing that is in euer
y^e empire is a thing, ordeined of God,
& a rightuous thyng, as for an exāple.
Political order, lawes, statutes, iud-
gement, execucion, & punishyng of of-
fendours, and therfore they reason as
misse, that say there is an abuse in a
political ordre, therfore we shall haue

U. J.

no

The arte

no order at al in any commune weale,
and again ye shal percepue, that there
is more in the conclusiō, then was re-
herſed in the two former propoſitiōs.
Therefore we ought diligētly to note
the circumſtaunce of the thynge, if we
wil auoide this ſubtiltie, and when a
thynge is ſpoken in parte, we muſt not
thereby iudge the whole: or meaſure
the vniuerſal, by that whiche is com-
prehended vnder the general.

A man may forſake an adulter-
rouſe wife.

Ergo he may forſake his wife.

This is from the inferior to the vni-
uerſal, which is not well gathered,
as it ſtādeth here: for although a man
may forſake his wife, being naught of
her body, yet may he not forſake an
honest woman, when it liketh hym to
change. for this word (wife) in the firſt
propoſition, is hedged with her circū-
ſtance, that is to ſay, adulter, which
cauſeth diuorcement. Neither is this
argument good. the King may put to
death euery euil man: Ergo the King
may

Of Logique. Fol. 146.

may put to death euery man. Again if we wil reason negatiuely, as wee did before affirmatiuely, we shall frame our argument amisse. As thus:

No wife should be put away;
Ergo neyther a naughty wife
shoulde be put away.

¶ Again.

No wyne is euill.
Ergo no mingled wine is euill.

This is from the vniuersal, to that which is inferior, and as ye would say hedged with his circumstance, & cōpalsed with that, which before, was neyther in wife, nor yet in wine. for a wife so lōg as she kepeth her self to her hōu shād only, she is no adulteresse. Wine that drinketh of it self, is not mingled, and therfore the argumēt is not good because that thing is in the lesse. or inferior, which was not in the general. There is a figure in Rethoricke, called Hyperbole, that is to say, when a thing is spokē beyōnd measure vcrediblie, and yet is not so largely ment. As when I will praise a man for his
¶ A.ij. strength,

Thynges spokē
aboue measure.

The arte

strength, I wil say, he passeth Hercules in manhode, meanyng that he excelleth in manhode and valauntnes. If we know one that runneth wel, either dogge, mā, or horse, we vse to say he is as swifte as a swallowe, he flieth like an arrowe out of a bowe, meanyng only that he is exceeding swifte. Therefore we must diligently take hede, when such speches are used, that we take not them as they be spokē, but as they are ment, neyther take the whole for the parte, when the whole is expressed in wordes, and the part ment in vnderstanding. And alwayes be wise in our mountyng, that ascendyng ouer hye, we be not commaunded to come down as fooles. A noble man hadde a childe which was very towarde in learnyng & partly for suche worthinesse, as was in the child, & partly to gette fauoure of suche a peere as the father was, diuerse commended the childe wonderfully wel, and one aboue al other thinking to say the most, not content with right excellent, or meruelouse wittie, or so to towarde, said thus after other mens

Of Logique. Fol. 147.

mens iudgement and reporte geuen.
Surely in my mynde, the child is euen
a very monster. With that the noble ^{a monster.}
man laughed to heare his folie, and al
the other likewise that ware there.
Therefore it is good in vsing such pas-
sng reportes, discretely to way them
before hand alwayes. Jeremie saith.

Scio Domine quod non est hominis
uia eius.

I knowe Lorde that man hath not
his way.

Therefore man hath no fre will at al
no aduise, no choise, to deliberate ^{fre will.}
either this way, or that way.

This consequent is not good, for
Jeremias sayng, must be vnderstande
exclusiuelv: The waye of man, that is ^{Jeremias.}
to saie, the calling of man, is not only
ruled or led by the powre, strength, or
force of mā, neither cā he do any thing
of himself alone, without the helpe or
grace of God. Sennacherib that wic-
ked king, thought by his owne powre, &
wisdom, to wyne his spures against
Jerusalem, but he trusted so much to

U.ij. him

The arte

hymselfe, & his owne wisdom, that he
lost his bootes and all, at length. The
chief & principall cause of al godly ac-
tions, procede from God, but so not
withstanding do they procede, that mā
hath choise, wil & libertie, to do what
him liketh, beyng assisted with grace
of God. As Christ praiseth the labour-
er, & saith. To him that hath, shalbe
geue. And Chrysostome saith very wel
God draweth vnto hym, but he draw-
eth the willyng. For God will haue
our good will, to be ioyned with his
callyng. Therefore Plato in his. iiii.
booke where he frameth his commune
weale, doth wel mitigate this Hyper-
bole, in this sentēce which semeth in-
credible (God doth all thynges, & or-
ders euery action) sayng I do wel al-
lowe this sentēce, that God ruleth al
thynges, but so not withstanding I al-
lowe it, if it be wel vnderstand. For it
wer best to ground it so, that mā wil
labour, & diligēce, must be ioyned ther-
vnto, as we se in saylyng vpon the sea,
Shipmen cal to God for helpe, & God
wil helpe thē, but so not withstanding,
if

Chrysostomes
sayng.

Platoes sayng
of Gods doyng.

if they helpe them selues. Accordyng
wherunto there is in the fables of E:
sope a tale of one, whose cart stode fast Crops fable of a
carte that Locke
saith.
in the mire, which man sepyng his cart
laied fast, cried to Hercules for helpe,
& praied that he might come frō heauē:
answere was made, that he should first
helpe himself, & thē cal vpo Hercules
oꝛ els his cart wer like to stick fast still.

¶ An other argument.

{ The church doth not erre.
{ The Phariseis are the church. The church
doth not erre.
{ Ergo the Phariseis do not erre.

The deceit is, from the particular
to the vniuersall. As who should say,
Some do not erre in the church, Ergo
no body doth erre at al, that is of the
church: which is false, for the church
is as well of the euell as of the good.
The good men that are trained in the
truth of God, & taught the true loue
of God, by ofte readyng & folowpyng
his worde, haue the true light, & erre
not. Oether that be slouhtful, careles,
dꝛowned in ambition, and all wordlie
luste, both can erre, and do erre, from
¶ A. iij. time

The arte

tyrne to tyrne. Therefore where as I
say, the church doth not erre, it is cal:
led Synecdoche, that is to say, when
the part is vsed for the whole.

C An other argument made by the
Anabaptistes.

The iust is free
from the Law.

{ To the iust, ther is no law set.
The riotouse sonne after his co:
uersion, is iust.
Ergo vnto hym there is no lawe
sette.

This argument is from the part to
the whole: he is deliuered fro the law,
for so much as pertaineth to his condē:
nacion, but he is not fre for so much as
he belōgeth to the due obediēce, which
he oweth vnto God: for this ordre stā:
deth for euer most stedfastly, that euery
creature be obedient to God the crea:
tour. Again for asmuch as in euery iust
man that is conuerted from his euill
wayes, there remaineth a wicked en:
clinacion, the same must alwayes bee
brydeled and kept in, euē with the ter:
rour of the Lawe, as though it ware
with a mouserolle.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 149.

The signe is often times turned
into the thynge it selfe, as I re:
herced before.

Here is saint George vpon the
wyndowe.
Ergo it is saint George himself

This argument men haue vsed, whē
they haue seen a man painted on a wal,
or grauen in a stone, but aswell they
might cal the picture of the horse saint
George, as the picture of the mā. This
is saint Christopher. This is sainte
Lop. This is the picture of Christ: er:
go it is Christe. This is an Image of
our Lady, Ergo it is our Lady, & here
she wil worke wonders, more then in
an other place, as she did at Walsin:
gham, at Boston, at Lincoln, at Gip:
swich, and I can not tel where, when
Priestes gatherd mony, and poore fol:
kes were mocked. Here, ye must deny
the consequent, because the signes is
not the thing signified, neither is God
bounde to any place, to the whiche he
hath not bound hymself by his worde,
nor yet any saint nepther. This rule

Images taken
for sainctes.

U. b. ouer;

The arte

ouerthroweth all maner of ydolles,
which haue ben in all ages fro time to
time. In this kind of subtiltie, ye must
diligently obserue foure circumstan-
ces, the person, the time, the place, &
the maner of comparng thynges to-
gether, all which are false, & deceipt-
ful reasons.

The person.

{ An officer appointed by the king
may send an offendour to ward
by authoritie.

Ergo euery man may,

The time.

{ It is not lawfull to walke in the
streets of London after the
watche is set.

Ergo it is not lawfull to walke
in London at al,

The place.

{ It is not lawfull to geue a blow
within the courte gates:

Ergo it is not lawfull at all in
mine owne defence.

The maner of comparng.

It is an ymage of a man,

Ergo it is a man.

Compaz

Of Logique. Fol. 150.

Compare these. ii. together, & marke the accident adioyned to a man, and ye shall perceiue that it taketh away all substance, and leaueth only the shadow: for this worde painted, restrayneth the other & cōpasseth him within his boundes, so that a painted mā can no more be called a man, then an adulterous wife can be called a wife: for so longe is a woman called a wife, as she kepeth her self within the boundes of matrimonie, otherwise she is no wife, although men vse to call them wiues.

Adulterouse women are no wiues.

The. iiii. deceiptful.

SEcundū non causam, vt causam, that is, whē a cause that is not able to proue y^e matter, is brought in, as though it ware of force & strēth but the ground beynge considered, the fault is easely espied.

A cause that is not, putte for a cause.

Drunkennes is euill:

Ergo wine is naught.

Wapne is not to be reprobued altogether, although some abuse the same for it is a good thyng ordeined of God for the sustenaunce of man.

An

The arte

¶ Another argument.

{ Some young men, when they come to their landes, fall to vnthriftines.

Ergo riches are not good.

In all suche argumentes, wherein good thynges are reproued, because evil bodie abuse the same, the evil wil and the naughty enclinacion of the mā which abused such thinges is to be rebuked: and therfore when it is otherwise, it may be said, that a cause which is not, is put for a cause. As some abuse Paules meaning, when they go about to depraue Philosophie.

{ Paule warned that we should not be deceiued by philosophie.
Ergo, Philosophie is naught, say some.

Philosophie.

The argument doth not folowe, for a good thyng may be much abused, and yet the thyng it selfe may not be altogether reiected as naught: therefore Paule doth not condemne demonstrations and principles which are assured truthes, taught by the sciences, as in
Arith:

Of Logique. Fol. 151.

Arithmetike .iiij. & .liij. make .viij. In Philosophie, the whole is greater then the parte, do as thou wouldest be doon unto, but he reproveth the abuse of sciences, when there is made a mingle mangle of them, and one confounded with an other, as some have said that Philosophie will teache a Christian, as much for his profession, as the Prophetes, and the whole Bible besides will do: this made Paule bid men take heed that they be not deceived by Philosophie.

Now a dayes they will say, I cannot tel, here is much preachyng, much teachyng of Godes woorde, but I see few followers of it, it was a better worlde when we had not halfe so many preachers, heresies were neuer more ripe, naughtinesse neuer more abounded, therefore geue vs the old learning again, and take you the newe.

This reason is not worthe a straw The wickednes of the Preachers cometh not of their learning, but of their vicious natures, and naughty desires: for out of one and the same floure the
Bee

Good preachers
and evil liuers.

The arte

Bees sucketh honey, and the spider dras
weth poison. By these and such other
like examples, ye may easely espie,
wherfore the argument is not good, if
ye marke whether the true cause be in
the former propoficion, or some couns
terfect reason, which semeth to proue,
and yet in diede doeth not proue the
matter at al, for if I reason thus.

{ Jobson and Robson looked through
an hedge, & the one saw the other.
Ergo they twoo are both nigh of
kyndred.

What man seeth not, that doth see
any iote at al, that this geare hangeth
together like a broken pottle sheerd, &
that the Antecedent doth nothing at
al, proue the Consequent: and yet the
other argumentes aboue reherfed (if
they be narrowly marked) are as folish
and as worthe to be laughed at, as is
this folish fonde reason, and madly in
vented argument.

¶ Another argument.

Feare not the signes of the Element:
Ergo they signifie none euil to come.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 152.

The consequent is false, for Christ doth forbid his Disciples, to feare the signes, not by cause they signifie none euil to come, but by cause that where as they signifie harme, & punishment to the world, & wicked persons: yet he wil be a present succour to his church, & neuer leaue it comfortles. As when the godly heare this (feare not death) it doth not folow, but that death is an horrible thynge, and much repugnaunt to mans nature. This deceitful Argument is much vsed in this our life, and made a bucklar for diuerse matters. As when I am lothe to bee of a quest, or that any such busines should trouble me, beyng sent for, I faigne my self sicke, because I would not gladly come. Or whē one that is riche should healde a poore mā, to say: God healde you sir. I haue a great charge my self, I can not do for you. Or when a Bishoppe shoulde be desired to teache or preache, to say: he is sick. Or when a lawyer beyng desired to helpe a poore man, and profered there vpon, a litle mony, euen so much as the poore man can

Bad excuses.

Riche men.

Bishoppen.

Lawyers.

The arte

can not wel spare, and yet not halfe so
muche as the lawyer woulde haue :
streight to say, I am sorre, I can not
do for you, if I were not called vpon
otherwise by diuerse men, I woulde
not fail to do you good. this is as they
say in English, better a badde excuse,
then none at al, in Latine it is called,
Non causa pro causa posita. And the
vling of suche excuses among the Re-
thoritiās, is called, translatio, that is
to say, a shiftyng or puttynge of the
faulce from one, to an other. As wee
reade that Demades vled a wonderful
good shifte, when it was laide sore to
his charge that he had writtē a very
naughtie decre & vn honest, for the ob-
teynng of the peace at Alexanders
hand: He aunswered that the same de-
cree was not written with his owne
wrytynge penne, but with Alexanders
warpyng speare, which is as much to
say, feare did driue him to take such, &
such condicions of peace. We reade a
notable Historie of a younge childe in
Rome, called Mapprius, whiche be-
cause both it is pleasaunt, & muche to
be

Demades.

Mapprius.

Of Logique. Fol. 153.

bee woundred at, and also serueth for
this purpose right aptly, I thynke it
mete to be reherſed in this place. This
Papirius being a yong lad, of .x. or .xii
yeres old, and ſonne to one of the Se-
natours in Rome (which wer then, as
noble men be now in Englande, lordes
of the counſaill) went euery daie with
his father, to the Parliament houſe,
and hard fro tyme to tyme, all matters
that were debated there. His father e-
uermore charged hym, that he ſhould
not vtter any thyng, whiche he heard,
to any body liuing. It happened after-
ward, that vpo vrgent cauſes & weigh-
tie affaires, the counſaill did ſit muche
longer, then thei were wont, and con-
tinued ſo, for the ſpace of ſeuene night.
Euery body maruelled, what this ma-
tier ſhould bee. This child Papirius,
knewe all. His mother being moſte of
all deſirous, to knowe what it ſhould
be, whē ſhe could not attain the know-
lege thereof, by her huſbande, ſhe cal-
led the bope to confeſſion, and hauing
thiſtument of abſoluciō by her, that
is, a very good birchen rodde, charged

¶ i.

her

Women deſirous
to knowe thinges

The arte

her sonne, truely to tell her, euerie
whitte that was debated in the Par-
liament house, or els he should smarte
for it surely: for, what with the secret-
nesse of the thyng, and what with the
silence of her sonne, she was wonder-
fully with child, til she had gottē some
what of the bope. The bope hymself,
firſte, remembryng his fathers com-
maundement, and consideryng how he
should be paled at his hande, if he told
all thynges in deede, as thei were: and
again on the other side, seepng present
pain before hym, the rodde at hande,
his mother with childe, till she were
somewhat satisfied, thought it better,
pretily, and by the waie, to mocke his
mother, and so to stoppe her mouth,
with some forged tale: Then falsely to
bewrape his father, his frendes, and
all his countrey. And therefore thus
he began craftely to shape his tale: mo-
ther, if you wil promise me to kepe that
close, whiche I shall disclose vnto you
and tell it no body liuyng, you shall
heare the whole matter, euen as it is.
She answered, she would not tell it
again

Aspirius an-
swered to his mo-
ther.

Of Logique. Fol. 154.

again, whatsoeuer it were. Then saied
he, mother, the matter wholy concer-
neth Mariage, and the counsaill haue
long debated, whether it were better,
for one man to haue twoo wives, or one
wife to haue twoo husbannes, and as
yet, the matter hangeth in suspence.

When she heard this, her harte bur-
ned, and her stomake was ouercharged
wonderfully, that except she had laied
it, in one of her neighboures lappes, it
was like she wold haue burst. But she
goeth, and maketh as much speede with
her tongue, as she doeth with her fete,
and telleth it immediatly to her nexte
neighbour, and from one to another, till
at length a number knewe it, where by
they agreed wholy, to go altogether
to the counsaill house, to entreate the
Senatours, to sit no longer vpon this
matter, but clearly to determine with
one assent and consent, that it wer best,
and mooste expedient for euery woman,
to haue twoo husbannes, and not o-
ther wise, for no worldes good, any
thyng heretofore to the contrary not-
withstanding. By this example ye may see

Women herdeley
kepe counsaill.

The arte

the subtiltie of this deceit. For when the mother asked her sonne, what the cause was, of their long sittynge, he told her a cleane contrarie thyng, which the counsaill neuer thought, nor yet once minded, this is, *nō causa pro causa posita* A cause that is not, put for a cause.

The .iiii. deceit.

The consequent.



Allatia cōsequentis, whē the consequent, that is to saie, the latter proposition is euil gathered by the antecedent, whiche goeth before. And the waie to knowe the fault, of this deceitfull argument, is to examine thargument, with the preceptes of Logique, aboue rehearsed.

Quill deedes purchase death.

Ergo good deedes purchase life.

Workes without
faith are wicked

This argument is not good, first considering, we cannot fulfill the law, by our selves. Again, workes are wicked, that are dooen without faith, so that first we must be in the state of grace by faith. & assured through faith, to liue euer, before our workes shalbe accepted for good, neither can our doynges be

be perfect, in any part, to fulfill Gods will, and his commaundementes, and therefore, though euill deedes deserue death, yet good deedes can neuer purchase life, so long as we be not able, to fulfill the lawe, as God knoweth, wee shall neuer be: scripture, our consciences, the worlde, and all, bearyng witness against vs. It signes that be not proper, neither tary long: no strong argument is made, as thus.

He is pale in countenaunce.

Ergo he is in loue.

Malenesse maie come of studie, of care and thought, of abstinence, of watching, of some distemperature in the body, and many other waies besides.

Again, there is another rule. A posse ad esse, non est bona consequentia. Because a thyng maie bee, it shall not therefore folowe that it is. As the Catholikes haue serued vs, for the Sacrament, saipng, that because God is omnipotent, and maie be in the Sacrament, by his power really: Ergo he is there really. For so maie I saie, God may fede euery christian, bothe in body

x.ij. and

The arte

and soule, with the might of his worde.
Ergo he doth so. The Prophet saith,
I neuer sawe a iust manne, forsaken of
God, nor his seede beggng his bread.
And yet God doth not fede all christi-
ans, with his word onely, but vseth his
appoynted wil generally. Likewise in
the Sacrament, God feedeth vs spiri-
tually, because the flesh eatē, profiteth
nothng, and thei that eat the Sacra-
ment in faith, tary in God, and God in
them spiritually, and haue life euerla-
stng, wheras other that eat it with-
out faith, haue it not at all, for lacke of
faith, considerng God is in no wicked
mā. But in thold world, many wōders
wer wrought, & because thinges might
be, althpnges should be, as thei would
haue it, and yet I cannot be perswaded
to thinke that, because all priestes may
be honest, therefore thei all bee honest.

frō the generall, to thinferior, affir-
matuely, is no good argument made.

He is a man of power.

Ergo he is a good man of power.
He may notwithstanding, bee an euil
man, yea, and soner euil, then good, for
none

The Sacrament
of Christes body

Of Logique. Fol. 156.

none can tell almost now a daies, wher
the good men do dwell. Or if thei haue
dwelling places still, yet fewe can finde
them at home. Again, to make an argu-
ment, from those thynges, which hap-
pen to a manne, and maie be a waie: the
reason cannot of necessitie folowe.

Good menne bee
hard to come by.

This old manne goeth gaily, and
like a young man.

Ergo he is in loue with some wo-
man.

In this reason, a likelihode is made
necessary, as though it could not other
wise bee, but that he were in loue, be-
cause he was in freshe apparell, yong
man like. But for this whole captious
cause, I thynke it best, that ye marke
the rules, aboue rehersed, and ye shall
not faile to espie the faulte, for the de-
ceipte is sone seen, if ye call the argu-
ment to accompt.

The. v. deceipt.



Lures interrogaciones, Many questions
many questions, & is. whē
I go about to deceiue one
askyng hym this & that, &
he thinkyng not to what

℥.iiij.

ende

The arte

Questions asked
two waies.

ende I aske hym, at length is brought to an incōuenience, by his former graūtyng, of thynges particularly. And it is twoo waies considered: firste, when we aske of many thynges, one, & again whē we aske of one thyng, many thynges, and put furthe diuerse questions, before we come to the purpose. For the first, this maie be an example.

Is water and wine hotte or no?

The question is asked, so that he muste answere to theim bothe, whiche he cannot do at any tyme, and geue one resolute answere directly, according to the demaunders will. But this is a trifle, and one that hath but a sponfull of wit, maie answere to this question, vsing a distinccion, and seuerally shewing the qualities, of bothe wyne and water, otherwise he cannot be able, to make any reasonable answere, as the question is propounded.

Is worshipping of saines, and praiuing to God himself, allowed among christians. or no?

Here ye see, that for twoo diuerse thynges, one certain question is directly

ly required, whereas no man can iustly
answere at a worde: and therefore the
questiō being vaine made ioyntly, must
seuerally be soluted.

I wil merily adde another, whiche
agreeth to the second maner of askyng
and I wil adde thesame, rather to gene
matier of laughyng, then that there is
any greate weight in it. A lawper toke
paines in a matier of law, for a certain
gentleman, that was some time a scho-
ler. The gentle manne promised hym a
horse for his labour, the lawper after
paines taken, required his horse, the
gentleman denied his debte, although
the lawper had witnesse. And thus the
gētleman reasoned merily for hymself:
sir & he, all horses be not of one colour
but of diuerse colours, some Blacke,
some white, some baye, some dapple: if I
owe you any by promise, I owe you no
more of one colour, then I doo of ano-
ther, considering, I did promise you
no more of one colour, then I did of a-
nother, & I maie bee discharged of my
promise, as well in deliueriug one cer-
tain coloured horse, as another. Ther;

a horse promised
to a lawper.

¶.v. fore,

The arte

fore, either I owe you horses of all colours, or els I owe you none at al: but I do not owe you horses of all colours (consideryng I promised you but one) therefore, I owe you none. Pea, serue you me so, qd the Lawyer, Mary this Schoole popnd, muche passeth all our lawe popndes. Well sir, as it pleaseth you, qd he, if you bee at that popnd. When the gentleman sawe him so reasonable, and heard hym saie so, he gaue hym, accordyng to his promise, consideryng, he referred the whole mattier so gently, to his pleasure.

For this seconde maner of askyng, whē of one thyng, many are asked, one maie easely be enueiled and brought to an inconuience, before he bee ware, and of this kynd of askyng, there is also another example in Tullie, wher he speaketh in his boke De inuentione, of this figure inductio, whiche is by thynges not doubtfull, to proue that thyng true, whiche is doubtfull. Socrates sheweth that Aspasia had this talke with xenophon, and his wife, in maner and forme folowynge, after other communication

Of Logique. Fol. 158.

municacion had before. And tell me in
faith (quod Aspasia) if thy neighbour had Aspasia.
more precious Jewels, then thou now
hast, whether wouldest thou wishe to
haue hers or thine awne? She answered
red. I would haue hers. What if she
had more costely garmentes, more fine
apparell, wouldest thou not haue it al-
so, yes Mary would I, (or she.) Ah wel
I saie, what if thy neighbor had a bet-
ter housbande, then thou now hast,
whether hadst thou rather kepe thine
awne still, or haue hers? With that she
blushed. Then Aspasia, when opportu-
nitie serued, spake to xenophō likewise, xenophon.
and said merily vnto hym, he not kno-
wying of this, that was spoken before.
I praye thee tell me xenophon: what if
thy neighbour had a better horse then
thine is, haddest thou rather haue thine
awne, or thy neighboures? I would
haue his saileth he. What if he had bet-
ter lande then thou hast, wouldest thou
haue his, or thine awne? I would haue
his saileth he. What if he had a better
wife then thou hast, wouldest thou
chaunge or no? Here xenophō said neuer

The arte

a woorde. Then spake Aspasia. for as muche as bothe of you, onely hath not answered me, in that poynt, whiche I moste desire to knowe: I my self will shewe what bothe you thinke, for you being a woman, first desire a very honest manne to your husband, and xenophon being a man, desireth to haue a right honest woman. Therefore, except you bothe shall so behaue your selves, that there maie be found, neither man, nor woman, more honest vpon yearth, then you two be, vndoubtely you both wil euermore most earnestly desire that whiche you thinke principall and beste of al, bothe that thou being a husband mightest haue a right honest wife, and you also being a woman, might be married to a right honest husbände.

The. vi. deceipt.

The Cuckowes
song.



Et itio principii, the cuckowes song, that is, repeating of that wholy in the conclusion, whiche before was onely spokē in y first proposicio; or els by thynges doubtfull to proue thynges that are as doubtful.

Euery

Every slanderer muste be banished the court.

Suche a man is a slanderer.

Ergo every slanderer muste be banished the court.

The conclusion is not well gathered, for it should not be universall, but particular, and therefore saying the same is repeted that was spokē before, without any good probacion: in my mynd it maie be called the cuckowes song. Self willed folke that folowe luste, and forsake reason, vse oft the cuckowes song. As beyng asked why thei doo this and that, thei answer streight, Marie because I wil do it, or because it pleaseth me best, so to do. The poore man beyng thus answered of the welthy, shal hardly escape daunger. For though it bee a plain deceipte, and by reason should bee ouerthrowen, yet so long as might beareth rule, and right is set aside: reason is out of season, and doeth but litle help. Some women are subiect to this answer, whiche in witte dooe excell, though in the eight partes of reason, fewe Scholers can hardly find them.

Reason is left out reason.

well

The arte

well, God graunt all our willes, to stande euer with his will, and then I doubt not, but this harme shall with ease be auoyded, and all deceipte for euer set aparte. Again, when an vnknewen thynge is proued by a thing, that is as muche vnknewen, as the other is.

Purgatorie.

In Purgatorie, synnes be forgiven to the dedde.

Ergo we must saie Masse still for the dedde.

This wise reason, fonde Preachers heretofore haue made, that therefore we muste haue Masse for the dedde, because in Purgatorie, synnes be forgiven the dedde. And yet doubt I as muche of this place Purgatorie, as I mistrust this foolish Massing, and to saie truthe, it is synne to like either of theim bothe, and as for Purgatorie, I thinke there was neuer none such, but onely inuented to feare the simple, as children haue been made afrayed with a visar, or els founde out, to pike mens purses. Another.

Praying to
saintes.

Thus many. C. peres haue me vnto
led to praeie to saintes departed.

Ergo

Of Logique. Fol. 160.

Ergo, thei dooe not amisse, that
prate to the dedde still.

I answer, whoe dome hath been
bled these many hundred yeres, Ergo
it is Lawfull, bothe to haue Stewes,
and to go to the Stewes still.

Euery manne maie se how foolish
this argument is, and yet it is as good
as the other, euery pynche of it. For al-
though menne haue prated, menne haue
gone on Pilgrimage thus long, and
thus long: yet it is not therefore true,
that the people did well therein. For
we Englishe menne knowe (not onely
by heare saie, but also by good experie-
nce) that custome is the mother, and
the sucke geuer vnto all erreure. And
therefore, when suche argumentes are
made, we saie. Dubium per id quod e-
que dubium est, confirmatur. That
whiche is doubtfull, is proued by that
whiche is as doubtfull, and so we doo
not allowe the argument.

Custome, which is
vnto naughtines.

Thirdly, when that thyng is take
to proue, as though it wer vndoubted,
and euery body agreed th: unto: wher
as yet it is in controuerisie.

The

The arte

Anabaptist.

The Anabaptistes haue the holy
ghoste, the teacher of all thynges.
Ergo thei neede not to heare the
Gospell, nor yet be bounde to fo-
lowe it.

Who knoweth not, that hath any
knowledge of the truthe, that the firste
maie lawfully bee doubted, and rather
denied, then graunted.

Fourthly, this deceit is then vled
when that whiche foloweth, proueth
that whiche goeth before, as though
the Cart went before the horse, for of-
ten tymes that thyng, whiche is pro-
ued, is more assured then that, whiche
doeth proue, as thus.

Infantes.

Infantes haue faithe.

Ergo thei must be Baptised.

The consequent is vndoubted true
forasmuche as we finde it so in the scri-
pture, that in the Primatiue Church
whole families wer Baptised, childre
and all: for we read not that thei were
excepted, and yet some doubt, and that
of the greatest Clerkes, whether chil-
dren haue faithe or no.

The v.i. deceit.

Ignoratio

Ignoratio elenchi, (that is the mistaking of contradictory propositions) is a deceitful argument whiche comprehendeth in it selfe al other aboue rehearsed subtilties. The occasion of this error resteth for not knowyng what is contradiction. Contradiction therefore is a repugnaunce of one and the same not substance onely, nor yet name onely, but of the substance, and name bothe together. Aristotle notwithstanding hath compassed this deceit within his boundes. First when respecte is not made to one and the same thynge, but of herselfe applied.

{ To eatte fleshe is good for helthe sake.

{ To eatte fleshe is not good when offence maie folowe.

{ Ergo to eatte fleshe is good and not good.

Truthe it is, and yet that it not folowe, that whosoever eateth, the same man doth offende: considering to eatte is lawfull, and is none offence to God at all, being ones allowed by the magistrate,

The arte

gistrate, in whose hande lieth the whole ordering of this matter.

Agayne, this deceipt is vsed when contradiction is made accordyng to diuerse respectes, as thus.

{ The lawe is to be folowed in moral preceptes, and not in ceremonies, nor yet alwayes in iudicials neyther:

{ Ergo the lawe is to be folowed and not to be folowed.

It is euen so, and yet not true neyther, that the lawe is alwaies to be respected, and to be folowed, as it pleaseth our phantasies.

Thirdly, this subtiltie is fashioned when a contradiction is vsed, and yet not vsed of like sorte, so that the latter parte dothe not deny the former in one manner of vnderstandyng, as thus.

{ I knowe the worde of God,
{ and I do not knowe it.

Those that liue licentiously, & feare not the general resurrection, may iustly be here included, and the. ij. sentences whiche seeme to gayne saue, maye bothe be true in them; for some knowe that

that the Scriptures are of God, or at least, they know that y^e Scriptures are commonly taken for the worde of god, and yet they themselves, knowe not one worde of gods will, nor yet passe a whitte for it. Or we may say that those pore soules in the Popes reigne knew the word of god only by here say, whē thei hard the gospell redde in latine, & could not tel one worde what it ment.

Fourthly, the time, maie alter thinges, and make two diuerse thynges to be both true, as thus.

To worke vpon the Sabbath is forbiddē, & yet, not to worke vpon other dayes, is also forbidden.

Ergo to worke, & not to worke, are both forbidden.

It is an easie matter to auoyde al such deceiptes. Therfore there is a rule in logique that twoo contradictions can neuer be both, either false or true, at one and thesame tyme, and that in one respect, as thus.

All true beleuers shall attayne saluation.

Some true beleuers shall not attayne

The arte

attaine saluacion.

These two propositions can neuer be bothe together either true or false. Nowe the other which were made before, maye be both true, at one and the same tyme, and therefore they are not contradictories, because they are not considered in respecte of one, and the same thyng, at one and the same tyme, but diuersely applied and considered, as thus.

To preache in the congregacion.
is mete for a man, and not for a woman.

Ergo to preache is mete and not mete.

All this is true beyng diuersly considered, first a woman may not preache and yet a man maye, and so the sentence is true, and it maye well be sayde to preache is mete and not mete, without anye contradiction at all, because of the diuerse respectes, whiche be had both to the man, and to the woman. If the rule of contradictorie propositions before rehersed, be wel marked, al these deceiptes maye easely be auoided.

Of

Of Logique. Fol. 163.

Of particular auoyding false argumen-
tes whiche are derpyed from
the places.

When I se an argument deri-
ued fro these subtile places,
or els from the places of in-
uention, whiche I haue be-
fore at large declared: I ought to ob-
serue diligently the general rules and
preceptes there geuen, for if one rea-
son thus from the general worde, suche
a man foloweth noughtines, Ergo he
is a thefe, the argument is not good, &
the error appereth the rather, by this
generall rule. From the general to the
kynde, the argument is not good. For
though one be nought otherwyse, yet
maie he lyue noughtly long enough, &
yet be no thefe at all, as he maie be an
adulterer, a swearer, or suche like.

particulare auoy-
ding false argu-
mentes.

False reasons made through the euell
frampng of an argument.

The wrong frampng, may with
ease be espied, if the rules bee
ones learned, that are before
set forth for the same purpose.
And again al other kynd of argumen-
tes,

False reasons
through euell fra-
mpng.

The arte

tes, haue rules especial, and proper to themselves wherby the true orderpng of an argument is better knownen.

Of obiections made to an argument.

Obiections.

Obiections are then vled, when we do not dissolue the argument by the rules of logique, or directly auoid the dasiger, but bypng an other thpng, as an example, to ouerthrowe that, whiche was spoken before, and this maner is foure waies vled.

1. By takpng occasion of the selfsame thpng, that is put forth, and wreslypng it otherwyle.

2. By vspng the like example in another matter.

3. By makpng cleane cōtrary exāple

4. By standpng to aucthoritie, or vspng sentences of the sage.

For the first, this exāple may serue, richesse are good, because they bypnge pleasure. The answer. May inarie richesse are euil, because they bypng wo.

Of the second, thus. Suche a one is an honest mā, for I saw him ones geue almose to the poore, I answer, such a one

Of Logique. Fol. 164.

one is no dronkarde, for I sawe hym
ones sober.

Of the third, thus. Such an honest
man hathe ones recepued a greate dis-
pleasure of his frende and neyghbour,
Ergo he may hate him deadly for euer.
Maye not so, for the wicked man will
sometymes forgeue, recepyng displea-
sure, and therfore the good man must
muche more forgeue.

Of the fourth, thus. fforgeue hym,
because he is a child. may not so, for Sa-
lomon byddeth, that the rodde should
not go fro the child, therfore it is good
to beate hym, when he offendeth.

I haue traualled thus farre to dis-
close vnt ruthes, and to open eloked er-
rors, wherein though sometimes the
examples be but slender, yet in greate
matters the same deceipte hath taken
place. Therfore though to the English
eare, they maie seme straunge, yet I
hope they wyl be better taken, when
this is knowen and fullie sene, that thei
geue light to greater matters, and that
logique by good order, & perfite reaso-
n doth rule all and espieth faultes whi-

The arte

the otherwise would brede offence: for
loke what false argument is vſed, the
ſame maie with eaſe be founde in ſome
one of theſe deceitful corners, or els
where in the places of inuention, and
therefore maie by arte eaſely be auoy-
ded: eſpeciallie, if the other rules a-
boue reherſed, be ones well digeſted.
ſo: the rules are touche ſtones to trie
vntruthes, and to frame matters right
And generally good hede ought to bee
had, that the matter, and forme of eue-
ry argument be true, accordyng to the
rules, for by theſe two pointes, all er-
rors are eſpied. The faulte is in the
matter (called in latine Materia,) whe
woordes are doubteful, and maie diuer-
ſely be taken, and alſo when the pitthe
or ſubſtaunce of the matter is confoun-
ded, and ſtraungely vſed by woordes
iorned together, and thynges not or-
derly placed: in all whiche kynde of ar-
gumentes, ye muſte vſe either a flatte
deniall of the propoſition, or els vſe a
diſtinction to ſhewe how the argumēt
maie be true, and how it maie be falſe,
accordyng as it is vnderſtanden. We
vſe

Fault in the mat
ter.

use a deniall when of two propositions in the Argument, wee denie either the proposition at large, or the severall by shewing the fault to be in the definition, in the division, in the causes, or some other place, as thus.

I had good cheere in suche a mans house.

Ergo he is an honest man.

Here the fault is in the definition, for if I would go about to define an honest man, every bodie would laugh me to scorn, if I would thus define hym.

That man whatsoever he be that maketh me good cheare at his house, is a very honest man: but I muste rather say thus. Whatsoever he is that dothe as he would be done vnto, and wrongeth no body, but liueth still vprightly, godly, and continently, that same is an honest mā, or els not. For vertue is gotten by long practise, and by wel doyng of many good thynges, not by making a good dinner, and therefore the other aboue rehersted definition, because it is not laful nor agreyng with the rules of a definitiō, it is vtterly to be denied,

Good cheare.

P. v.

this

The arte

this reason applied there vnto that the definition is not lawfull. Notwithstandyng in talkyng of honest men, euermore the weltheft are considered, and therefore this and suche lyke talke is communely vsed. Of what opinion is suche a man? An honest man suerlye, saith another, for he wil eate his meate. I warrunt you, he is none of those scrupulouse consciences, he hath the Bible in his house ye may be sure: talke with hym of the Sacrament when you will, and he is hable to aunswere ad omnia quare, As though whole religion stoude in these pointes onely. I asked ones a felowe in Latine, if he could do any thyng in the scriptures, whose learnyng I was then comaunded to examine. He answered me thus. Etiam, possum fabulari de Sacramēto, si placet. That is, yea ser, I can babble of the Sacrament if it please you. Yea, quod I, marie then you haue enough, and I warrunt you agaynste all men, and so bad hym fare well, beynge well instructed of his greate worthinesse. I remēber an other, and that no smal

Gospell preachers
take for good me

no smal birde, which was better lear-
 ned then wise, and yet not so wel lear-
 ned in diete, as he thought hymselfe in
 his owne opinion, wyse, and vled ano-
 ther moze daungerouse reason. For
 where as it chaunced by occasiō of tal-
 ke, that one in hys compaignie inuei-
 ghed against the same mannes frende,
 speakyng thynges nothyng tothsome,
 and otherwise then he would gladlye
 heare, although not greatly missyng
 the quishpne in reportyng truthe, he
 toke the matter very hotte, and lyke a
 frende spake earnestlye in his frendes
 cause, testifyng for his honestie with
 mozte constant wordes, and to persua-
 de hym y^e better he vled this soze reason.
 Thou art to blame, quod he, to depre-
 ue such a mans estimaciō, for by Gods
 mother he is a very honest mā, for he is
 my special frend, I would thou shoul-
 dest knowe it, & therfore cease thy rap-
 ling: with that, other came to part thē,
 for they fell to reasonyng with Argu-
 mentes, that ware neyther in fygure,
 nor in mode, but stode in plaine buffe-
 ttes, whiche is a subtiltie, that is not
 men;

Rage, overtho-
 weth reason.

The arte

Carters So-
phistrie.

mentioned within the compasse of this booke, and therefore dangerous, neyther can it be auoided, except one haue a headpece, or some weapō in his hande to beare of, suche deceipte, & so to saue hymselfe harmelesse. Some call suche rough dealing, Carters Sophistrie, when the fiste reasoneth a matter by buffetes, which the tongue should proue by Argumentes. Again for the diuision when it is not well made, it is to be denied in lyke maner, the cause showed why and wherefore, as thus.

Guerriman is either wastefull or
couetous.

Cicero is a man:

Ergo Cicero is either wastfull
or couetous.

This deuision is not good, for many men offende in neither, but liue moderately, content with there owne, be it neuer so litle. Moreover whē no true cause is applied, but a false reason forged, ye may auoide daunger by denieng it, as thus.

Mony maketh vnrifites.

Ergo mony is naught.

¶ Thus.

Fire burneth houses,

Ergo what shall we do with it.

¶ Thus.

Water drowneth whole Cities,

Ergo water is nothing profitable.

In all suche Argumentes the true cause is omitted, & a counterfeite cause vled. For neither money, nor fire, nor yet water, do harne of the selues, but the naughtines of nature which abuseth them, and the negligence of man, whiche forseeth not to them, is the very true cause of their euell dopug: and yet in waightie matters suche sonde reasons haue bene vled, as for the readyng of Gods worde, for women to be learned, for Rethorike to be taught, or the tempoꝛall lawe at this date in this our realme to be frequented, or occupied. A distinction muste be vled, when any worde is doubtful, and maye be taken diuersly. As thus.

{ Tyme healeth sicke folke.

{ Ergo it is very good.

Here a distinction must be vled, for tyme aswell signifieth an hearbe, as it
signi:

Goddes worde.

Rethorike,

Tempoꝛall lawe

The arte

signifieth the space, whiche is of an houre, daie, or yere. A frende of myne was called Harris: one not well knowing his name, called him Harrisone. I denie the sonne) qd he) not meanyng the second person in Trinitie, but the addicion of this worde (sonne.)

Whysician.

A learned man & a Whysician (some knowe whō I meane) haupng at a certain tyme a coate of Meluct, that was muche worne, and bare at the brest, beypng then also pooze with all, & haupng a thynne purse, sittng at a table, and laipng his hande vpon his brest, sayed thus merely to his frende: well (qd he) for all this harde worlde, at the worste I am thus mache worth, euen in bare Meluct. The same man after ward, sittng at a Table, not haupng elbowe rowme, but beypng troubled, & his cote somewhat araied, which was dresled at the Shermans, not past two or thre daies before, said merely: I praeie you my Maisters bee good to my coate, for I promyse you, within these two or thre daies, it hath scapt a skowpng.

A young man of
Cambridge.

A young man of Cambridge, stan-
dyng

dyng in a Galarie ouer the water, and
 lokyng on his booke: haupng the water
 on the one side, and a gardine on the o-
 ther side, wherin (as it chaunced then)
 ware diuerse maidens of the tounne (for
 it was aboute Easter, at what tyme
 maidens gadded abrode, after they had
 taken their maker, as thei cal it) he be-
 yng thus beset, one of his felowes be-
 yng abrode, and seying hym there, badd
 hym come to him. He answered, I can
 not come. The other demaunded why?
 Mary (quod he) because I am compas-
 sed with fire, and water. Meaning the
 maidens to bee fire, and a prouocation
 to lust, burning worse then fire: and so
 all good authours haue vsed this worde
 fire. As Terence. Accede ad ignem
 hunc, iam calesces plus satis. Come
 to this fire, saith Parmeno to Phre-
 dia, meanyng Thais the harlotte, and
 you shalbe as whote as coles, by & by.
 Therfore where such speache is vsed,
 it is alwaies called in latine metapho-
 ra. That is to saie, a turnyng from the
 proper significacon to that, whiche is
 not proper, wherein the olde Philoso-
 phers,

The arte

phers, haue wonderfully excelled, as Diogenes, Socrates, and in our tyme Sir Thomas More, a mā for his witte, very singulare.

Faulte in the making of an argument.

The faulte that is in the forme, or maner of making, as we call it, maie be dissolued, when we shewe that the conclusion, is not well proued by the former propositions, and that the argument, is either not wel made, in figure or in mode, or in bothe: for of true thynge, none other thing can be concluded but truthe, if the due forme of concluding be obserued, and the iust placing or setting of the partes or termes, called in Latine, termini, as ye hard before, be truly kept, as the rules before haue taught. Notwithstanding of false propositions an vndoubted truthe, maie wel enough be concluded, as thus.

{ Every synne, maie be suffered in a common weale.

{ Every execuciō done by a lawe is synne,

{ Ergo every execuciō, done by lawe, may be suffered in a common weale.

The

Of Logique. Fol. 169.

The two first propositions are manifestly false, & yet the conclusion is hereby true. So that ye may see, after .ij. false propositions, a true conclusion may followe, and not contrarie wise, of two true propositions, a false conclusion can be made. For, as we say in Latine. Ex ueris nil nisi uerū sequitur, that is to say, of true saynges, nothing doth followe but truth. Therefore when the conclusion seemeth not good, ye may iustly suspect the other .ij. propositions, although they seeme neuer so true. for undoubtedly, the fault is either in the euill knittynge, (when the argument is not in his mode, & figure accordyngly) or els in the confoundynge of wordes either euill placed, or not wel applied or els in the doubtfulness of some worde.

{ All riot is an offence.
{ No couetousnes is riot.
{ Ergo no couetousnes is any offence

Thus we see a false conclusion, made of two vndoubted true propositions, and yet I said before, of true saynges nothing doth followe, but only truth.

Z. j.

But

The arte

But abide, ye must examine this argument with the rules, & then ye shal see, that the fault is in the forme, or maner of makynge an argument. For it is in no mode of the first figure, although it be an argument of the first figure.

Fault in the matter of an argument.

Some time the fault is onely in the matter, & not in the maner of makynge an Argument, whereof there are diuerse examples aboue reherſed. Sometimes the fault is both in the matter, and in the maner of makynge an argument, as thus.

The pearth is profitable, and causeth much plentie.

Al men are in the pearth.

Ergo al men are profitable, and cause much plentie.

First, it is in no figure, because the double repeat in the first proposition, is the substance of the pearth, and in the seconde proposition, is the being in the pearth, & so there bee foure termes in the two propositions. Again it is in no mode, because the first proposition in the first figure is not vniuersal

Of Logique. Fol. 170.

uerfal. And this may suffice which hereto I haue rehearsed for the solving of an argument, forasmuch as he that can deuide, define, and make his argument in mode and figure, according to the rules before mentioned, & diligently marke doubtful wordes: shall soon espie the faultes in an euill argument, forasmuch as it cannot otherwise be, but that he whiche knoweth the beste, shall easely iudge, and without difficultie espie the worst.

And nowe the rather to delight the reader, I wil adde here certaine witty questions and argumentes, whiche can hardely bee auoided, being very pleasaunt, and therefore not unworthy to be knownen.

They are called trappung argumentes, because few that answer vnto them, can auoide daunger, and thus they are named in straunge wordes.

Trappung argumentes.

Crocodilites.

Antistrephon.

Ceratinæ.

Alistaton.

Cacolistaton.

Vtis.

Pseudomenos.

Z. ij.

Croco.

The arte

Crocodilites, the Serpentes guyle.

CRocodilites, is suche a kynde of subtiltie that when wee haue graunted a thyng to our aduersarie being asked before what we wil say: the same turneth to our harme afterward: & causeth an inconueniencie therupō to ensew. Authours do feigne that the Crocodile being a monster in Egypt did take a womans childe from her, and spake with the mother in this wise: Womā I wil geue the, thy childe again, if thou wilt say truth to me, & tel me assuredly, whether I wil geue the, thy childe againe, or no? She answered, I knowe assuredly thou wilt not geue me my childe again, and therefore it is reason I haue my childe again because I haue said truth. Nay, saied the Crocodile, I wil not geue the thy childe again because thou maist be seen to haue said truth: lesse that if I geue the thy childe again, thou shouldst haue made a lie: neither yet woulde I haue geue the thy childe again, if thou hadst said otherwise, because thē thou hadst not said truth. And hereof this Argument

Crocodile.

Of Logique. Fol. 171.

ment hath his name, called Crocodi-
lites. Notwithstanding Luciane tel-
leth this tale after an other sort, & mar-
keth Chrysippus to aske an other man
what he would say, in case he shoulde
be asked such a question of the Croco-
dile, as I haue before rehearsed.

¶ Antistrephon.

ANtistrephon, is nothyng els,
then to turne a mans sayeng in;
to his owne necke again, and to
make that whiche he byngeth
for his owne purpose, to serue for our
purpose, in Latine it may be called, In-
uersio. Aulus Gellius hath a notable
example of Pythagoras, a noble So-
phiste, & Euathlus scholer to the same
Pythagoras. This Euathlus was a
very riche young mā, & glad to learne
eloquence, and to pleade causes in the
cōmune place. This young man ther-
fore considering Pythagoras to bee a
singular man in this behalfe, & a mete
Scholemaister for his purpose, desired
to be his scholer, and promised to geue
him a great some of mony, for his pain-
es, euen as muche as he woulde aske,

The rebounding
or turnyng again
of an argument.

Pythagoras and
his scholer Eua-
thlus.

The arte

and gaue hym vpon agreemēt halfe in hande before he learned, and couenaunted their vpon that he shoulde haue the other halfe euen the first day that he stode at Barre, and by pleasyng, gotte the ouerhand in iudgemēt of his aduersarie. After this, when he hadde bene a good while Pythagoras scholer, and profited very much in the Lawe, and yet notwithstanding came not to the Barre, but stil shifted hym of, and tracted the tyme (of like because he woulde not paie that residue of his mony) Pythagoras taketh aduisement as he hymselfe thought, very subtilly, and chargeth hym with his promise, haupng an action of debte against him, and therfore he called him to the Law. Where when he had hym before the Judges, he begynneth his tale in this wise.

Pythagoras reason
to his scholer

Here I haue the now (saith Pythagoras) and learne therefore folishe fellows as thou art, & marke this point for thy learnyng: whether the iudgement be geue with the, or against the, I shal haue my money euery grote of it.

Of Logique. Fol. 172.

it. If thou art cast in the law, I haue
wonne by vertue of the lawe: if thou
art not cast, but gettest the ouerhande
by iudgement of these men, yet muste
I haue it neuerthelesse, because our
bargain was so made, when I first be-
gan to teache the. Quathlus hearing
this, answered as ye shall heare. I
coule easely sic auoide this your cro-
ked subtiltie, & be without al daunger,
if I would not stande at the barre my
selfe, but get some aduocate to stande
for me, for by such meanes, you coule
not charge me with any debte, consid-
ring I my self pleaded no cause. Not:
withstandyng I like it better a thous-
sand fold, that I my self am here per-
sonally, & speake in mine owne cause:
seyng & not only, I will get the ouer-
had of you in this our matter, wherby
I shalbe discharged of debt, but also
euē in this argumēt I wil turne your
owne wordes into your owne necke a-
gain, & so triumphe both wayes. And
therfore learne you againe as wise as
you are, & marke this point for your
learnyng, whether the iudgement be

Quathlus an-
swered to his mai-
esty.

Z.iiij. geuen

The arte

geuen with you, or against you, I shal
saue my money every groate of it. For if
you be cast in the law, I haue wonne
by vertue of the lawe, & so I owe you
nothyng. If you be not cast, but gette
the ouerhand of me, by the iudgement
of these men: then according to my bar-
gain, I shal pay you nothyng because
I haue not gotten the ouerhand in iud-
gement. The iudges seing the matter
so doubtful, & so harde to determine
for either partie: fearpng to do amysse,
lefte the matter raw without iudge-
ment for that time, & differred the same
to another season. Thus ye se that the
younge man being the scholer, gaue his
maister a bone to gnawe, & bette hym
with his stone rodde, which the ma-
ster had made for his Scholers taple.

Aristophanes.

There is in Aristophanes a wonder-
ful pretty talke, betwixt the father &
the sonne, which serueth well for this
purpose. For where as the sonne had
beaten his father contrarie to al order
and honestie, yet notwithstanding the
sonne thought he had as good autho-
ritie to beate his father if he did amysse

as

Of Logique. Fol. 173.

as the father hadde to beate hym. And therefore he said, wherfore shoulde my father beate me? His father made answer. Mary (quod he) because I loue the, and would thou shouldest do wel. Mary therefore (quod the sonne) will I beate the to, because I loue the also good father, and would thou shouldest do wel: and with that laide on strokes surely, til he made his father graunt that it was as laful for the sonne, to beate his father, as for the father to beate his sonne.

A good sonne
paye of hame.

¶ Ceratix.

Ceratix argumentationes, are called, horned argumentes, the which are so dangerous to answer vnto, for both partes propounded, that it wilbe hard to escape a foile. Euen as when ye se a bull, and would catche him by the hornes, ye se as much danger in the one horne, as in the other, & so you feare to take hym on either side: In like case, whē these horned argumētes are proponed, a mā vneth can tell what to answer. As we read in the gospel of Mathew the

Horned argu-
mentes.

The arte

phariseis sought
to take Christ in a
trippe.

xxij. Chapter, where the Phariseis did
send their disciples (which did pretend
holines, & bare a face of true religiō)
to take Christ in a snare. And therefore
first they came, geuyng hym a name of
authoritie, & called him master flatter-
ingly, as though, he might speake his
mind frely to them, because their was
none but his Scholers, and suche as
sought unfainedly to be edified in the
truth: secōdly, they prasse him for his
goodnesse, that he is true in al his dea-
lynges, and vseth no dissimulation: &
againc they say, that not onely he is
true, but also teacheth y way of truth
and then thus they begyn to question
with him, and to feele his minde what
he wil say (for truely they thought to
take him in a trip, whether he helde his
peace, or spake) and therefore they said.
Sir may we lawfully pay tribute to
Cesar, or no? or how thinke you, doth
it stand with Goddes worde, that we
may pay or no? Here Christ was beset
two wayes, first it was dangerous
for him. to hold his peace: for then he
might seme by so doyng, to haue re-
spect

Of Logique. Fol. 174.

spect to the person of men, & for feare
not open the truth, in such a weighty
matter, & so stain the glory of god. Of
the other part, if he should answer,
it wer a dangerous peece of worke in
like maner, for thei thought, he would
either speake on Cefars side, & allowe
payeng of Tribute, and so incurre the
hated of al the people, whereby they
might more boldly after ward, put him
to death: or els they thought, he would
speake against Cesar, and so he should
commit treason, and bee apprehended
thereupon, as a traitour. But Jesus
knowyng their naughty purpose, and
plainly seying where about thei went,
disapointed them of their will, that
thei could take none aduantage of him
at al. And therfore he saied, because he
would publishe their falthode, what
seyst you me ye hypocrites? Shew me
the coine of the tribute: and they toke
hym a penny, and he saied vnto them:
whose is this Image & superscripcion?
They saied vnto him, Cefars. Then
saied he, Geue therfore vnto Cesar the
thynges which are Cefars, and vnto
God

Christes an-
swere.

The arte

God those thinges, which are goddes. Christe did not at the first when they propounded their question vnto hym, plainly say, geue vnto Cesar the thinges, whiche are Cesars, but when he had asked them, whose coine it was, & that they by their adone confessiō, had graunted it to be Cesars, wherby they bare witnes of themselves that they were subiect to Cesar: he said, for as much as you graūt your selues by the vertue of this coine to be tributaries, pay on goddes name to Cesar the thinges that pertainē to Cesar, and vnto God, those thynges that are Gods.

¶ Cacosistata.

*Euil argumentes,
that make aswel
against one, as
with one.*

Cacosistata are suche argumētes that beyng propounded, betwene two persones, they serue aswel for the one parte, as the other, as thus. You muste forgeue him, because he is but a child, no marv, therfore wil I beate him, because he is a childe. or thus. This man should not be indged to dye, by any temporal lawe, because he is a priest. yea marv, therfore should he bee iudged to dye, because he is a priest,

Of Logique. Fol. 175.

priest, & hath offended, which shoulde
haue geuen good example to other of
wel liuynge. Alas saith one, it is pitie
suche a man shoulde be hanged, consi-
derynge he is a gentle man. And why
not gentle men as well as other poore
men, if they deserue it? Pea why not
they rather then any other if they more
deserue it then any other?

¶ A listata.

Abstruse reason-
ing.

A listata are suche Argumentes,
as are impossible to be true, as
when a child of two yerres old,
should be accused of adulterie,
as though it ware like, that he coulde
offende in such filthinesse: or els thus,
if one saye, he holdeth his peace, and
yet doth speake still.

¶ Vtis.

Uncertaine pro-
uings.

I tis is nothing els, but when
one goeth about to proue a
thyng, & maketh that whiche
should proue, to be as vncer-
tain, as that thyng, whiche is proued,
as thus. In Purgatorie sinnes are
forgiuen, by vertue of the Masse, er-
go we must say Masse still. Where as

The arte

but I thynke there is no godly wise mā, but doubteth as much that purgatorie is, as he may iustly say, that the masse saueth no man.

Pseudomenos.

812738.

This is called a lying argument for what soeuer ye shal say, ye must needs say amisse. Epimenides a man borne in Crete, saied that the people borne in Crete, wer liars, said he true, or no? if ye say that he said truth, I may wel say, that can not be wel said: for if the people in Crete be liars, then lied Epimenides & so his sayng cannot be true, because he was a man their borne, and one of Crete, & said they wer liars. Again if ye iudge that the people there, bee no liars, then Epimenides saied truth euen when he said, the people of Crete are liars, because he himself was a mā of Crete. But this subtiltie is thus auoided, if ye will saye that where as mencio is made of the people in Crete, yet al are not comprehended vnder the same, neither is the Proposition vniuersall, but indefinite, that is to say,
not

Epimenides.

Of Logique. Fol. 176.

not comprehendynge al, but certayne,
as thus. The people of Crete are ly-
ers, truth it is, that many of them be
liars, and yet Epimenides may be ex-
cepted, and be a true man of his word
notwithstanding. As also he that was
warned in his slepe not to geue cre-
dite to any dreames, did not thynke
that dreame vain, although he iudged
many other to be litle esteemed, & smal
hede to be taken to them. For by this
dreame he was warned not to beleue
greatly other dreames, and yet not-
withstanding he was warned to be-
leue this dreame.

One warned, not
to beleue dreames

That whiche I craved, at the
first setting forth of this boke
the same request make I now
in correctynge of the same. I
desire of al mē their fauourable helpe,
to supporte my weakenes, or at y least
to geue me none euell reporte, for my
wel meanynge, and then I shal thinke
my self sufficiently rewarded. But if
offence should breed through labour
sustained, and no fauour gotten, when
gentlenesse had ben offered, it had ben
as

The arte

as good (in my mind) to please & lose nothing, as to take paines, & lose al. But my trust being stayed vpon the honest and godly affected, I haue traualled without feare, hopping well that my doynges shalbe taken without blame. And therfore this obteyned, I shal desire al men for the loue of God to embrace the truth, and not to wedde themselves to any opiniō without some stay or sure foundaciō of goddes truth. And where as God is the authoꝝ of peace & concord, & loueth the, that vnfainedly cal vpon him in truth: I shal hartely pray to God, that al we may drawe after one line, & seke one vniforme and sounde doctrine, to the praise of God, & the comfort of our soules. And because some heades are very bolde to entre farther, then witte can reach, or els haue a minde vaine to question, of thynges not nedeful: I thought it not amisse to set forth here Aristoteles mind, as touching thinges that should not be brought in question. There be foure thinges (saith he) which shoulde not be examined by reason. And first,

*Foure thynges
not to be examined
by reason.*

Of Logique. Fol. 177.

noman ought to argue of those thyn-
ges, wherein if any one put doubte, he
deserueth the punishment. As to rea-
son whether there be a God or no. And
therfore, Tullie saith very well, it is
a wicked and an vngodly custome, to
dispute, or talke against God, either in
earnest, or yet in spoite. Again, it is a
fondnesse, to reason of those thyn-
ges, whiche our senses iudge to be true. As
to knowe by reason, whether fire bee
hotte, or no. The whiche were madnes
to aske, and surely, if any one should
so reason with me, I would bidde hym
put his finger in it. Thirdly, it is euill
to reason of those thyn-
ges, whiche can
not bee knowne by mannes witte. As
to knowe what God the father is in
persone, what the holy Ghoste is, how
thei sit, and are placed in heauen, or of
what makyn-
g the soule of manne is.

Fourthly, to talke and dispute of
those thyn-
ges, whiche are vndoubted-
ly true. As in Arithmetique, three and
three are sixe. In Philosophie. The
whole is greater then the part. In all
whiche mattiers to moue any earnest
¶.i question,

The arte

question, or to doubt euer muche in
thynges nothyng doubtful, wer either
starke madnesse, or els plain foolish-
nesse. Therefore I wishe of God, that
all our reasonyng, might bee fastened
vpon suche matters, as are necessarie
bothe for the hearer to learne, and also
good, for the godly reasoner, to teache.
Wherin though I haue doen nothyng
so well my self, as my good wil was
therunto, yet I trust all honest hartes
wil testifie with me, that I haue moste
earnestly minded the glory of God, and
the setting furthe of his holy name,
throughout the whole course of this
my rude and simple booke: the whiche
once doen and knowen, I hope the gen-
tle reader, will heare with me in other
thynges, and rather help me, then hate
me, when I seke to helpe all, and hurt
none. I aske no reward, but louyng re-
porte, for incessaunt laboure, the one
is easie for all men to graunt, the other
was busie for me to compasse. Thus I
line in hope, yea, I hope well, for
through hope: beholde, I tra-
uaile. God be praised.

Finis.

The Table,

Accident. fol. b. xi.
 and .xx. xxx.
 Accidentes to what
 the thei are. xi.
 Accidentes diuided in
 so accidentes. xxii.
 Accidentes beeing a place.
 fol. xcii.
 Accidentes beeing a false co-
 elution. C. xl.
 Accion. xxv.
 Adioyned wordes. lxxii.
 Adulterous women, are no
 wives. C. l.
 Affections of the mynd. xxi.
 Alexander. lxxii.
 Ambiguitie. C. xxx.
 Anabaptistes. lii. cxlii. clx.
 Answer made to the matier
 twoo waies. cxxv.
 Appostles had wives. lxx.
 Araying or clothyng. xxvi.
 Argumentes how thei shoulde
 be made. xlv.
 Argument what it is. xlv.
 Argumentes of iiii. kindes. xlv.
 Argumentes in generall must
 be ordered by seven especiall
 rules. xlviii.
 Argumentes how thei shoulde
 bee settled or placed. liii.
 Argumentes how thei are made
 in the first figure. liiii.
 Argumentes knowne to be in
 modes, through knowlege of
 howelles. liiii.
 Argument vniuerselle, called
 Enthymema. lxxii.
 Argument made by a Rounne
 proper. lxxiii.
 Argumentes brief. lxx.
 Aristotles mynde, touchyng
 the triall of any matier. i.

Arithmetique. lxx.
 Aristophanes. lxxii.
 Astronomie. liii.
 Authoritie of the god. lxxii.
 Authoritie a place of inuen-
 tion. C.
 Augustines sayng upon the
 churche. lxxii.
 Augustines sayng, depraue
 by euill poynting. cxxviii.

Brief argumentes. lxx.
 Bare twoo waies taken.
 cxxviii.
 Bare twoo waies taken. cxxv.
 Bishoppes married in olde
 tyme. lxx. clii.
 Blind men, Gospellers. cxli.
 Boyes gette boyes in this
 tyme. cxviii.
 Brief argumentes. lxx.

Catholike. i.
 Carters Sophistrie. cxvi.
 Causes of thynges. lxxvii.
 till. xciii.
 Cause that is not, putte for a
 cause. cl.
 Ceremoniall lawe. xxvi. l.
 Chauncing thin. xcv. xcvi.
 Chrysostome. cxlii. cxlv.
 Chyistes answer, beeing cry-
 ken on the cheke. lxx.

Chyist taken of the Jewes.
 cxxvi.
 Church doth not erre. cxviii.
 Common weale diuided three
 waies. xxvi.
 Concupiscence. cxxvii.
 Confession. cxxv.
 Confutation twoo waies v-
 sed. cxviii.
 Consequent, beeing a false co-
 elution. clviii.

Contrary

The Table.

Contrary propositions. xl.
Contradictories can neuer be
bothe true. lvi.
Contraries. cv. cvi.
Conuerſion. xxvii. xli. xlii.
Conuerſion of turnyng of a
proposition nedefull. xlii.
Conuerſion not made of ſin-
gular wordes. xliii.
Conieanres. xcvi.
Counterſeit chaſtitie fonde-
ly defended. cvii.
eroune, diuerſt waies take. xv
Cuckowes ſong. clviii.
Cuſtome, nurce vnto naugh-
tiſſe. clx.
D.
Diuid. xli.
Definiſion. xxv. xxviii.
and lxxvi.
Definiſiō being a place. lvi.
Definiſion twoo waies con-
ſidered. xxvii.
Definiſions in generall, muſt
be ordered by foure eſpeciall
rules. xxviii.
Demades. clii.
Differencia. ix. lxxviii.
Diogenes cocke. xxviii. liii.
Diuiſion of places. lxxvi.
Diuiſion teacheth the diſfe-
rence of all thynges. xxix.
Diuiſion what it is. xxx.
Diuiſion is either of a word
or of a thyng. xxx.
Diuiſions in generall, muſte
be marked by certain eſpeci-
all rules. xxxii.
diuiſiō whē it is faultie. xxxiiij
Doxors inducciō in behoue
of the Maſſe. lxxvi.
Double propoſitiōs. xliii. xlv
Double repeate. xlv. xlvii. l.
Double repeete why it ought

not to be a doubtfull worde. l.
Doubtfulnes of a wo. cxxviiij
Doynge of any thyng. xxv.
Dooyng in generall, either
naturall or voluntary. lvi.
Doynge or ſufferynge, beeyng
a place. lxxviii.
Dreamyng taught one, not to
beleue dreames. clxxvi.
E.

Eade of thynges beeyng a
place. lxxix.
Eſop's fable of a Carte that
ſtacke faſt. cxxviiij.
Epimenides.
Euil. ii. waies taken. cxxviii.
Example a kynd of argumē-
tation. lxxv.
Examples. xv. xvi. xxviii.
 xxxv. xlv. xlvii. xlviii. lx.
 and. liii. lxx. lxxi.
F.

Faith without worke. cxxv.
Faith is a worke. cxli.
Faith defined. cxxii.
False conclusions. cxxiii.
False conclusion what it is.
 cxxvii.
false cōclutiōs diuid. cxxviii.
Faulte in the makynge of an
argument. cxxvi.
Fault in the matier of an ar-
gument. lvi.
Figures. liii liiii. lvi. lvii.
and. lix. lx. lxi.
Figure of thynges ded. xxi.
forme of thynges liuyng. xxij
Foure thynges, through rea-
ſon muſt not be tried. clxxvi.
Framing of an argumēt. xlv
Freedom. ii. waies taken. lii.
Free will. cxxvii.
Friers neuer mencioned in
ſcripture. ci.
from

The Table

From the part to the whole.	cxlvi.	Plittynge of wordes to the	
		Substance of any thing.	xcvi.
		Mynd.	viij. lxxviij.
		Mynd. ij. waies diuided.	viij.
		Mynd. Aud.	cix.
		Mynd. declared by the places of Logique.	cxi.
			l.
		Use of the Gospell.	xxx.
		Lawyers.	cxlviij. clj.
		Letters declaring the reduction of bringyng of an argument, from the second or third figure, to the first.	lv.
		Libertall Artes described in	
		Witer.	liij.
		Likelihoodes.	lxxij.
		Logique whether it be or no.	
		What it is in substance,	
		What manet a thyng it is.	
		Wherefore, or to what ende it is.	ij.
		Logique. ij. waies diuided.	ij.
		Logique differeth from Sophistrie.	Idem.
		Logique differeth from Rhetorique.	v.
		Logiques office.	Idem.
		Lotter daughters.	cxi.
			l.
		Manner of speche.	cxlv.
		Matters aboue reason,	
		would not bee searched, by course of reason.	clxxvi. clxxij.
		Marcus Attilius Regulus.	lxxij.
		Marriage of Priestes, proued by Logique.	cxiij.
		Marriage when it would be, by Aristotles mynd.	cxviij.
		Matter beyng a cause.	xxi.
		Method, what it is.	lxxij.
		and.	lxxix.
		Mode what it is, & how many there	liij.
			there
Genus of generall worde	viij. xliiij. lxxvii.		
Generall worde, twoo waies diuided.	viij.		
Geometrie.	liiij.		
Gospell and the law.	cxliiij.		
Gospel praters taken for honest men.	clxv.		
god chaughor of marriage.	cxv.		
Godly are fewe in number.	lxxvi.		
Good men are harde to come by.	clvi.		
Gourmandise causeth droopie.	lxxij.		
Grammer.	liij.		
Habite.	xxviij. xxvi.		
Habite. ij. waies diuided.	xx.		
Habite of the mynd.	xx.		
Hebrue phrases.	cxliiij.		
Heapyng reasons.	lxxviij.		
Hozned argument.	lxx.		
Horse keepers better cherished then scholemasters.	clij.		
Horse promised to a lawyer.	clviij.		
Hiperbole what it is.	cxlvi.		
Jeremias.	cxlvij.		
Jpages.	cl. cxliij.		
Induccion.	lxxij.		
Infantes.	clx.		
Inuencion.	ij. lxxij.		
Interpretaciō of a word.	xcviij.		
Inuersion.			
Joseph.	lxxxiij.		
Joinyng of two wordes that would be parted.	cxliij.		
Judiciall lawe.	xxxi.		
Iustificacion.	cxliiij.		

The Table.

There be in every figure. liij.

Wouther. cxlvij.

Worall lawe. xxxi. l.

Wotes law increaseth synne. cxliij.

Musicke. iij.

Wittes of wordes haue blinded our blisse. cxvij.

M.

Mame of a thyng. xcviij.

Naturall pith. xx.

Naturall weakenes, Ibidem
nature through God geueth
encrease. lxx.

Noble, diuerse waies take xv
and xvi.

Noune proper. viij.

O.

Obseruacion for thynges
compared. cxij. cb.

Obsiessions made to argu-
mentes four waies. cxij.

Oatours made absolute, by
five especiall poyntes. lxxxi.

Oder otherwise called Me-
thodus right nedefull for e-
very matier. xxxij. xxxb.

P.

Papirus wittie behauiour
towards his mother and
his faithfull silence dec. clj.

Particion. xxxi.

partying of wordes that would
be ioyned. cxvij.

Partes and the whole. lxxix
and lxxx.

Partes integrall. Ibidem.

Pastions. xxi.

Paule rebuking the Corin-
thians. cxvvi.

Phariseis sought to trippe
Christe. clxxij.

Peter killed Ananias. lxxij.

Physician learned, and plea-

santly disposed.

Phrases not known, haue
caused error. cxvbj.

Philosophie. cl.

Places. xxij. in nobet. lxxvi

Place what it is. lxxij.

Platoes sayng of Goddes
doyng. cxliij.

Politicall lawe. xxxi.

Praying to sainctes. clx.

Pope. xxxi.

Predicable what it is. vi.

Predicamentes. xij. xv. xvi.

Predicables to what ende
they are. xij.

Priestes. cxliij.

Propertie and difference of
fundy natures. xi.

Propertie what it is, b. i. x.

Proposition. vi. xxxb. xxxvi.
and xxxvj. xl. xliij. xliij.

Propositions diuided accord-
yng to the matier or nature
of the thyng. xxxi.

Proposition double, or the
whiche standeth of two sen-
tences. xliij.

Propositions double of thre
cortes. xliij.

Purgatorie. clviij.

Pythagoras and his scholer
Euathlus. clxxi.

Q.

Qualitie what it is. xviij.

Qualitie thre waies diui-
ded. xviij.

Qualities, bee instrumentes
of nature. xxi.

Qualities of the mynd four,
of the body five. v.

Qualities abiding, differ fro
perturbacions. xxi.

Qualitie hath thre proper-
ties.

The Table.

ties. xxx.
 Quantitie. xviij.
 Questions what they are. i.
 Questions howe they would
 be vted. xxxij. xxxij.
 Questions, many for one thing
 and diuersly proponed. clvi.
 R.
Rage, ouertroweth rea-
 son. clxvi.
 Reason howe it would bee
 founde out, to make an argu-
 ment. xlv.
 Reasons infallible. lxiij.
 Reason without reason. clx.
 Rebelles die wretchedly. lxxv.
 Reboundyng, or turnyng a-
 gain of an argument. clxxvj.
 Reduccion. lvi. lvi.
 Relatiues. xxx. xxx. xxxij.
 and xxx. xxxi.
 Relatiues declared by a Ta-
 ble. xxx.
 Relatiues beyng a place. clxij.
 Repugnauncie of proposi-
 tions. xxxviij. xl.
 Repugnauncie nedefull to be
 known. xxxviij.
 repugnantes being a place. cl.
 Rhetorique. liij. b.
 Riche me haue their excuse.
 clx.
 Rules for diuision. xxxij.
 Rules for makynge an argu-
 ment. xlvij. l. li.
 S.
Sacramentes necessarie.
 lxxv.
 Sacrament of Chyristes bo-
 dy. clv.
 Sage, doubtfully vted. xv. xvi.
 Selfe willed folke. clx.
 Sentences graffed in man by
 nature. ci.

Sentences gainesaying. clxij.
 Sennacherib. clxviij.
 Similitude of inuencio. lxxij.
 Similitude or parable, what
 it is. clx.
 Similitude how it would be
 founde out. clx.
 Slepe what it signifieth. C.
 and xxxvi.
 Sophistrie differeth from
 Logique. liij.
 Species, the kynd or sort in
 thynges. vij.
 Socrates induccio. lxxvi. clxij.
 Sophistes reason to Dioge-
 nes. lxx.
 Substaunce what it is. xlv.
 Sufferyng. xxxvi.
 Substances diuided into their
 accidentes. xxxij.
 Subiect or thyng containyng
 lxxv.
 Syllogismus. li.
 Synne is nothyng, how it is
 so calid. lxx. clxij.
 T.
Table of Substaunce. ix.
 Table of Qualitie. xxx.
 Table of Relatiues. xlv.
 Tyme diuersly taken xv. xvi.
 Table of repugnaunt propo-
 sitions. xxxviij.
 Termes or partes to bee ob-
 serued in makynge of an argu-
 ment. xlvij. xlvij. xlix.
 Testimonies two waies v-
 ted. c.
 Trappynge argumentes. clxx.
 Tullies will what it is, what
 men reason of God. clxxij.
 V.
Virtues, are made perf. &
 by vse. xxx.
 Vertues geuen of God who-
 ly. lxx.

God is a
 substance.
 pag. 137. b.
 pag. 21. a.

The Table.

Wise maketh matters. **cx.**
Wisdomfullnesse blessed in e- **cxlv.**
 uery kingdome. **cxlv.**
Women made. **clij.**
W.
When, containing the di- **xxvi.**
 uersitie of tymes. **xxvi.**
Where, comprehending the **xxvi.**
 description of places. **xxvi.**
Whole and partes. **lxxxix.**
Wicked men make their ende **lxb.**
 wretchedly. **lxb.**
Wicked men clyne, euen when **cxl.**
 they do iustice. **cxl.**
Wife. **cxlvj.**
Women desirous to knowe **clij.**
 thynges. **clij.**
Wordes spoken by imitation. **cxclxviij.**
Wordes double in meaning **xx.**
 should be opened. **xx.**
Wordes of one name, compre- **xxvi.**
 hend the nature of many thin- **xxvi.**
 ges. **xxvi.**
Wordes allowable in dispa- **xxvi.**
 ration. **xxvi.**
Would what it is by Aristo- **c.**
 tles mynd. **c.**
Woordes without faith, are **clij.**
 wicked. **clij.**
W.
Worded wordes. **lxxxv.**
Wungman of Cambridge. **clxvi.**
W.
W.
Zenophon. **cl.**
Zeno compared Logique **v.**
 to a fiske closed. **v.**
Z finish.

faulted & raped

In the. xxix. fol. reade these wordes. (It is an olde say-
yng. &c.) Untill ye come to the title, what a division is, imme-
diately before the title, of rules necessary. fol. xxxij.

IMPRINTED AT
London by Richard Grafton,
Printer to the Kynge
Maiestie. Anno.

M.D.L.II.

*Cum priuilegio ad impri-
mendum solum.*

